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ABSTRACT 
 
 Dominant party systems are those in which a single party or coalition rules for an 
extraordinary period of time by regularly winning contested, multiparty elections.  In this 
dissertation I consider two questions raised by these party systems.  The first is about 
origins: what causes the emergence of ruling parties with systematic advantages over all 
their competitors in the party system?  The second is about persistence: what affects the 
survival of such “advantaged” ruling parties?   
 To answer these questions, I collect data on the duration in office of ruling parties 
in all electorally-contested regimes (ECRs) in the world since 1950.  On the first 
question, I find that most long-lived ruling parties began as “first-movers” in the party 
system: they were the first parties to take office in newly-founded ECRs.  Because they 
played a central role in shaping the regime that they then competed in, long-lived ruling 
parties typically held a large partisan advantage over their competitors in the party 
system—what I term high party system asymmetry.  Thus, the typical dominant party 
system occurs at the beginning of a contested regime, when party competition is highly 
asymmetric, and gradually breaks down into a more competitive party system over time 
 On the second question, I find the type of executive regime—presidential versus 
parliamentary—has an important effect on ruling party survival.  Advantaged ruling 
parties are significantly more vulnerable to defeat in presidential than in parliamentary 
regimes, all else equal, and this effect is greatest in the most asymmetric party systems.  I 
also find that economic growth and state repression improve ruling party survival rates, 
while the size of the state does not appear to have a meaningful effect on survival. 
 xix 
 I demonstrate the utility of the theory in the case of Taiwan, where an advantaged 
ruling party, the Kuomintang or KMT, lost power only four years after the first 
presidential election.  I explain this defeat as a consequence primarily of presidentialism: 
if the KMT had adopted a parliamentary regime, it almost certainly would not have lost.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1      
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND QUESTIONS: DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS IN 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
 
 
“Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections.” 
 --Adam Przeworski (1991: 10) 
  
 1.1. Introduction 
 March 18, 2000, was a watershed moment in Taiwan’s politics.  On that day, 
Taiwanese voters went to the polls and for the first time in the island’s history peacefully 
voted an incumbent party out of office.  The presidential election results delivered an 
ignominious end to the 50-year tenure of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT): its presidential 
candidate finished a distant third in the presidential race, winning only 25% of the 
popular vote.  The victor with over 38% was the nominee of the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), the main opposition party that had grown out of the island’s democracy 
movement.  The election result jolted cross-Strait relations with the People’s Republic of 
China, capped Taiwan’s political evolution away from a highly autocratic regime, and 
emphatically established the island as one of the most open, vibrant, and contested 
democracies in all of Asia. 
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 The magnitude of Taiwan’s electoral earthquake1 was equaled by developments 
half a world away the very next day.  On March 19 voters in Senegal threw out the 
longtime ruling Socialist Party of Senegal and its president, Abdou Diouf.  That election 
outcome, like Taiwan’s, was remarkable for two reasons: it ended 40 continuous years of 
single-party rule in Senegal, and it marked one of the only times an African leader has 
ever left office quietly and peacefully after an electoral defeat. 
 Less than four months later, voters in Mexico completed the electoral trifecta.  On 
July 2, the presidential candidate of the incumbent Institutional Party of the Revolution 
(PRI) went down in a resounding defeat at the ballot box.  As in Taiwan and Senegal, the 
election results upset a long-established political order, ending seven decades of PRI rule 
and leading to the first peaceful transfer of presidential power from one party to another 
in Mexico’s history. 
  The former ruling parties in Taiwan, Senegal, and Mexico anchored three of the 
most prominent examples of dominant party systems, in which a single party or coalition 
maintains a grip on power through repeated victories in contested elections for the 
highest offices of government. Dominant party systems are a widespread political 
phenomenon, occurring in all regions of the world and in both repressive autocracies and 
liberal democracies.  They continue to be important in the contemporary world: a 
conservative estimate is that at least 40 have existed at points in time since the 1950s, 
ranging from extensively-studied examples in countries such as Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Italy, Israel, Sweden, South Africa, and India, to more obscure cases in 
Seychelles, Djibouti, Samoa, Liechtenstein, Botswana, and Namibia.   
                                                
1 The metaphor is Diamond’s (2001). 
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 This project is about the formation, evolution and breakdown of this special type 
of party system.  It is centrally concerned with accounting for the feature of dominance 
that is so striking in the Taiwan, Senegal, and Mexico cases: the ruling party’s 
extraordinary duration in elected office.  As these cases and others demonstrate, some 
ruling parties endure in power under electorally competitive conditions for extremely 
long periods of time.  Their existence raises two questions that I address in this study.  
The first is about the origins of dominant party systems: under what conditions do ruling 
parties acquire large electoral advantages over all competitors in the party system?  The 
second is about the evolution of dominant party systems: what affects the rate at which 
these ruling party advantages decline relative to competitors, leading to their eventual 
defeat? 
 To answer these questions, I develop a new theoretical framework for 
understanding dominant party systems.  The research has three parts.  In the first, I 
investigate the origins of dominant party systems.  I develop and defend a definition of 
dominant parties based on their extraordinary longevity in office, and I argue for the 
party system as the key level of analysis.  Drawing from an original dataset covering 
nearly 700 ruling parties in electorally contested regimes between 1950 and 2006, I then 
identify a set of about 40 ruling parties that qualify as “dominant” under my definition.  I 
show that most of these were the first parties to hold office in electorally-contested 
regimes—that is, dominant party systems tend to occur at the beginning of a period of 
electoral contestation and gradually evolve into something more competitive over time.  
Most dominant parties initially enjoy electoral advantages that originate in their role in 
creating the regime, giving them a “first-mover advantage” in the party system.  The 
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question “why dominance?” is really about why some first incumbents enjoy these initial 
advantages while most do not. 
 Second, I develop a theory of party system development in new electorally-
contested regimes.  The initial conditions of these systems are much like formerly 
monopolized markets that have been newly-opened to competitors: electoral competition 
is often highly asymmetric at first, favoring the incumbent party to the disadvantage of 
new opposition parties.  I discuss three mechanisms through which differences between 
the incumbent and the opposition lead to asymmetric competition: partisanship of voters, 
spatial positioning of parties, and coordination between voters and parties to convert 
votes into seats, and seats into executive control.  I then highlight how institutional 
features of the political system can work to reduce or sustain party system asymmetry 
over time.  I show that asymmetric competition matters more for ruling party duration 
under parliamentarism than presidentialism and is worse in unitary than federal regimes.  
I also demonstrate that electoral rules have countervailing effects on party system 
asymmetry, such that party system asymmetry is possible under a wide variety of 
electoral systems.   
 In the third part I test the theory.  I employ my cross-national dataset to examine 
how differences in institutions affect predicted incumbent survival rates.  I also examine 
the effects of the social cleavage structure, previous regime conditions, level of 
repression, economic performance, state share of the economy, and other possible 
explanatory variables.  In addition, I demonstrate how my theory of party system 
development accounts for starkly divergent outcomes in the case of Taiwan.  Drawing on 
a combination of fieldwork, archival research, and existing scholarship, I show that the 
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combination of a disadvantageous ethnic cleavage and a presidential system led to the 
defeat of the KMT, Taiwan’s long-time ruling party, in the 2000 election, despite its 
sizeable advantage in the party system at the advent of the democratic era there. 
 
 1.2. The Dominant Party Puzzle 
 The central puzzle of dominant party systems is the extraordinary longevity of the 
ruling party in a regime with genuine electoral competition.  Ruling party turnover does 
not occur even with generational change in the electorate, the rise of new political issues, 
or increasing dissatisfaction with the incumbent party’s performance.  For instance, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was from 1955 until 2009 the party of government for 
all but 10 months and 20 days, surviving the end of the Cold War, the bursting of 
property and stock market bubbles, and an entire decade of zero economic growth 
(Scheiner 2006: 11-13).  Similarly, since first presiding over the Federation of Malaya’s 
(later Malaysia) independence in 1957, the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO) has survived serious ethnic riots, multiple leadership succession crises, and the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; it remains the ruling party there today despite recent 
electoral setbacks (Singh 2009).  In Mexico, the PRI in its various incarnations remained 
continuously in power at the federal level for 71 years, lasting through both rapid 
economic growth and devastating recessions, bloody student protests and peasant 
uprisings, wild fluctuations in world oil prices, and a five-fold rise in population, among 
other dramatic events (Eisenstadt 2004; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007).  In Italy, every 
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prime minister from 1946 to 1981—a total of 21 leaders—was a member of the Christian 
Democratic (DC) party.2  
The persistence of these and other dominant party systems is of concern precisely 
because they combine genuine electoral competition with an absence of ruling party 
turnover.  Their continued existence calls into question the most fundamental mechanism 
through which citizens hold governments accountable—elections that incumbents lose 
(Przeworski 1991: 10).  The alternation of different parties in power is part of what we 
typically think of as the “normal” pattern of democratic politics.  Incumbent parties that 
remain in power for decades defy this expectation, raising both normative and positive 
concerns. 
On the normative side, the extraordinary longevity of ruling parties such as the 
People’s Action Party in Singapore (in power since 1959), the UMNO in Malaysia (in 
power since 1957), and the Botswana Democratic Party (in power since 1966) throws 
into doubt whether these systems are democratic.  With no examples to point to, it is not 
clear whether the incumbent party would voluntarily and peacefully cede power were it 
to lose an election.  Nor is there unequivocal proof that elections in these countries serve 
as mechanisms to keep leaders responsive and accountable to the people at whose 
pleasure they ostensibly serve.  Leaders who do not fear defeat at the ballot box have 
little to prevent them from using public office for private benefit or to force them to 
respond to shifts in public opinion and the emergence of new public concerns.  If we take 
the central features of democracy to be uncertainty at election time and the alternation of 
                                                
2 Some scholars (e.g. Boucek 1998: 112; Greene 2007: 285) date the end of DC dominance to June 1992, 
although its period of unbroken control of the prime minister’s office ended in June 1981.  In the 1980s, 
two Italian PMs were from parties other than the DC. 
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rival parties in power, then dominant party systems fall short of full democracy 
(Przeworski et al. 2000: 23-28).  As T.J. Pempel has memorably put the issue, 
“democracy predicated on the ability to ‘throw the rascals out’ is far less convincing 
when it exists only in the abstract than when it is backed up by periodic examples of 
rascals actually flying through the doors” (1990: 7).  In dominant party systems, the same 
rascals keep winning.  
The existence of long-lived ruling parties in electorally contested regimes raises 
positive questions as well.  One-party dominance is puzzling in light of current theories 
of political parties, party systems, and voting behavior, which lead us to expect contested 
elections to produce regular rotation of parties in power (Pempel 1990: 5-6). The tough 
business of governing inevitably requires incumbents to make difficult tradeoffs that 
violate campaign promises and lead to the disillusionment of groups of erstwhile 
supporters (Mueller 1970).  Thus, regardless of how popular and effective governments 
may be when they enter office, they all eventually face tough decisions that drain their 
popularity.  The near-ubiquitous economic business cycles and political scandals that 
damage ruling party standing should also erode support and predispose a growing share 
of the electorate to consider voting for alternatives (Paldam 1986; Rose and Mackie 
1983; Kramer 1971; [cited in Maeda 2009]).  Ambition theory also leads us to expect 
constant efforts by opposition politicians to seek out and raise wedge issues capable of 
breaking apart a ruling party’s electoral coalition, attracting enough votes to deliver them 
into power (Schlesinger 1966, 1991; Prewitt 1970; Carmines and Stimson 1981, 1986, 
1989; Schofield and Sened 2006; Hillygus and Shields 2008).  And when demographic 
shifts and economic growth transform the shape of the electorate, we expect new political 
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cleavages to arise that disrupt and reshape the party system, as activists and political 
elites highlight new issues and advance new policy ideas and approaches (Sundquist 
1973; Clubb et al. 1980; MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987; Inglehart and Abramson 
1994; Layman and Carmines 1997; Miller and Schofield 2003).   
In short, the regular re-election of incumbent parties appears to be a perverse 
deviation from the natural pattern of competition for elected office.  Thus, the continued 
electoral success of the LDP during economic slumps in the 1970s and 1990s has 
occasioned much head-scratching and been the subject of an extensive body of 
scholarship (e.g. Cox 1996; Christensen 2000; Johnson 2000; Eisenstadt 2004; Scheiner 
2006; McElwain 2008).  So, too, has the consistent leading role of the DC in Italian 
governments, through scandal, economic and international crises, and frequent cabinet 
reshufflings, from 1946 until its implosion in 1992, appeared to many political scientists 
as an “uncommon” phenomenon requiring additional explanation (Arian and Barnes 
1974; Levite and Tarrow 1983; Pempel 1990). 
Nor is the dominant party puzzle limited to those regimes which clearly meet all 
the procedural requirements of democracy: the defeat of ruling parties which began in 
highly authoritarian regimes such as those in Mexico and Taiwan has attracted significant 
scholarly interest precisely because they lasted so much longer than most autocracies 
(e.g. Diamond 2001; Solinger 2001; Eisenstadt 2004; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007). The 
emergence since the end of the Cold War of “competitive” or “electoral” authoritarianism 
as a distinct, perhaps modal type of authoritarian regime also raises the question of why, 
rather than being “stalled” or “prolonged” transitions to democracy, many such regimes 
have endured in more authoritarian form despite a pattern of contested elections 
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(Carothers 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Schedler 2002, 2006; Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007; Teorell and Hadenius 2008; Slater 2010; cf. Howard and Roessler 2006).   
 Thus, in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, dominant party systems 
challenge our understanding of how politics should work: contrary to expectations, 
multiparty elections do not produce rotation in power in these cases. 
 
 1.3. Autocracies, Democracies, or Both?: Where Dominant Parties Occur 
 In this study I use the term dominant party to refer to a ruling party or coalition 
that wields continuous control over the national executive for an extraordinary period of 
time by regularly winning contested elections. This phenomenon has been called many 
names, including dominant party regime (Greene 2007) or dominant party system 
(Friedman and Wong 2008), hegemonic party regime (Magaloni 2006; Aldrich et al. 
n.d.), one-party or one-party-dominant regime (Solinger 2001; Gonzalez 2007) or system 
(Johnson 2000; Scheiner 2006), single-party regime (Geddes 1999, Smith 2005), and 
predominant party system (Sartori 1976, Ware 1996).  Despite the varied terminology, all 
of these authors refer to the same general political phenomenon: the occurrence of long-
lived ruling parties in regimes with contested elections. 
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 The Dominant Party: An Ambiguous Concept 
 Dominant parties have attracted interest in political science for at least sixty 
years.3  As the literature has developed, however, the terms dominance, dominant party, 
dominant party system, and dominant party regime have taken on a variety of divergent 
and inconsistent meanings.  Many scholars in recent years have employed the terms 
casually and without definition, as if the meaning were self-evident (e.g. Carty 2006; 
Friedman and Wong 2008; Anderson 2009).  But a review of recent work on “dominant 
parties” indicates much disagreement about what, exactly, makes a party “dominant.”  In 
particular, the term is used to describe two rather distinct sets of cases which differ based 
on whether or not a regime is democratic.  “Dominance” in its earlier usage tended to 
refer exclusively to parties in systems that by and large met the procedural requirements 
of democracy, yet featured a single leading party in power indefinitely.  Thus Duverger 
(1954 [1959]), in writing that “a party is dominant when it holds the majority over a long 
period of development,” tacitly limited the statement to regimes that allowed open 
political contestation (307-8).  Arian and Barnes (1974) wrote that the dominant party 
system “permits more than one party to compete,” so “it is certainly democratic in the 
procedural sense.  And since…it mobilized the modal citizens of a society, it can be said 
to be substantively democratic as well” (593).  Pempel’s landmark volume on the subject 
                                                
3 The question of what allows single party governments to endure goes back at least to V.O. Key’s 
Southern Politics in State and Nation, a study of the mostly one-party politics of states in the US south 
(Key 1949).  The dominant party system also receives influential if brief mentions in classic works 
including Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties (1954), Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968), Jean Blondel’s Comparing Political Systems (1972) and Giovanni Sartori’s Parties and 
Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (1976). Other prominent early work on the dominant party 
concept includes Coleman (1960), McDonald (1971), Arian and Barnes (1974), Levite and Tarrow (1983), 
and Pempel (1990). 
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is similarly limited to “the group of industrialized democracies,” which have “free 
electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for civil liberties, and 
the right of free political association” (1990: 1). 
 However, the term has also been commonly applied to ruling parties in 
authoritarian regimes that allow multi-party elections but restrict some elements of 
political contestation—the so-called “competitive authoritarian” or “hybrid” regimes 
(Levitsky and Way 2002; Karl 1995; Diamond 2002).  One of the most influential uses of 
the term in this way is Giovanni Sartori’s (1976).  He calls long-lived ruling parties in 
industrialized democracies “predominant parties,” reserving the terms “hegemonic party” 
and “single party” for those systems in which only one party is de facto (hegemonic) or 
de jure (single) able to contest elections and hold power, and leaving the term “dominant 
party” to refer, generally and vaguely, to “whatever major party outdistances the other 
parties in whichever type of party system” (230).   For better or worse, most recent 
scholarship has not adopted Sartori’s term of “predominant” to distinguish democratic 
regimes from their more authoritarian counterparts and continues to use the “dominant 
party” moniker to refer to long-lived ruling parties in both highly repressive and liberal 
regimes (e.g. Bogaards 2004; Ishiyama and Quinn 2006; Friedman and Wong 2008; 
Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter 2010a, b).  Adding to the confusion, while some 
scholars have reserved the terms “single-party” and “one-party” for partisan regimes 
which ban multi-party contestation (Huntington 1968: 419; Ware 1996: 246), others have 
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called these parties “dominant” instead (Friedman and Wong 2008; Slater and Smith 
2010; Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter 2010a, b).4 
To sum up, the concept of the “dominant party” as used in contemporary 
scholarship in political science contains at least two ambiguities.  The first is about the 
kinds of regimes in which dominant parties occur: existing research covers a wide variety 
of regime types with starkly different means of winning power and enforcing authority, 
from long-established democracies such as Britain under the Conservative Party to 
unabashed autocracies such as China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  And 
among autocratic regimes, “dominant party” has described ruling parties in both single-
party regimes which ban opposition contestation (e.g. contemporary China) and those in 
which oppositions regularly contest but never win (e.g. Mexico before 2000).  The 
second is about the level of analysis: “dominant” has been used to describe a type of 
regime, a type of party system, and a type of party. 
 
 Dominance as a Party System Phenomenon 
The absence of a common definition of dominance is problematic in a couple of 
ways.  For one, it has hindered the development of general theories, as scholars 
purporting to study the same phenomenon have focused on very different sets of cases. A 
good illustration is the vast disparities between the countries included in two edited 
volumes on dominant party systems, The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and 
                                                
4 The converse is also true: in much writing on the subject, “single-party” or “one-party” regimes in 
practice include those in which opposition parties are allowed to form and run their own candidates for 
elected office (Coleman 1960: 295-302; McDonald 1971: 220; Blondel 1972: 99-100; Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995: 1; Schedler 1998: 99; Geddes 1999: 121; Diamond 2002: 32; Smith 2005: 424; Magaloni 
2006: 36-37).    
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Democracy (edited by Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simpkins [1999]) and Political 
Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose (edited by Edward Friedman 
and Joseph Wong [2008]).  For Giliomee and Simpkins, dominant parties can only occur 
“within a framework in which at least some democratic rules or practices have to be 
observed” (xv).  Their analysis consequently is focused on “four of the five most 
prominent dominant parties in the past four decades” in the industrializing world: South 
Africa, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Mexico.5  Friedman and Wong, by contrast, explicitly 
include ruling parties in regimes in which multi-party contestation is banned, calling 
them “a kind of dominant party system” (1).  This broader conception leads them to 
discuss a very different group of parties, including the communist parties of eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the CCP in China, and the conservative parties in 
South Korea, which for much of their tenure in power were the civilian face of a military 
regime (cf. Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter 2010a, b; Slater and Smith 2010). 
In addition to the problems it poses for comparison, the ambiguous meaning of 
“dominance” in political science has also led to very different ideas of what is puzzling 
about long-time ruling parties.  Scholars who adopt a narrower definition of dominant 
parties are likely to explain away their existence in more autocratic settings by simply 
noting that elections there are neither free nor fair.  It is hardly surprising, in this view, 
that the same party wins elections every time when it is the only party allowed to 
compete.  The mystery of permanent one-party rule is limited to a single regime type: 
those in which incumbents regularly win despite meeting procedural requirements of 
democracy, including open competition for elected office, easy access to information, 
                                                
5 The fifth in their view is India under the Congress Party. 
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respect for civil liberties, and freedom of political association (Pempel 1990: 5).  In this 
view, the party system, rather than the regime, is the key level of analysis. 
By contrast, scholars who adopt a broader definition of dominance tend to view 
its occurrence in light of questions about authoritarian breakdown and democratization, 
and therefore to focus on the regime level.  This approach sees variation in incumbent 
leadership duration in authoritarian regimes as no less interesting or surprising than that 
in democratic ones.  Friedman and Wong, for example, argue that authoritarian single-
party states are no less “vulnerable to losing their hold on power, even if they are not 
subjected to regular elections,” and that “every party eventually suffers some political 
crisis during which its defeat appears imminent, be it peacefully or violently” (2008: 1).  
The motivating question for them is how dominant parties adapt to such crises, and what 
happens to the political systems they inhabit—questions not confined to ruling parties in 
democracies.  Likewise, Geddes’s (1999) influential argument about authoritarian 
breakdown is motivated by the observation that single-party autocracies appear to be 
systematically more durable than personalist or military regimes—a fact that has no 
apparent relationship to how liberal the regime is.  Nor can the huge variation in ruling 
party tenure that Smith (2005) finds in single-party autocracies be attributed to the 
restrictions they place on electoral contestation—some extremely durable ruling parties 
such as the PRI in Mexico have held regular, contested elections for decades, while 
others such as the CCP in China have done nothing of the sort.  Similarly, Brownlee 
(2009) finds no systematic difference in the durability of exclusionary “single-party” 
regimes versus electoral “hegemonic party” ones.  
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Thus, viewed as a whole, studies of dominant parties tend to fall into one of two 
research traditions that pursue distinct sets of research questions at different levels of 
analysis.  The first tradition is focused on the party system and examines what drives the 
emergence and persistence of long-lived ruling parties in democracies: if electoral 
competition is reasonably free and fair, why does the same party always win?  The 
second tradition is aimed instead at the regime level and seeks to account for the 
durability of authoritarian regimes: why do autocrats supported by strong ruling parties 
appear to last longer than others, under what conditions do single-party regimes break 
down, and what are the consequences for the political system?   
The questions I address in this study straddle these two research traditions.  Like 
the first, my main focus is on the party system: I aim here to account for the longevity of 
ruling parties rather than the stability of the regimes in which they reside.  But like the 
second, I am interested in the fates of ruling parties in autocracies as well as democracies: 
all ruling parties that face a risk, however slight, of losing power as the result of an 
election.  
I reserve the term “regime” to describe a state’s system of de facto rules and 
resource allocations through which political actors are selected and exercise authority.  In 
my usage, regimes are at a higher level of analysis than party systems: dominant parties, 
for instance, can occur only in regimes that hold contested, multi-party elections.  The 
term “dominant party regime” blurs this crucial distinction between party system and 
regime, so I avoid it altogether.6  The central phenomenon of interest in this study is the 
combination of contested, multi-party elections with the continuous and extraordinary 
                                                
6 I avoid using “hegemonic party regime” as well for the same reason. 
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duration in office of a single party or coalition, which I refer to as a dominant party 
system. As Figure 1.1 shows, the dominant party itself is in a subordinate position in this 
conceptual schema: when they occur, dominant parties are one of several parties that 
make up one type of party system that may occur in a given regime. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1.  THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS: REGIME, PARTY SYSTEM, AND PARTY 
 
As I employ the term, dominant parties can occur in two types of regimes: 
democracies and electoral autocracies.  Thus, I intentionally include in the study ruling 
parties in both liberal and illiberal regimes, or in Sartori’s terms, dominant parties of both 
the “predominant” and “hegemonic” kind.  Dominant parties as I define them do not 
occur in all types of autocracies, however.  Autocracies in which all parties save the 
incumbent’s are banned from contesting elections, as in China, do not have dominant 
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party systems by my definition, but rather single party systems.7  Likewise, autocracies in 
which winning elections is not the main path to power, as in Iran or Myanmar, do not 
have dominant party systems, either; indeed, they often have no coherent party system at 
all.  In this study, then, the key distinction among regime types is not the conventional 
one between democracies and non-democracies, but instead between electoral and non-
electoral regimes—one broadly similar to the boundary that Levitsky and Way (2002; 
2010) and Schedler (2002), among others, have attempted to draw to differentiate 
“competitive autocracies” from closed and unstable autocracies.   
I elaborate on these distinctions between types of autocracy in more detail in the 
next chapter, where I describe how my data on ruling party duration were collected.  For 
the moment, suffice it to say that there are at least two good reasons to combine both 
authoritarian and democratic regimes in a study of dominant parties.  First, the difference 
between democratic and non-democratic dominant party systems is in practice difficult to 
draw in some cases, especially over the entire life of the ruling party.  Dominant party 
systems exist uneasily within democracies, as book titles such as “The Awkward 
Embrace” and “Uncommon Democracies” suggest.  The presence of a long-ruling 
incumbent raises hard questions about the regime’s democratic credentials even in 
countries that have few restrictions on civil liberties or opposition party campaign 
activities.  For instance, in a highly influential study, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi (2000: 23-28) take turnover in government because of electoral defeat as the 
critical indicator of democracy, and are thus bedeviled by how to code dominant party 
                                                
7 My definition of dominance is therefore narrower than that of Slater and Smith (2010) and Reuter (2010a, 
b), who explicitly call closed, one-party states that ban all opposition parties “dominant.” 
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systems, whose central feature is the absence of turnover.  As they themselves note, this 
procedural definition of democracy makes it observationally impossible to distinguish 
between ruling parties that would leave office if defeated and those that would not, if 
neither has ever actually lost an election.   
To take a concrete example, the difference between the ruling party in Botswana 
and that in Zimbabwe is easier to describe as a matter of degree rather than of kind.  Both 
have held power continuously since independence, and both have regularly won 
contested elections.  But one is hard-pressed to predict whether the Botswana Democratic 
Party would respond in the same way that Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF did when threatened 
with electoral defeat—that is, through brutal violence against opposition supporters and 
outright fraud at the ballot box—because it has never faced such an immediate electoral 
threat to its hold on power (cf. Pzeworski et al. 2000: 23-28).  Nor can one say with much 
confidence when a formerly autocratic regime with a long-time ruling party becomes 
“democratic” if the incumbent has never lost: in both Taiwan and Mexico, for instance, a 
long period of gradual political liberalization preceded ruling party defeat, but it is hard 
to pinpoint exactly when an opposition victory moved from unthinkable to possible.  
These examples suggest that the best practice at the outset may be to treat all 
dominant parties as instances of the same phenomenon, whether they occur in 
democracies or autocracies (cf. Magaloni 2006: 32-42; Greene 2007: 13-17).  This is not 
to say that the regimes in which dominant parties exist do not vary in the degree to which 
they live up to democratic procedural norms: they do, and these differences are clearly 
important.  Nevertheless, the approach I adopt in this project is to view variation in 
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restrictions on the opposition as a continuum, rather than as a dichotomy, and to treat this 
variation itself as something to be measured empirically rather than assumed a priori.8 
The second reason to examine ruling party duration in both democracies and 
autocracies is that there are good reasons to believe some of the same causes of 
dominance should be present in both liberal and illiberal regimes.  For instance, the ruling 
party’s origins and its role in the establishment of the regime appear to differ more within 
democracies than between authoritarian and democratic regimes.  As I show in Chapter 2, 
the fact that a ruling party founded the regime has important implications for subsequent 
electoral competition.  Focusing exclusively on why incumbents in authoritarian regimes 
bother to engage in meaningful electoral competition without considering how that 
competition is likely to play out, or on why dominant parties remain in power in liberal 
regimes without considering how they came to dominate, can obscure an important set of 
processes that buttress or undercut ruling parties’ grip on power.  
 To recap: the central object of interest in this study is the party system.  Both the 
type of regime in which the party system occurs and the characteristics of the dominant 
party, while important as possible explanatory factors, are of secondary interest as 
outcomes to be explained.  I am interested in accounting for the origins and duration of a 
specific kind of party system, the dominant party system, which can occur in two 
different kinds of regimes: electoral autocracies and democracies.  
                                                
8 In other words, I will draw a difference of kind between regimes in which electoral outcomes decisively 
determine who holds power and regimes in which they do not, but drawing only a difference of degree 
between democracies and the rest of the regimes in this class.  To incorporate all cases in which dominant 
party systems could possibly occur, I am in effect relaxing the conventional “hard” distinction between 
democracies and all other regime types and shifting it outward so that electoral autocracies are included as 
well. 
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 In the next section, I take a closer look at a second conceptual question: what 
exactly makes a party “dominant”? 
 
 1.4. What is a Dominant Party System?: A Review of the Literature  
 As I showed in the previous section, the term “dominance” has quite an 
ambiguous meaning in political science: it is used to refer to parties, party systems, and 
regimes, to both single-party and multi-party autocracies, and even to ruling parties in 
democracies.  Even in reference to the much more clearly bounded subject of a party 
system, however, there is still no universally accepted definition of what a “dominant 
party system” is.  In practice, this term is used to describe a party system meeting any one 
or more of six distinct criteria: 
 
 1.  Dominance through Numbers of Seats or Votes   
 Dominance is frequently construed as a single party winning a large percentage of 
seats and/or votes, although the threshold used to define dominance varies widely among 
scholars who include this criterion.  At the low end, Duverger (1959 [1954]: 308) and 
Pempel (1990: 3) require only that a party win a plurality of seats. Others set the bar a 
little higher: a party is dominant if it “wins enough parliamentary seats to control 
government on its own”—that is, a majority (Ware 1996: 159; see also Blondel 1972: 99-
103; Sartori 1976: 195; Reuter 2010a: 35).  On the other end of the spectrum, some 
scholars imply that a party is dominant only if it controls a supermajority of the seats: 60 
percent (McDonald 1971: 220; Van de Walle and Butler 1999: 25 fn. 34), 70 percent 
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(Coleman 1960: 295), or as high as the 75 percent threshold used by the Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer 2007).  At the high end, as noted, some 
scholars even refer to ruling parties which ban opposition party contestation, and 
therefore control 100 percent of the seats, as being “dominant” (e.g. Ishiyama and Quinn 
2006; Friedman 2008).   
 The key feature of dominance conceived in this way is the ruling party’s virtually 
unchecked authority.  Dominant parties control enough seats to unilaterally form a 
government, to pass legislation, to design and implement new policies, and to amend the 
constitution.9  In parliamentary regimes, dominant parties are those that enjoy single-
party majorities, perhaps supermajorities.  In presidential regimes, parties are dominant if 
they control both the presidency and majorities or supermajorities in the legislature.  This 
criterion is also notable for making dominance a continuous measure: parties and party 
systems can be ordered according to “how dominant,” from controlling all the seats at the 
high end to controlling just a plurality at the low end of the scale (e.g. Boucek 1998).   
 
 2.  Dominance through Duration in Power 
 The most common addition or alternative to the percentage of seats is the duration 
of the ruling party or coalition in power.  The period of time used to identify parties that 
are not merely successful incumbents but “dominant” ones has varied: anywhere from as 
little as a single year (Reuter 2010a) to winning two (Przeworski et al. 2000: 27) or three 
(Sartori 1976: 199; Bogaards 2004: 175) consecutive elections, to 10 years (O’Leary 
                                                
9 Indeed, Magaloni (2006) makes a ruling party’s ability to unilaterally amend the constitution the crucial 
distinction between “hegemonic parties” and those that are merely “predominant” (35-36). 
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1994: 4), 15-20 years (Marshall and Jaggers 2009: 59, 80), 20 years (Blondel 1972: 99-
103; Greene 2007: 12), or 30-50 years (Cox 1997: 238), to the vague “permanent or 
semi-permanent governance” (Pempel 1990: 15) or facing no “imminent threat of 
replacement” (Slater and Smith 2010: 5).  Although the thresholds may differ, the central 
idea is nevertheless the same: in “normal” party systems, all incumbents sooner or later 
lose an election.  At some point, a party’s ability to maintain unbroken control of 
government reflects something more systemic than just a lucky run of favorable electoral 
conditions or savvy leadership (cf. O’Leary 1994: 5; McGann 1999: 108-9).  Exactly 
where that point occurs, however, has been in the eye of the beholder. 
 This conception of dominance contains a second ambiguity as well: some scholars 
take “in power” to mean complete control of the government and rule out coalitions in 
which one party is always in the lead (Ware 1996: 159) or divided presidential systems in 
which one party always controls the presidency but not necessarily the legislature (Sartori 
1976: 195; Greene 2007: 12; Reuter 2010a: 37); others explicitly include parties in 
coalition governments and make these the main focus of their analysis (Arian and Barnes 
1974; Levite and Tarrow 1983; Pempel 1990).   
 
 3.  Dominance through Bargaining Position   
 A third distinct criterion appears in the work on government coalition formation, 
where “dominant party” commonly refers to the party that can form at least one 
alternative winning coalition to the present one (Van Deeman 1989; Van Roozendaal 
1992, 1997; Abedi and Schneider 2006).  Dominant parties are in a superior bargaining 
position either because of their spatial location or their size.  In this criterion, dominant 
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parties do not have to control a majority of the seats to obtain cabinet positions—they 
need only be indispensable to the formation of any governing coalition (Boucek 1998: 
107).  Nor do they have to be the same party in each election cycle, although in practice a 
party that is in a pivotal, centrist position after one election is likely to repeat in that 
position in the future (Riker 1976: 104-5). 
 
 4.  Dominance through Agenda-Setting Power   
 A related criterion is that dominance is indicated by a single party’s consistent 
control of the public policy agenda, either because of its centrist position in a coalition or 
because of its control of the formal agenda-setting institutions of the regime.  As Pempel 
describes it, “[b]ecause of its long-standing presence at the core of government, the 
dominant party carries out what many would call a historical project, a series of 
interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the 
national political agenda” (4).  In this view, a distinguishing feature of dominant party 
systems is the ruling party’s regular and outsized influence in the policy-making process 
and its central role in the development and execution of a country’s policies (cf. O’Leary 
1994: 4).   
 
 5.  Dominance through Party Identification with or Control of the State    
 A fifth distinct usage refers explicitly to parties that have strong ties to the state 
itself, often forged through revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) struggle for 
independence or equality (Tucker 1961; Arian and Barnes 1974; Pempel 1990; Slater and 
Smith 2010).  Duverger (1959 [1954]) argued that in order to be dominant a party had to 
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be “identified with an epoch, when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style…coincide with 
those of the epoch” (308). Likewise, Giliomee and Simpkins (1999) find that all of their 
cases of one-party dominance came “out of a background of revolution…or counter-
revolution…decolonization, and liberation” (2).  The distinction between the party and 
government is blurred, and the party justifies its permanent control of the state by 
reference to its historical legacy and mission.  The examples are many: the Indian 
National Congress Party in India, Mapai/Labor in Israel, PRI in Mexico, ANC in South 
Africa, KMT in Taiwan, KANU in Kenya, FRELIMO in Mozambique, SWAPO in 
Namibia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, and CCP in China, among others.   
 Also falling under this criterion are conceptions of the dominant party as a 
coordination device for state elites.  In this view, dominant parties are those that create 
and maintain a stable regime by using “privileged access to state resources or extra-
constitutional means” to determine policy outcomes and distribute patronage (Reuter 
2010a: 28; cf. Magaloni 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2008; Slater and Smith 2010; Levitsky 
and Way 2010).  Scholars who focus on this criterion tend to be concerned with 
accounting for variation in the incumbent’s ability to institutionalize how offices and 
state resources are shared among ruling elites, in the ruling party’s ability to co-opt or 
“delegitimize” potential competitors for power, and in the enduring weakness of 
opposition parties and other organizations (e.g. Pempel 1975; Levite and Tarrow 1983; 
Slater 2010). 
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 6.  Dominance through a Divided Opposition 
 Finally, a number of scholars include the criterion that the opposition be divided 
among multiple parties, typically distributed across the ideological spectrum and to either 
side of the incumbent party.  Like some of the others, this criterion is often phrased in 
ways that are transparently tailored to fit the country the researcher is focused on: for 
instance, in Canada, that the “main opposition party” wins less than 33% of the vote 
(Pinard 1967: 359 fn. 6) or that there are at least three parties and one “regularly” 
receives at least 40% of the vote (Jackson and Jackson 2009: 385).  But considered from 
a comparative perspective, this criterion is essentially about the relative sizes and 
distributions of parties in the party system, and therefore has much in common with the 
first criterion, dominance through numbers.  The dominant party wins a plurality of seats 
by a “large margin” over the next closest party—anywhere from 10 percent more to twice 
as much or more—and none of the multiple opposition parties has much prospect of 
becoming the largest party any time soon (Blondel 1972: 103; Sartori 1976: 193-4; Ware 
1996: 159; Anckar 1997: 250; cf. Abedi and Schneider 2006: 3-4). 
 
 Conclusion 
 There are, then, at minimum six separate criteria that have been used to 
characterize a dominant party system, although to my knowledge no one has included all 
six in a single definition.  More typically, scholars have in mind only two or three of 
these criteria—but they differ on which ones indicate dominance.   
 The lack of a consistent definition of “dominance” means that different studies 
have produced remarkably disparate candidates for dominant parties.  For instance, as I 
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noted earlier, it is hard to think of two countries whose political institutions and traditions 
are more different than Britain and China, yet both have been said to have “dominant 
party systems” in separate studies in the last few years (for instance, compare Margetts 
and Smyth [1994] and Boucek [1998] to Friedman [2008]).  Indeed, one wonders about 
the analytical utility of a term used to describe the party system in both one of the world’s 
oldest democracies and its most prominent single-party autocracy.  If the concept is to be 
at all useful, then, it is imperative that a study of dominant party systems be precise, 
consistent, and transparent in specifying the measures used to identify cases. 
 
 1.5. Duration in Power: The Key Outcome of Interest 
 In this study, my response to this panoply of competing definitions has been to 
focus on what appears to be the central unexplained feature of dominant party systems: 
the extraordinary longevity of the incumbent.  That is, of the six criteria listed above, 
only the second—duration in power—is uniquely puzzling given our current 
understanding of party organizations, party systems, and electoral competition.  In 
isolation, none of the others focuses on a feature so at odds with the conventional wisdom 
that competitive elections should eventually result in the removal of incumbents from 
office. 
 Other criteria of dominance either describe features of the party system that are 
already well-understood or that appear less central to the conceptual puzzle.  For 
instance, the questions surrounding “dominance through numbers” have actually received 
sustained attention from a broad array of comparative researchers since at least Duverger 
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(1959 [1954]; see also Rae 1967; Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Grofman and Lijphart 
1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994, 1999; Cox 1997; Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2001).  Thanks to this work, we now have a good understanding of how party 
systems are shaped by the electoral rules and social structure of different countries, so 
that there is nothing especially mysterious at this point about a party controlling a 
legislative supermajority in a place like Britain. We know, for example, that the 
percentage of the seats a given party wins is typically a function of three things: the 
number of seats up for election in each district, each party’s percentage of the vote, and 
the more or less mechanical conversion of one into the other.  Granted, the process 
through which votes are translated into seats can be complicated in many ways by a wide 
range of district magnitudes and the peculiarities of how they are drawn, electoral 
thresholds, different PR formulas, multiple electoral tiers, and other rules; and there 
remains an active research program in this area (e.g. Golder 2005; Ferrara and Herron 
2005; Scheiner 2008; Umeda 2011).  But overall, this literature provides a clear 
consensus that majoritarian electoral systems in which the vote-to-seat conversion tends 
to be highly disproportional, such as plurality rule in single-member districts, are the 
most likely to produce outsized majorities for a single party (Blais 2008).  In short, by 
itself, there is nothing particularly odd about a party winning a large legislative majority 
in majoritarian systems.  It is only when the same party wins such majorities, election 
after election, that we have a puzzle.  
On a more critical note, unless it is combined with a measure of duration, the 
“dominance through numbers” criterion can be a misleading way to identify party 
systems in which one party always wins.  As a practical illustration of this point, consider 
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a typical election outcome in Britain, which several scholars said had a dominant party 
system from 1979-1997 under the Conservatives (Margetts and Smyth 1994; O’Leary 
1994; Boucek 1998) and after 1997 under Labour (Bogaards and Boucek 2010: 2).  The 
fact that, for instance, Britain’s Labour Party won 63% of the seats (418 out of 659) in 
the 1997 House of Commons election despite winning only 43% of the popular vote is 
not particularly puzzling: it is a straightforward consequence of the use of plurality rule in 
single-member districts, many three-way races, and a surge in support for Labour.  It 
does not make much sense in my view to call the party system in Britain a dominant 
party system after 1997, as a strict numbers criterion requires, when the “dominant” 
Labour Party had not managed to win power once in the previous four elections.   
An even more extreme example is in Jamaica, another country employing first-
past-the-post rules to elect its parliament.  In 1976, the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) won 
only 13 out of 60 seats (22%) with 41% of the vote, while the People’s National Party 
(PNP) won 47 seats (78%) with 57% of the vote.  Four years later, the vote and seat 
shares were nearly reversed: the JLP won 51 seats with 59% of the vote, while the PNP 
won nine seats with 41%.  A measure of dominance based only on seat share would 
indicate dominance by the JLP in one term, followed by dominance by the PNP in the 
next—yet there is still regular party alternation in power.  The fact that in this instance 
one “dominant” party willing stepped down after losing to the soon-to-be “dominant” 
opposition party, and that such alternation has occurred regularly throughout Jamaican 
electoral history, undercuts much of the rationale for calling this party system “dominant” 
at all (cf. Przeworski et al. 2000: 24).   
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 For two reasons, then, I focus in this study on duration of control of the executive 
rather than seat or vote share as the key outcome of interest.  First, there is a huge 
literature on the determinants of seat share in a wide array of political systems, and it has 
clearly advanced our understanding of how some parties win outsized majorities in a 
given election.  By contrast, the most striking feature of dominant parties—their long 
tenure in power—has been much less studied in the broader literature on party systems.  
Second, even in the work on dominant party systems, there is a common mismatch 
between the conceptualization of a dominant party as one that “rules for a long time” and 
its operationalization as one that “controls most of the seats” (e.g. Sartori 1976; Anckar 
1997; Boucek 1998; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Bogaards 2004; Abedi and Schneider 
2006; Caulier and Dumont 2010).  Measuring duration explicitly and making it the focus 
of analysis will go a long way toward addressing this problem. 
 For similar reasons, I do not include measures of dominance that focus on a 
party’s bargaining position in coalition formation or on a party’s ability to set the policy 
agenda.  By itself, the fact that one party is essential to any coalition is not particularly 
distinctive or puzzling—such parties exist in many party systems and are simply a normal 
part of coalition politics (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Laver 
1998).  It is only when we observe the same party occupying the essential bargaining 
position term after term that something unusual appears to be going on.  Likewise, there 
has been a great of research in recent years on variation across regimes in agenda-setting 
powers (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Carey and Shugart 1998; Tsebelis 2002; Cox and 
McCubbins 2005).  In both presidential and parliamentary regimes, executives differ a 
great deal in their power to introduce legislation they favor and exclude legislation they 
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do not, to alter or veto bills sent to them, to offer amendments or make laws by decree, 
and so forth.  The question of how one party enjoys outsized agenda-setting authority is 
not much of a mystery unless the same party consistently wields that authority—only 
then do we have a puzzle. 
 Conversely, the requirement that dominant parties be closely identified with the 
state and its founding is too limiting if what we really care about is longevity in elected 
office.  For one, there are a number of counterexamples of parties that had no grand 
“historical mission” and no role in the country’s founding or “period of crisis” but 
nevertheless controlled the institutions of government for decades.  It is a stretch, for 
instance, to claim that long-lived ruling parties in Canada (Liberals, 1935-1957), Sweden 
(Social Democrats, 1936-76), Australia (Liberal-Country Party coalition, 1949-1972) and 
Luxembourg (Christian Socialists, 1979-present) were in power so long because of their 
close identification with the state.  To the extent this criterion is relevant, it is mostly 
because many dominant parties began as nationalist movements that led the country to 
independence and left them in a leading position despite the presence of opposition 
parties and contested elections—a kind of “first-mover advantage” that should eventually 
fade away as new competitors enter the political market (cf. Tucker 1961; Levite and 
Tarrow 1983).  Moreover, the “state party” criterion appears to conflate descriptive 
measures with causal variables: are “strong state-party linkages” the explanandum or the 
explanation?  Some authors make arguments that are in effect tautological, as for instance 
when Pempel defines dominant parties as long-lived ruling parties closely identified with 
the state, and then explains that dominant parties last so long in power—because of their 
tight control over the state! (1990: 3-4, 341-344). 
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 The final criterion, divided opposition, is neither necessary nor sufficient for long-
term one-party rule.  Empirically, it is true that most long-lived ruling parties do compete 
against more than one opposition party.  But this need not be the case.  In Botswana, for 
instance, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party has remained continuously in power 
since independence, and over most of that period only a single opposition party, the 
Botswana National Front, has won seats in the parliament.  The opposition in parliament 
was similarly united in a single party during long periods of one-party rule in Trinidad 
and Tobago (PNM, 1962-1986) and Australia (Liberals, 1949-1972).  At the other 
extreme, a divided opposition is certainly not sufficient for dominance, either—most 
ruling parties that face multiple opposition parties nevertheless do not endure in power 
for decades.  And finally, once again, opposition divisions are not particularly puzzling 
without also considering duration.  It is not odd for the political parties that lose an 
election and are shut out of power to be severely divided.  What is odd is if for decades 
the same political parties remain divided and in opposition, and the same ruling party 
benefits.   
 In conclusion, the definition of dominance that I employ in this study is a “thin” 
one—it is operationalized simply as time in control of the executive. This approach 
admittedly simplifies what is a rich and multi-dimensional concept into a single measure, 
time in power, and captures only part of what is interesting about dominant party 
systems.  However, as I have argued at length above, the term “dominant party” is itself 
so fluid a concept as to raise fundamentally different questions for different researchers—
from why ruling parties are created (Geddes 2007), to why some succeed in 
institutionalizing spoils sharing (Reuter 2010a) and become especially durable (Magaloni 
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2006; Slater and Smith 2010), to why some parties win supermajorities in a given 
election (Boucek 2001), to why opposition parties in such systems are extremist (Greene 
2007).  Given this, some kind of simplification is necessary in any comparative study of 
dominance—one simply cannot expect to account for every possible thing that sets 
dominant party systems apart.  Operationalizing dominance as time in power allows me 
to focus on a feature of ruling parties that has not been systematically explored in the 
literature, and one that is suitable for quantitative analysis. 
 
 1.6. The Dominant Party System: A Working Definition 
 The level of analysis in this study is the party system.  I define a dominant party 
system as follows: 
 
Dominant party systems are those in which a single party or coalition controls the 
national executive for an extraordinarily long period of time by regularly winning 
contested elections.  
 
As noted earlier, I explicitly include ruling parties in both liberal and illiberal regimes—
my definition is not limited to contexts with a high degree of political freedom or level of 
development (cf. Pempel 1990; Gilomee and Simpkins 1999; Magaloni 2006).  The 
following four features distinguish dominant party systems from other party systems.   
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 First, there must be a political party that both selects or endorses the regime 
leader and exists independently of him.10  It makes little sense to speak of a dominant 
party system when no ruling party exists.  Thus, the leader’s authority must depend to a 
significant degree on the support of other key figures within the party; the party may be 
firmly under his control, but it serves as an autonomous organization independent from 
the formal institutions of state.  Similarly, the party continues to exist as a functioning 
organization if the leader dies, retires, or is otherwise deposed.   
 Second, the incumbent party’s control over the offices of state is due in large part 
to repeated victories in contested elections.  Coercive or underhanded tactics, of course, 
are often used to supplement the incumbent party’s legal electoral activities and to 
improve its chances of winning.  But at a minimum, the regime’s leadership is elected 
rather than appointed, and it is the officials who hold elected office rather than military, 
religious, or dynastic figures who wield ultimate power.  The level of coercion also 
cannot be so great as to eliminate even the appearance of a choice for voters.  Thus, 
elections are usually held at regularly scheduled intervals or are called in accordance with 
legal requirements, opposition parties and candidates are not banned, multiple-candidate 
contestation is allowed and does occur, and opposition candidates do win some races—
but the incumbent party nevertheless routinely wins either majorities or enough seats to 
remain the leading party in government.   
 Third, the incumbent party wields national executive authority.  At a minimum, a 
member of the dominant party always occupies the prime minister’s office in 
                                                
10 I use the masculine pronoun because dominant party leaders are almost always male—out of several 
dozen parties and many more leaders, the only exceptions I have come across are Indira Gandhi, who led 
the Congress Party in India beginning in 1967, and Golda Meir, who led the Israeli Labor Party in the early 
1970s. 
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parliamentary regimes and the presidency in presidential ones.  These offices give their 
occupants principal authority over the most powerful institutions of the state, including 
the military, the security services, and much if not all of the national bureaucracy.  A 
party cannot be dominant if it does not control these institutions.  Nor is it necessarily 
checked if it does not control a legislative majority; in parliamentary regimes, the 
executive may be controlled by the largest party in a coalition, while in presidential 
regimes, the executive may still wield broad authority without a majority in Congress.  
For a party’s tenure in power to end, it must relinquish executive and not just legislative 
control. 
 Finally, the incumbent party rules for an extraordinary period of time.  For 
present, descriptive purposes, I define a dominant party as one that controls the executive 
for at least 20 consecutive years. This threshold, although admittedly arbitrary, has a 
couple advantages to recommend it.  First, it is a conventional one: in their recent work 
on dominant party systems, both Magaloni (2006: 37) and Greene (2007: 16) adopt this 
same cutoff for identifying dominant parties.  Greene justifies this threshold as an 
approximation of “one generation” in politics, arguing that it best “capture[s] the notion 
that a dominant party system is a stable pattern of inter-party competition (i.e. a dominant 
party equilibrium), but [is] not so restrictive that it makes the category disappear” (16).  It 
also has the advantage of approximating four consecutive terms in the typical 
Westminster parliamentary system (at five years for a full term) and five terms (at four 
years a term) in the US and many Latin American presidential systems—thus 20 years is 
a natural “break point” at which we expect many incumbents in both presidential and 
parliamentary systems to have to face the electorate.  More convincing, perhaps, is the 
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empirical finding I report in Chapter 2: that across all electorally contested regimes, 20 
years is close to the 90th percentile for ruling party duration in power—that is, only about 
ten percent of all ruling parties last longer.  Thus, 20 years does seem to be a 
substantively meaningful threshold beyond which ruling party durability appears 
increasingly extraordinary.  Finally, it is worth reiterating that I use this cutoff mainly for 
descriptive purposes, to identify the party systems with the longest-lived incumbent 
parties.  In contrast, for tests of the explanations that I develop in this study, I dispense 
with a threshold approach altogether and employ a continuous measure of duration. 
 
 1.6. The Questions of Dominance  
 Existing Causal Models of Dominant Party Systems  
 Existing work on dominant party systems asks three distinct questions.  The first 
is about dominant party origins: under what conditions do dominant party systems 
emerge?  (e.g. Tucker 1961; Huntington 1968: 420-433; Reuter 2010a; Slater and Smith 
2010).  The second is about dominant party persistence: how is the dominant party 
system maintained once established?   (e.g. Arian and Barnes 1974; Pempel 1975; 
Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006; Greene 2007). The third is about dominant party defeat: 
what leads to the breakdown of the dominant party system? (e.g. Levite and Tarrow 
1983; Solinger 2001; Greene 2007; Aldrich et al. n.d.). 
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FIGURE 1.2.  THE CONVENTIONAL CAUSAL MODEL OF DOMINANCE 
 
 Most of this scholarship treats these as questions with discrete answers: the 
mechanisms through which dominance is produced should not necessarily (or even 
likely) be the same as those through which dominance is reproduced, and the factors 
leading to dominant party defeat should be distinct from those that initially sustain the 
party in power (cf. Greene 2007: 10).   The causal process of interest is then modeled as 
shown in Figure 1.2.  Some ruling parties possess a set of characteristics that make them 
“advantaged” in electoral competition, and they in turn acquire a leading position in the 
party system; other ruling parties are less advantaged and hold power in a more 
competitive party system (I).  The advantaged parties remain indefinitely in power in 
dominant party systems, while the non-advantaged parties are defeated after a shorter, 
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“normal” period, allowing us to distinguish between the two party system types (II).  
Finally, after a much longer period of time, a new causal factor arises to disrupt the 
equilibrium in some of the dominant party systems, leading to dominant party defeat in 
these cases (III).  
 Researchers who have this model in mind make several implicit assumptions 
about the nature of dominant party systems.  The first is that, once established, dominant 
party systems will persist indefinitely in a kind of competitive equilibrium, until and 
unless there is some kind of external shock.  The intellectual task should then be one of 
identifying the relevant actors in each party, estimating their preferences and capabilities, 
and demonstrating how these lead to behavior that sustains an equilibrium in the party 
system.  Second, researchers who adopt this model tend to assume that the dominant 
party system exists in a discrete “state of the world,” and that it can be clearly 
distinguished from preceding and subsequent states in which competition for power plays 
out in fundamentally different ways. Thus, most previous work looks for explanations for 
transitions between these states: dominant party defeat indicates a breakdown of the 
preexisting equilibrium, and the causal process that leads to defeat should therefore be 
distinct from that which drives the creation of the equilibrium and that which maintains 
it. Finally, this model requires that researchers be able to distinguish ex ante between 
party systems that are in a dominant party equilibrium and those that are not.  In practice, 
most have used some sort of longevity threshold to differentiate truly “dominant” ruling 
parties from others. 
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 Problems with the Conventional Model 
 I do not adopt this causal model for this project.  I avoid it for several reasons.  
First and foremost, it is not self-evident that all dominant party systems exist for a time in 
a state of competitive equilibrium.  Indeed, evidence I present in Chapter 2 shows that 
this assumption is not realistic for many party systems with a long-lived ruling party: 
most of the parties that scholars call dominant actually helped found or presided over a 
transition to an electorally contested regime, and therefore were the first parties to hold 
power in the new regime.  As a consequence, the typical party system at the beginning of 
these regimes was in a state of considerable flux, as parties could organize and compete 
openly in elections for the first time.  Rather than being in equilibrium, most of these 
party systems began with a profound shock: the introduction of multi-party contested 
elections.  A better analogy for a dominant party system is to that of a formerly 
monopolized market newly-opened to competition, where the outcome of interest is the 
rate at which competitors gain market share. 
 A second problem with the equilibrium model arises when we try to identify 
dominant party systems.  How are we to distinguish between cases in which there is a 
“true” dominant party system in stable equilibrium from those in which one party has just 
“gotten lucky” in several consecutive elections?  The most straightforward way is to 
adopt a longevity threshold, such as Greene (2007: 15-16) and Magaloni’s (2006: 36-37) 
20 years: ruling parties lasting in office beyond this threshold are “dominant” and 
therefore exist in a party system equilibrium, while those leaving power earlier were 
never in an equilibrium.  This distinction is crucial to draw, because the equilibrium 
approach effectively requires the outcome of interest to be dichotomous: either a country 
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has a dominant party system, or it does not.  Thus, the validity of empirical tests of these 
theories rests heavily on the decision rule used to identify party systems in equilibrium. 
 To see the problems this identification procedure may cause for statistical 
inference, consider an example.  The threshold approach means that we have to assume 
that when Congress in India held power for 30 consecutive years (1947-1977), the party 
system was in a period of equilibrium, but when the Conservative Party in Britain did so 
for 18 years (1979-1997) it was not.  A glance at changes in seat share over time, 
however, suggests precisely the opposite conclusion: after a high-water mark in 1957, the 
Congress Party lost seats to splinter parties throughout its time in office, while the 
Conservative Party in Britain held nearly as many seats after its last electoral win (336 in 
1992) as it did in its first (339 in 1979).  If we had to pick the party system that was more 
likely to be in equilibrium, Britain’s looks like the stronger candidate. 
 As this example suggests, relying only on a longevity threshold will almost 
certainly lead us to classify some party systems incorrectly as being in or out of 
equilibrium.  If we want to draw valid statistical inferences about the causes of dominant 
party defeat, then, we must be prepared to deal with both false positives—ruling parties 
we call “dominant” even though the seat shares of parties are in flux—and false 
negatives—ruling parties we exclude even though their seat shares are stable.  The false 
negatives are likely to bias results against tests of significance—some dominant party 
systems will be incorrectly coded as non-dominant, making the two sets of cases appear 
more similar than they actually are.  The false positives, however, are more worrisome: if 
many parties in power more than 20 years are not in a competitive equilibrium, then we 
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may improperly attribute dominant party defeat to factors that in actuality have nothing to 
do with equilibrium breakdown. 
 The third reason to avoid the previous model of causality is that the key 
unresolved puzzle is about duration in power.  The concept of dominance invites the use 
of duration analysis: it is important to understand “not only if something happens, but 
also when something happens” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 1).  That is, rather 
than trying to identify, measure, and account for movement between discrete states of the 
world, a more natural way to model the underlying data-generating process is as the 
accumulation of hazards over time.  The operative research question then becomes: what 
factors affect the rate at which ruling parties lose power?  And the causes of dominance 
that we should seek to identify are those that systematically lower ruling party hazard 
rates and lengthen expected duration in power. 
 
 My Causal Model 
 For these reasons I adopt an alternative causal model in this study, shown in 
Figure 1.3.  In this model, there are only two distinct causal processes that need to be 
explained.  Ruling parties begin their time in power (I) either with many electoral 
advantages over their competitors—a highly asymmetric electoral environment—or with 
few—a more symmetric environment.  Once in power, ruling parties suffer from the 
decay of these advantages over time (II), raising the likelihood that the party will lose. 
 Framed this way, dominant parties raise only two distinct research questions:  
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1. How do dominant parties originate?  In other words, what produces the large 
electoral advantages that these parties enjoy over others in the party system? 
 
2. What determines the rate at which ruling party advantages decline?  That is, 
most dominant parties begin with massive electoral advantages over their 
competitors in the party system.  The natural end-point of the party system’s 
evolution is for these advantages to disappear, and for the ruling party to be 
defeated.  Thus, why does this development occur more slowly in some party 
systems than in others? 
 
 
FIGURE 1.3.  MY CAUSAL MODEL OF DOMINANCE 
 
 Note that this model eliminates the additional question in the previous approach: 
once initial advantages fade, the ruling party is expected to lose.  Dominant party defeat 
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in itself does not need to be explained—instead what needs to be accounted for is 
variation in the time elapsed beforehand.  Thus, since duration is the central feature of my 
conception of dominance, the main dependent variable in this study is the amount of time 
a party remains in office. 
 
 Duration Analysis: The Requirements for Valid Inference  
 Adopting duration as the main dependent variable raises a distinct set of 
methodological concerns that have not received much attention in previous work on 
dominant party systems.11 First, a study of ruling party duration needs to avoid selection 
on the dependent variable.  Previous studies have tended to compare only long-lived 
ruling parties to one another (e.g. Pempel 1990; Giliomee and Simpkins 1999; Magaloni 
2006; Greene 2007, 2010).  But including only cases of “successful”—i.e. long-lived—
ruling parties in the analysis eliminates much of the available information about ruling 
party duration and precludes the testing of rival explanations of ruling party persistence 
(King et al. 1994: 128-139; Geddes 2003: 89-130).  In other words, if we want to know 
why dominant parties occur in some times and places and not others, then we also need to 
look at the instances in which dominance does not occur as well as the instances in which 
it does (cf. Reuter 2010a).   
 Second, a study of ruling party duration requires careful consideration of how to 
define the universe of cases under study.  Under what conditions is it hypothetically 
                                                
11 The most relevant study employing duration analysis that I have come across is by Maeda and Nishikawa 
(2006), who look at ruling party duration in 65 democracies.  The phrase “dominant party” appears 
nowhere in their article, however.  My dataset also covers a much larger set of regimes, including semi-
presidential democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes that were excluded from their analysis. 
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possible to observe dominant parties emerge?  I have defined dominant parties as 
occurring in democracies and electoral autocracies, but not closed autocracies or unstable 
regimes where opposition parties do not have opportunities to take power by winning 
elections.  In order to draw valid inferences about what leads to long-lived ruling parties, 
then, we need to identify all ruling parties that held power in democracies and electoral 
autocracies, whether or not they became dominant!  The distinction between electoral and 
closed autocracies is a particularly important one, as it separates those regimes in which 
dominant parties are possible from those in which they are not.  And because this 
distinction is not commonly made in existing quantitative research, it is one that we need 
to be especially careful about delineating. 
 Third, claims about the determinants of ruling party longevity should more 
properly be phrased and tested as probabilistic hypotheses rather than deterministic ones.  
Previous work has often tended to treat a single disconfirming case as sufficient evidence 
that a hypothesized causal relationship does not exist.  For instance, consider the question 
of whether dominant party systems are more likely to occur in some types of electoral 
systems than in others.  One of the generalizations Pempel drew from the case studies in 
Uncommon Democracies was that a multi-party system fostered by proportional 
representation (PR) was a necessary condition for the existence of dominant party 
systems (1990: 338-9).  As a deterministic statement, this claim is clearly false.  By his 
own definition, Pempel overlooked a number of “dominant” parties that existed in 
majoritarian electoral systems even at the time he wrote, including those in India, 
Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and Canada.  And several dominant parties have 
existed with only a single major party in opposition, including Botswana, Trinidad and 
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Tobago, the Bahamas, and Australia.  For this reason, Greene (2007: 23-24, 257) among 
other authors has rejected electoralist arguments to explain dominant party longevity.   
 However, Pempel’s argument is not so easily dismissed if it is stated in 
probabilistic terms—and there is no good reason not to do so (cf. Sekhon 2004).  A more 
reasonable test of this proposition would compare ruling party duration in PR systems to 
that of non-PR systems and see if there is a statistically significant and substantively 
meaningful difference.  Finding a single instance of dominance in a non-PR regime does 
not by itself falsify the proposition that dominant parties occur more frequently under PR 
electoral rules.  And our empirical strategy for testing causal claims needs to allow for 
this possibility. 
 To sum up, my research approach differs in at least three ways from previous 
work on dominant party systems.  First, I am concerned chiefly with accounting for 
duration in power: questions about ruling party seat share, bargaining position, agenda-
setting power, ties to the state, integration of elites into the ruling party, and divisions 
among the opposition are all of interest only insofar as they shed some light on ruling 
party longevity.  Second, I focus on two causal processes: the creation of ruling parties 
with massive electoral advantages, and the decline of these advantages over time.  That a 
ruling party has lost does not in itself require explanation; the time it lasted before it lost 
does.  Third, I pursue a new empirical strategy for testing my arguments about ruling 
party longevity: I gather data on all ruling parties in democracies and electoral 
autocracies, and I examine how the posited causes of dominant party system change 
affect ruling party hazard rates over time.   
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 1.7. Overview of the Remaining Chapters  
 In this chapter I reviewed the literature on dominant parties and dominant party 
systems.  I found much of the existing scholarship to be focused on one or a handful of 
cases; the comparative work that does exist is not very systematic.  In particular, 
dominance turns out to be a very fuzzy concept: there is little agreement about whether 
“dominance” should refer to the regime, the party system, or the ruling party; be limited 
to democracies, autocracies, or both; and refer to total control of the political system, 
large seat and/or vote shares, extraordinary longevity in office, or something else.  In 
response, I argued that (1) dominance is best conceptualized as a party system 
phenomenon rather than a regime or party-level one; (2) dominant party systems occur in 
both democracies and electoral autocracies, but not closed autocracies; and (3) the 
outstanding puzzle of dominance is one of duration in executive office: why do some 
ruling parties endure in power for decades despite facing regular, contested, multi-party 
elections in which they could lose?  This question will motivate the rest of the study. 
 Chapter 2 addresses the question of how dominant party systems originate.  One 
of the persistent problems in existing work on this topic is selection on the dependent 
variable: most comparative research compares dominant party systems to each other 
rather than to cases of non-dominance.  In contrast, I collect observations on all ruling 
parties holding office in electorally-contested regimes (democracies and electoral 
autocracies) between 1950 and 2006.  Using this data, I find that the longest-lived 10 
percent of all ruling parties lasted at least 20 consecutive years in office.  Using this 
cutoff, I identify about 40 dominant party systems in the postwar era.  I also find that 
most of these dominant parties were “first-movers” in the party system: they were the 
 46 
first ruling parties to hold office at the beginning of the regime.  Thus, the modal pattern 
of “dominance” is for one party to start in office with an advantage over all its 
competitors, and for the party system gradually to become more competitive over time.   
 Chapter 3 responds to these findings by presenting a simple theory of party 
system development in new electorally-contested regimes.  I introduce the concept of 
party system asymmetry and discuss how it relates to expected ruling party duration in 
power.  I then discuss three mechanisms through which asymmetry is produced: 
differences between parties in mass partisanship, spatial positioning, and electoral 
coordination.  The typical pattern in new regimes is for party system asymmetry to 
decline gradually, as opposition parties develop their own partisans, become more 
ideologically flexible, and get better at strategic coordination in elections.  This process 
can be retarded or hastened by other features of the regime, including a ruling party 
resource advantage, the use of state repression against the opposition, and the underlying 
social cleavage structure.   
 Chapter 4 considers how formal institutions modify the effect of each mechanism 
on party system asymmetry.  I consider three institutional features: the electoral system, 
the type of executive, and the degree of centralization.  The electoral system turns out to 
produce countervailing effects on party system asymmetry: the same electoral rules that 
make the effect of coordination asymmetry larger also make the effect of spatial 
positioning smaller, and vise versa.  Thus, dominant party systems can occur under a 
wide array of electoral rules.  By contrast, the type of executive matters a great deal for 
ruling party survival: party system asymmetry matters much more in competing for 
parliamentary executives than presidential ones.  As a consequence, I predict that long-
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lived one-party rule is much less likely in presidential than parliamentary regimes.  I 
make a similar prediction for the degree of political centralization: dominant parties are 
most likely in highly centralized parliamentary regimes, while they are least likely in 
decentralized presidential ones. 
 Chapter 5 exploits the dataset on ruling party duration to provide more 
sophisticated tests of the argument in previous chapters.  I estimate a fully parameterized 
model of ruling party hazard rates and find strong support for several of the predictions of 
the theory.  Most significantly, hazard rates in presidential and parliamentary regimes 
have substantially different shapes over time: while parliamentary executives are initially 
at greater risk of defeat than presidential ones, this risk declines over time while rising for 
presidential incumbents. Thus, long-lived ruling parties are indeed more likely in 
parliamentary than presidential regimes.  The model estimates also support the claim that 
repression lowers hazard rates, and that ruling parties which begin with a large first-
mover advantage also last longer in office, all else equal. 
 Chapter 6 illustrates the theory in action in the case of Taiwan, where the ruling 
KMT initially benefited from a highly asymmetric party system in the first multi-party 
elections.  However, two features of Taiwan’s political system worked to reduce this 
advantage.  First, Taiwan’s ethnic cleavage structure placed the KMT at a disadvantage 
relative to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party: while the KMT had to maintain 
the support of both mainlanders and “native” Taiwanese, the DPP could focus its appeals 
exclusively on the majority of the electorate that spoke Taiwanese.  The emergence of 
Taiwan’s future vis-à-vis mainland China as the central cleavage in Taiwanese politics 
contributed to a serious split in the KMT’s base at the same time that it aided the growth 
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of partisan support for the DPP.  Second, the use of presidentialism made competition for 
the executive more candidate-centric and reduced the importance of the KMT’s partisan, 
positioning, and coordination advantages. 
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CHAPTER 2      
PATTERNS OF DOMINANCE: INCUMBENT DURATION IN ELECTORALLY-
CONTESTED REGIMES, 1950-2006 
 
 
 
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.  
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead 
of theories to suit facts.”   
 
 --Sherlock Holmes, “A Scandal in Bohemia” 
 
 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 The least-well understood feature of dominant party systems is the ruling party’s 
extraordinary longevity in elected office.  Part of the task of improving our understanding 
is in proposing better explanations; another part is in adjudicating between competing 
explanations. But as the epigraph suggests, before theorizing or testing, we first need a 
good sense of the facts: what actually needs to be explained?  In this chapter, I present 
those facts. Drawing on an original dataset of ruling party turnover in all sovereign, 
multi-party electorally-contested regimes in the world between 1950 and 2006, I describe 
the frequency and patterns of ruling party duration and show how dominant parties 
compare to their shorter-lived counterparts. These data serve to motivate the theory 
developed in Part II of the dissertation.  I also venture an explanation for the origins of 
long-lived ruling parties: ruling party advantages over competitors in the party system are 
usually a consequence of having founded the regime in which they are competing. 
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 The chapter is organized as follows. I first detail how I deal with several 
important case selection and measurement concerns in constructing my sample of ruling 
parties.  The second section presents a first cut of the data, describing the patterns of 
incumbent duration and situating dominant parties within the larger set of ruling parties 
in democracies and electoral autocracies—what I term “electorally contested regimes” 
(ECRs).  In the third section, I show that most dominant parties began as the first 
incumbents in such regimes, and that these lasted longer on average than did subsequent 
ruling parties.   In the fourth section I discuss the concept of first-mover advantage in 
party systems, arguing that advantages in (1) partisan support, (2) party organization, and 
(3) control over the formation of the regime produce clear electoral victories for some 
first incumbents, giving them a leading position in the party system at the beginning of 
the contested period.  In the fifth section, I introduce a simple measure of first-mover 
advantage and use it to identify “advantaged” first incumbents.  These incumbents, I 
argue, are the ones best positioned to endure for an extraordinary period of time in power.  
Section six concludes. 
 
 2.2. Identifying the Universe of Cases: Sample Selection and Coding Issues 
 To identify the universe of cases in which dominant party systems could have 
occurred, we first need to decide on the set of countries that featured contested, multi-
party elections as the primary path to power and the time periods in each for which this 
was true.  To make this determination, I examined the procedures for selecting the de 
facto executive power-holders in all independent states that existed between January 
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1950 and December 2006. 12  My objective was to identify the time periods in each 
regime during which (1) incumbent executives were at a non-zero risk of losing power as 
the result of an election outcome, and (2) election winners controlled executive power.  A 
simple typology of regimes can help clarify how I made these decisions.   
 
  
 
FIGURE 2.1.  REGIME TYPES USED TO DEFINE THE UNIVERSE OF RULING PARTY CASES 
 
                                                
12 The reasons for these start and end dates are largely practical.  Available data on the dependent 
variable—ruling party duration—are much less complete before the end of World War II, as are data on 
economic performance, electoral system features, and many other possible explanatory variables.  (See, for 
instance, the range of data in the Penn World Tables.)  It is also considerably more difficult in earlier 
periods to identify the procedures through which executives were selected and to assess whether winning 
an election was the main route to power. 
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 Figure 2.1 shows four regime types in a two-dimensional space organized from 
most contested executive election to least, and from most institutionalized executive 
election to least.  By contestation, I mean the degree to which competition for executive 
office is open to multiple candidates and parties, and to which non-incumbents are able to 
make appeals for votes.  The key boundary to establish is between regimes in which the 
formation of new political parties for the purpose of contesting elections is both legal and 
possible in practice and those in which it is not, represented by the solid vertical line 
dividing Regions II and IV in the figure. 
 A couple of examples will illustrate how contestation was coded in cases close to 
this boundary.  Consider first the New Order era of Suharto (1965-1998) in Indonesia.  
This regime featured three legal parties—the ruling party GOLKAR, the secular and 
Christian PDI, and the Islamic PPP—but the latter two were organized by and firmly 
under the grip of the ruling party, and all other opposition parties were banned.  Thus, 
Indonesia from 1965 until 1998 clearly falls to the left of the single/multi-party 
contestation boundary.  By contrast, over the past two decades in Turkey (1987-present), 
two separate incarnations of the major Islamist party in the country have been banned by 
court order: the Welfare Party and its successor the Virtue Party.  Nevertheless, because 
these were not blanket bans against all opposition parties, and because the membership of 
these parties was able to reconstitute itself into the current Welfare and Justice Party 
(AKP) and win power, Turkey falls to the right of the single/multi-party contestation 
boundary beginning in 1987.  (The detailed coding rules are described in the appendix to 
this chapter.) 
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 By institutionalization, I mean the degree to which the struggle for power is 
resolved through regularly scheduled elections that effectively determine who controls 
the formal executive offices of the state.  The key boundary here demarcates regimes in 
which electoral results determined control of the executive from those in which they did 
not, represented by the solid horizontal line dividing Region III from Regions I and II.  A 
good example of a regime that falls below this boundary is contemporary Iran (1979-
present). Iran in the last decade has held regularly scheduled, hotly-contested, multi-
candidate presidential elections.  However, the president of Iran is not the most powerful 
executive figure in the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Ayatollah Khamenei is, and his 
position is not subject to popular election.13  Therefore, Iran clearly falls below the 
elected/unelected executive boundary.  The same is true for many other Middle Eastern 
regimes: in Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, Oman, and the UAE, among others, 
executive authority is primarily in the hands of unelected officials, despite the existence 
in some cases of competitive races for legislative offices.  By contrast, in most of the 
constitutional monarchies of western Europe, such as the Netherlands, real executive 
authority is vested in the office of the prime minister and her cabinet rather than the 
monarch, and the procedures that determine who controls the prime ministership are 
well-established and clearly linked to electoral outcomes.  Therefore, the Netherlands 
falls above the elected/unelected executive boundary, as do Norway, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Britain, Spain, and Belgium. 
                                                
13 For instance, see Neil MacFarquar, “A Divine Wind Blows Against Iran’s President,” The New York 
Times, Thursday, June 23, 2011, p. A4+. 
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 With these differences spelled out, we can now identify the regions in Figure 2.1 
in which dominant party systems can occur. Regimes in Region I are democracies.  
Power-holders are not only chosen through regular, contested elections, but these are 
largely free and fair as well: there are few or no restrictions on opposition candidacies, 
dissemination of information, freedom of association, or citizen participation. 
 Regimes in Region II are electoral autocracies. They also feature regular, 
contested elections, but these generally violate one or more of the requirements for 
democracy.  They nevertheless do not experience military intervention in politics or other 
non-institutionalized means of leader turnover (Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 
2010).  Prominent contemporary examples include Belarus, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, 
Tanzania, Venezuela, and Singapore. 
 Regimes in Region III are contested but non-electoral autocracies.  They may 
also feature formal electoral means for the allocation of power, but these rules do not 
generally govern how leadership turnover occurs.  Regimes may fall into this category for 
a wide variety of reasons: losing candidates do not respect the outcome of elections and 
refuse to relinquish power or commit blatant fraud; leadership contests are typically 
resolved through non-electoral means (coups, rebellions, popular protests, etc.) rather 
than at the ballot box; formal leaders are elected, but unelected officials retain significant 
executive power and the ability to override decisions of elected officials; the country is 
not fully sovereign or is governed by foreign powers; or there is no effective central state 
at all to control.  Contemporary examples of non-electoral autocracies include countries 
as different as Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand, Jordan and 
Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, and Somalia and Libya. 
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 In the final category, Region IV, fall closed autocracies.  These are regimes that 
do not even make a pretense of choosing their leadership through contested multi-party 
elections.  Included here are single-party states that ban all opposition parties, military 
dictatorships, theocracies, and absolute monarchies.  Contemporary examples include 
China, North Korea, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Brunei.  
 Together, Regions I and II contain all regimes where winning contested, multi-
party elections is widely accepted as the primary route to power.  In the interest of 
brevity, I will call the union of these two regime types electorally-contested regimes, or 
ECRs.  Dominant party systems as I have defined them can occur only in ECRs, and the 
relevant comparison cases where dominant party systems are not present are also to be 
found only in these regimes.     
 In constructing the sample of ruling parties, then, the first challenge is to 
differentiate between cases in ECRs—Regions I and II—to be included in the dataset, 
and those in Regions III or IV to be excluded. This distinction is best drawn at the regime 
rather than the country level: many countries do not fit cleanly on either side of this 
division, most often because at different points in their history the regime changes.  Thus, 
this determination also requires specifying the period the country-regime remained in 
Regions I or II.  For instance, the regime in Kenya first became an electoral autocracy 
(moving from Region IV to Region II) in December 1992, when the first multi-party 
election for president was held; prior to that time, opposition candidates were not allowed 
to contest the presidency, so the regime was a single-party autocracy.  Observations of 
ruling party duration in power for Kenya thus begin with December 1992. 
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 With the set of ECRs identified, we can then turn to measuring ruling party 
duration in power.  Each ruling party constitutes a case, and the outcome of interest is the 
ruling party’s total time in power measured in months.  That is, the dependent variable is 
the length of every unique period of partisan control of the executive in all democracies 
and electoral autocracies.   
 To make the determinations about regime type and to identify ruling parties and 
their duration in power, I drew from a variety of sources.  No single existing dataset was 
sufficient by itself for this classification task.14  In response, I developed my own set of 
decision rules and used these to code ruling party duration in electorally-contested 
regimes.  To ensure that the cases were coded as uniformly and consistently as possible, I 
examined the actual political and electoral histories of each country over the last 60 
years.  My main sources in this endeavor were the series of elections handbooks edited by 
Dieter Nohlen (Nohlen et al. 1999; Nohlen et al. 2001; Nohlen 2005; Nohlen 2010) and 
various encyclopedias of political parties of the world (Ameringer 1992; Delury 1999; 
Sagar 2009).  When these sources were unclear about the stability of the regime, the 
process of executive selection, or the quality of elections, I cross-checked these against 
coding from Polity IV, the Database of Political Indicators (DPI), the Center for Systemic 
Peace (CSP) database of Coup d’Etat Events, and in some cases with country-specific 
                                                
14 For instance, the Executive Contestation variable (eiec) in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
comes close to capturing the single-party/multi-party distinction, but the DPI data only extend back to 1975.  
I also came across several cases that appeared to be coded inconsistently on this variable (e.g. Kenya vs. 
Egypt). The Polity IV dataset did not contain a single measure of either contestation or institutionalization 
that adequately captured these dimensions, although several variables (e.g. parcomp, xrreg, xrcomp) proved 
useful in cross-checking my initial assessments from the case histories.  Most other datasets that code 
between regime types have been focused on the difference between democracies and everything else, rather 
than ECRs and everything else (e.g. Maeda and Nishikawa 2006, Przeworski et al.’s ACLP).  Levitsky and 
Way (2010) attempt something along these lines, but their analysis is limited to post-Cold-War regimes and 
does not systematically record dates when regimes or ruling parties changed. 
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sources.  Data on leadership and ruling party turnover were obtained from the Zarate’s 
Political Collections (ZPC) website. 
 The individual coding rules along with the list of included regimes and their start 
and end months have been consigned to the appendix.  There are four elements of the 
coding process worth highlighting here, however: how I deal with regime changes in a 
country; how I measure executive control; my criteria for partisan (as opposed to non-
partisan or personalist) incumbents; and my focus on the national (as opposed to 
provincial or local) level.  
   
 Adjusting for Regime Changes 
 Counting the beginning and end of each ruling party’s duration in power is non-
trivial.  One challenge is in deciding how to treat ruling parties that endured through a 
regime change—that is, that began in closed autocracies (Region IV) which later moved 
into the electoral autocracy or democracy category (Regions II or I). To address this 
challenge, I recorded both the time at which the party initially came to power (the ruling 
party “birth”) and the time at which it first faced contested multi-party elections (the 
beginning of the “at risk” period in the new ECR).  Duration in power can then be 
measured in two ways: by total time in power or by total time “at risk” of an election 
loss.  For parties that came to power in regimes that were already electoral autocracies or 
democracies, these values are the same. 
 In this study, tenure at risk of electoral defeat rather than total time in power is 
the primary dependent variable.  One reason is that the causal questions raised by 
dominant parties are really about duration in ECRs, where winning contested, multi-party 
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elections is the main path to power.  It is only after ruling parties move into the multi-
party period that we have a reason to wonder why they have not lost—it is hard indeed to 
lose an election when there is no opponent!  In contrast, most work on leadership 
duration in autocratic regimes has tended to take as the dependent variable leader 
turnover under any conditions and for whatever reason, including defeat in an election 
but also intra-party leadership struggles, coups, putsches, invasions, deaths from natural 
causes or assassinations, civil wars, and popular uprisings (e.g. Bienen and van de Walle 
1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Gandhi and Pzreworski 2007; Cox 2009)—or, 
alternatively, the breakdown of the regime itself (e.g. Geddes 1999; Smith 2005; 
Brownlee 2007).  My focus on the subset of ruling parties at risk of electoral defeat 
complements this previous work but allows for a consideration of the wide variation 
within electorally-contested regimes. 
  The second challenge presented by regime change is how to count ruling party 
duration when the movement is in the opposite direction, from Regions I or II into 
Regions III or IV.  This change could occur, for instance, as the result of a military coup, 
a civil war or foreign invasion, a popular uprising that deposes the incumbent, or the 
declaration of a state of emergency that results in the banning of opposition parties.  
When these types of regime changes occur, they raise suspicions about whether the 
previous regime in fact met the criteria for contestation and institutionalization.  I treat 
these events in one of two ways.  If the previous period of contested elections was long 
enough to suggest a settled pattern (at a minimum, five years and two consecutive 
elections), then the change signals the “death” of the entire regime, and the observation of 
incumbent party duration is right-censored.  If the previous period was not long enough 
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to suggest a settled pattern, however, then the regime is treated as having been in Region 
III or IV for the entire period, and the observation of the ruling party’s duration is 
excluded entirely from the sample. 
 
 Executive Control 
 Measuring executive control also raises a set of special challenges.  Because my 
main interest is in explaining the “death,” or lack thereof, of ruling parties, I use a 
generous definition of what constitutes ruling party “control.”  I require only that a party 
control the main executive office—prime minister in a parliamentary regime, and 
president in a presidential one—to be considered “in power.”  This coding follows from 
my definition of dominant party system: only when a former ruling party is 
unambiguously driven into opposition does true turnover of power occur.  An incumbent 
party forced to govern in coalition with others still maintains the leading role as long as it 
controls the prime minister’s office.  In similar fashion, an incumbent president lacking a 
majority of his own party in the national assembly is still the leading executive officer 
and head of government, so I record the end of an incumbent party’s duration in power 
only when it relinquishes the presidency.  
 This approach makes coding partisan turnover in presidential and parliamentary 
regimes straightforward.  However, the issue of who is the principal executive in so-
called semi-presidential regimes—those that have both a president and premier who 
exercise some formal control over the executive branch—is trickier. The key challenge in 
such regimes is determining whether the president or the assembly is the ultimate 
principal to which the cabinet is responsible.  For my purposes, this question is relevant 
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when government is divided; that is, when the assembly is controlled by a party or 
coalition opposing the president.  The key to ascertaining which is the “opposition” and 
which is the “ruling party” in this instance is to look at the party of the prime minister.  If 
the prime minister always or almost always is an ally of the president in this 
circumstance, the regime is fundamentally more like a presidential than a parliamentary 
one: the president, rather than the assembly, is the ultimate principal who exerts control 
over the makeup of the cabinet.  In contrast, if the prime minister is always or almost 
always from the leading party in the assembly, then the president along with the minority 
in the assembly is the opposition, and the majority party or coalition is the ultimate 
principal to which the cabinet is accountable.  Looking at the partisanship of the prime 
minister in most circumstances indicates which type of executive a particular country-
regime has.   
 To take a concrete example, under divided government in the French Fifth 
Republic (i.e. “cohabitation”), the prime minister is from the leading party in the 
Assembly and is typically an adversary of the president.  Thus, France functions much 
like a parliamentary system under these circumstances.  I code a turnover of ruling party 
in France, then, whenever the party the prime minister belongs to changes, but not when a 
member of an opposition party in the assembly is elected president.15 
 
                                                
15 Of course, in France a newly elected president can call Assembly elections in hopes of securing a 
friendly majority, and therefore a fellow partisan as prime minister.  So turnover of the party controlling the 
prime minister’s office in practice usually occurs within a couple months after an opposition party’s 
candidate has won the presidency.  
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 Parties, Not Leaders 
 The requirement that an incumbent leader be supported and constrained by a 
durable ruling party also presents some difficulty in coding.  In a number of cases, a 
ruling party exists, but as barely more than a name and a collection of titles—real 
authority is exercised through the leader’s personal network of informal ties.  To the 
extent we want to identify dominant parties, and not merely long-lived leaders, this poses 
a problem. To account for this possibility, I require that an incumbent experience at least 
one change of leader during the party’s tenure in power to be considered a dominant 
party.  Ruling parties in which there was no change of leader but which met the other 
criteria are included in the list of long-lived parties under a separate category, personalist 
incumbents.  I also include in the dataset a dummy variable recording whether the ruling 
party experienced leader turnover during its time in office, and another recording whether 
the incumbent executive had no apparent partisan affiliation; in the statistical analysis, 
these variables allow me to control for the possibility that some long-lived “dominant 
parties” may in fact simply be long-lived leaders.   
 In addition, many ruling parties on occasion are reorganized or renamed, absorb 
or merge with opposition parties, or experience sizeable defections or splits.  I code such 
changes as a continuation in power if the same leader remained in charge of the new 
ruling party, or if the personnel, leadership, and support patterns of the old party were 
largely the same as the new; otherwise, the new party’s assumption of power is coded as 
a change in ruling party.  For instance, in Malawi, the current president Bingu wa 
Mutharika was nominated by and began his tenure in office as a member of the 
incumbent party, the UDF.  Within a year of taking office, however, he broke with UDF 
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and founded his own party, the DPP, subsequently winning re-election.  Because he 
remains in control of the executive, the DPP is coded as a continuation of the previous 
incumbent: no ruling party turnover has occurred in Malawi since the UDF came to 
power in April 1994. 
  
 Central, Not Provincial Offices 
 Finally, while the dataset contains observations for all electorally contested 
sovereign states from 1950-2006, the focus of this study is limited to the central 
government; I make no systematic attempt to identify or explain instances of long-term 
one-party rule at the provincial/state or local levels.  This is most certainly not to assert 
that one-party dominance is purely a central government phenomenon—as I have defined 
them, dominant party systems clearly have existed at the state and local level in a wide 
range of political contexts.  I am aware of a number of instances, including in the states 
of the Democratic “Solid South” in the U.S., Alberta and Saskatchewan in Canada, 
Bavaria in Germany, several Land in Austria, and West Bengal in India, although I have 
not attempted a comprehensive review of provincial/state governments and thus have no 
way to know how common such occurrences are.16  I also make no attempt to account for 
the persistence of “authoritarian enclaves” within democratic regimes, although some of 
the explanations I develop in this study may be relevant there as well (cf. Fox 1994; 
Lawson 2000; Snyder and Samuels 2001; Gibson 2005; Gervasoni 2010; Mickey 2011).   
                                                
16 The most expansive survey I am aware of is Abedi and Schneider (2006; see also 2010), who identify 
dominant parties at the state/provincial level in Canada, Australia, Germany, and Austria. 
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 I leave out provincial and state dominant parties for several reasons.  In addition 
to the practical difficulty of gathering comparative data on partisan turnover in local 
offices, one should be careful not to assume that local dominance is driven by the same 
forces that give rise to dominant parties at the central level.  For one, national parties can 
transfer resources to party branches that are weak in certain localities—a source of aid 
not available to parties in opposition at the national level (Greene 2007: 17 fn. 23).  In 
addition, a party system that is competitive but highly nationalized is likely to feature 
many pockets of partisan strength and weakness across the country, and this partisanship 
should affect voting behavior in local elections as well.  To give a concrete example, the 
demographics of Utah—mostly white, majority Mormon, and predominantly rural or 
suburban—mean that on the federal level it is a safe Republican state.  Democrats 
running for federal office there start out at a tremendous generic disadvantage.  One 
should not be surprised, then, if the state’s electorate also consistently favors Republican 
candidates at the state level.  In nationalized party systems, where the same parties 
compete in all regions and at all levels, localized one-party dominance is not only not 
uncommon, it should be expected (cf. Abeidi and Schneider 2010). 
 
 2.3. Ruling Party Duration in Electorally Contested Regimes, 1950-2006 
 Following the coding rules described in the last section, I identified a 
comprehensive set of electorally contested regimes (ECRs) that existed at some time 
between 1950 and 2006, and I recorded the start and end dates and total duration in 
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months of all ruling parties to hold power in each regime.17  Table 2.1 summarizes the 
key descriptive statistics.  In total the dataset contains observations on 692 separate ruling 
parties that held power in 159 regimes in 142 different states.  Of those parties, 535 
(77.3%) exited the dataset with their defeat, leaving 158 right-censored observations—
parties that exited without being defeated in elections.  Among these censored 
observations, 25 (15.8%) ended with a regime change (coup, suspension of elections, or 
other disruption18), while the remaining 133 (84.2%) were still in power at the end of the 
observation period. In other words, only 3.6 percent (25 of 692) of the ruling parties in 
the dataset had their reign ended by a change in regime, which should bolster confidence 
that the regimes included in the analysis are in fact stable and extra-constitutional 
turnover is rare.  Ruling party observations were most likely to be censored because of 
regime change in sub-Saharan Africa (12.3%), East Asia (11.1%) and Southeast Asia 
(13.6%). 
                                                
17 The list of regimes with start and end months is in Appendix B. 
18 Two regimes ended with a substantial change in the constitutional order, although the subsequent regime 
was also an ECR.  In France, the semi-presidential Fifth Republic replaced the parliamentary Fourth 
Republic in January 1959.  In South Africa, the apartheid system ended and a government elected from a 
single national electorate was seated in May 1994.  The ruling party duration is right-censored in these 
cases. 
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 The estimated median duration across all regions was 57 months, although there 
appear to be meaningful differences between regions: the median ruling party in Africa 
lasted 171 months in power, or more than 14 years at risk of electoral defeat, while that in 
Eastern Europe lasted only 34 months, or less than three years, even though most ECRs 
in both regions were established in the early 1990s as part of the Third Wave of 
democratization.  A plurality (27%) of all ruling parties in the dataset were in Western 
Europe, reflecting the long democratic history and regular partisan rotation of most 
countries in this region.  The longest-lived ruling party in the sample was the PRI in 
Table 2.1.  Ruling Party Duration: Observations by Region 
Region 
Number of 
parties % of total 
Median 
Duration
1
 
Right-
censored % censored 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
57 8.25% 171 36 63.16% 
South Asia 32 4.63% 56 6 18.75% 
East Asia 18 2.60% 72 6 33.33% 
Southeast Asia 22 3.18% 72 8 36.36% 
Pacific Islands / 
Oceania 
99 14.33% 37 14 14.14% 
Middle East / 
North Africa 
27 3.91% 52 7 25.93% 
Latin America 89 12.88% 60 21 23.60% 
Caribbean and 
non-Iberic 
America 
66 9.55% 104 17 25.76% 
Eastern Europe  73 10.56% 34 13 17.81% 
Western Europe 190 27.50% 47 22 11.58% 
Post-Soviet 18 2.60% 126 8 44.44% 
            
Total 691 100.00% 57 115 16.64% 
      
1Calculated from the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function, which accounts for censored data. 
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Mexico, which endured a total of 653 months at risk19, followed by the National Party in 
apartheid-era South Africa at 551 months; at the minimum, 10 ruling parties lasted only a 
single month in office.  Notably, the longest-lived ruling parties appear widely distributed 
around the world; of the top ten, four are in Western Europe, one is in Latin America, two 
are in sub-Saharan Africa, one is in East Asia, and two are in Southeast Asia.  Long-lived 
one-party rule is clearly a global phenomenon by this measure.  
 These statistics are interesting in their own right, but for present purposes the data 
are most helpful for systematically identifying the subset of ruling parties that meet my 
criteria for dominance.  In the previous chapter, I defined dominant party systems as 
those in which a single party or coalition controls the national executive for an 
extraordinary period of time by regularly winning contested elections.  The key word 
here is “extraordinary”—how should we differentiate those ruling parties that are well 
and truly exceptionally long-lived from those that are merely ordinary?  The term 
requires that we choose some kind of threshold to make this determination, with all the 
requisite problems for causal analysis that I noted in Chapter 1.  However, as a purely 
descriptive exercise, employing a threshold can at least give us a good sense of what the 
longest-lived parties look like and where they occur.   
 The data I have collected allow us to make this determination more objectively 
than choosing a cutoff that just feels “about right.”  In Figure 2.2 I have plotted the 
                                                
19 Dating the election which ushers in a period of truly meaningful multi-party competition in an autocratic 
state can be a difficult task when the incumbent retains power.  The transition from closed to competitive 
autocracy in Mexico, for instance, has no obvious break point; one could make a reasonable case for an 
election as early as 1946, when the incumbent party first won less than 90% of the vote for president, or as 
late as 1988, when its vote share fell below 70% for the first time.  I use a 90% vote threshold, so include 
Mexico beginning in 1946.  See rule 2 of the Competition Criterion in the coding rules listed in Appendix 
A. 
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Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function, which predicts the percentage of all 
ruling parties expected to remain in office through any given number of months.  As the 
figure indicates, this function estimates that the longest-lived five percent of all parties in 
the dataset last at least 349 months, or just over 29 years, and the top 10 percent lasted at 
least 219 months, or 18 ! years.    The definition I have offered—20 years in power—
falls between these two, at just under the 91st percentile.  That is, about 10 percent of all 
ruling parties in the dataset lasted more than 20 consecutive years in office.  If we were to 
award Latin honors to ruling parties, then lasting at least 20 years in office is something 
like earning magna cum laude.  In this sense, then, using a 20-year threshold appears to 
be a reasonable method of identifying the “extraordinary” cases in the dataset.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.2.  KAPLAN-MEIER PLOT OF THE RULING PARTY SURVIVOR FUNCTION   
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 It is worth reiterating here that in practical terms, the choice of threshold matters 
mostly at the idea-generating stage—it allows us to identify a concrete set of the longest-
lived parties and examine how they compare to the rest.  At the testing stage, the use of 
duration in power as the dependent variable, rather than the persistence or breakdown of 
a party system equilibrium, frees us from having to rely on this or other cutoffs.  All 
ruling parties in the sample will eventually provide some information about what affects 
ruling party survival—not just those that survive 20 years.   
  
 Dominant Parties: A Closer Look 
 Having established a universe of cases and selected a longevity threshold, we can 
now identify the longest-lived ruling parties in electorally-contested regimes.  Table 2.2 
lists the 24 ruling parties that lasted at least 20 consecutive years in office in an ECR 
between 1950 and 2006.  Among these are incumbent parties in a number of the most 
prominent electoral authoritarian regimes of the last two decades, including those in 
Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana, and Senegal.  They also include long-lived 
ruling parties in several developed democracies, including Austria, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, West Germany, and Sweden.  Given how commonly these party systems 
have been called “dominant,” their appearance here is expected. 
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 There are also a few surprises, however.  In western Europe, continuous one-party 
control of the prime minister’s office lasted for over 20 years in Belgium and 
Liechtenstein (twice)—cases which have received less attention in the literature.  Ruling 
parties in Luxembourg (1945-1974), West Germany (1949-1969) and Austria (1970-
2000) also qualify under my definition; these cases are sometimes excluded because the 
major opposition parties were included in the ruling coalition for part of those periods 
Table 2.2.  Ruling Parties Lasting > 20 yrs in Electorally-Contested Regimes, 1950-2006 
Country Party Start Month End Month 
Tenure 
(Months) 
Antigua and Barbuda LP Nov-81 Mar-04 268 
Austria SPO Apr-70 Feb-00 358 
Australia LP+CP Dec-49 Dec-72 276 
Belgium CVP Apr-74 Jul-99 303 
Botswana BDP Sep-66 - 483* 
Canada LP Oct-35 Jun-57 260 
Gambia PPP Feb-65 Jul-94 353 
Germany, West1 CDU+CSU Sep-49 Oct-69 241 
India INC Aug-47 Mar-77 355 
Israel Mapai/Labor May-48 Jun-77 349 
Italy1 DC Apr-48 Jun-81 426 
Japan LP/LDP Dec-54 Aug-93 464 
Liechtenstein (I) FBP Jul-28 Mar-70 500 
Liechtenstein (II) VU Apr-78 Apr-01 276 
Luxembourg (I)1 CSV Oct-45 Jun-74 344 
Luxembourg (II) CSV Jul-79 - 329* 
Malaysia UMNO/BN Aug-65 - 496* 
Mexico PRI Jul-46 Dec-00 653 
Senegal PS Feb-78 Apr-00 266 
Singapore PAP Aug-65 - 496* 
South Africa NP Jun-48 May-94 551 
Sweden SAP Sep-36 Oct-76 481 
Trinidad and Tobago PNM Aug-62 Dec-86 292 
Zimbabwe2 ZANU-PF Apr-80 - 320* 
* Incumbent still in power; tenure calculated through December 2006  
1Count begins with first election after WWII 
2Personalist incumbent: Robert Mugabe the sole leader of ZANU-PF since independence 
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(e.g. Di Palma 1990: 162-63).  A bit further afield, long periods of one-party rule 
occurred in Australia, Canada, Antigua and Barbuda, and Trinidad and Tobago—
countries that have not figured heavily in the rather Eurocentric literature on dominant 
party systems in democracies.  
 The list of parties in Table 2.2 is just as notable for who is not included as who is.  
A number of prominent “dominant” parties do not make the cut, including the CPP in 
Cambodia, United Russia in Russia, FRELIMO in Mozambique, ANC in South Africa, 
CCM in Tanzania, and KMT in Taiwan.  Some of these cases do not appear here because, 
while they endured in power for more than 20 years, they were actually at risk of 
electoral defeat for much less than that.  One can see this difference clearly in Table 2.3, 
which lists the set of all autocratic parties that managed to retain power for at least 20 
years and most recently did so by winning multi-party elections.   
 For instance, Cameroon’s CPDM has held office since January 1960, but it only 
faced an opposition challenger for the first time in the October 1992 presidential election.  
Thus, while the CPDM may be a dominant party under some definitions (e.g. Bogaard 
2004: 182; Ishiyama and Quinn 2006: 326; Lindberg and Jones 2010: 204), it has been 
even theoretically at risk of losing the presidency in an election for only 18 of the 50 
years it has been in power as of this writing. For the same reason, long-time ruling parties 
in Djibouti, Kenya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Paraguay, Seychelles, Taiwan, Tanzania, 
and Turkey are not included in the list of dominant parties in Table 2.2: they did not 
survive (or had not as of December 2006) at least 20 years at risk of electoral defeat. 
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 Some of the inconsistency in the literature about which countries have dominant 
party systems stems from a failure to distinguish between these two ways of counting 
ruling party duration.  A good illustration is in the case of Taiwan. Taiwan’s KMT is 
often called a dominant party20 because it combined long duration in power (50 years) 
with wins in regular, contested elections for local offices.  Crucially, however, these 
elections were only held for offices below the central government level; until 1992, the 
large majority of members in the national legislature were effectively lifetime appointees, 
                                                
20 E.g. Giliomee and Simpkins (1999); Magaloni (2006); Greene (2007); Friedman and Wong (2008). 
Table 2.3.  Autocratic Incumbents Lasting > 20 yrs:  
Tenure in Power vs. Duration at Electoral Risk 
Country Party 
Start 
Month 
End 
Month 
Month 
Exec at 
Risk
+
 
Tenure 
(Months) 
At Risk 
(Months)
+
 
Burkina Faso1 Compaore/CDP Oct-87 - Dec-91 230* 180* 
Cameroon CPDM Jan-60 - Oct-92 563* 170* 
Djibouti RPP Jun-77 - May-93 354* 163* 
Gabon1 Bongo/PDG Mar-68 - Dec-93 465* 156* 
Gambia PPP Feb-65 Jul-94 Feb-65 353 353 
Ivory Coast PDCI Aug-60 Dec-99 Oct-90 472 110 
Kenya KANU Dec-63 Dec-02 Dec-92 468 120 
Malaysia UMNO/BN Aug-57 - Aug-57 592* 592* 
Singapore PAP Aug-65 - Aug-65 496* 496* 
Mexico PRI Dec-24 Dec-00 Jul-46 847 653 
Mongolia MPRP Sep-21 Jul-96 Jul-90 898 72 
Mozambique FRELIMO Sep-74 - Oct-94 387* 146* 
Paraguay PC Aug-48 Aug-08 May-93 720 183 
Senegal PS Aug-60 Apr-00 Feb-78 476 266 
Seychelles SPPF Jun-77 - Jul-93 354* 161* 
Taiwan KMT Dec-49 May-00 Mar-96 605 50 
Tanzania CCM Apr-64 - Oct-95 512* 134* 
Turkey RPP Oct-23 May-50 Jul-46 319 46 
Zimbabwe1 Mugabe/ZANU-PF Apr-80 - Apr-80 320* 320* 
+Counted in formerly closed autocracies from month multi-party election held for the executive 
* Incumbent still in power; tenure calculated through December 2006 
1Personalist incumbent: no leader turnover 
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and the president was popularly elected for the first time only in 1996.  Indeed, as we will 
see shortly, compared to other first incumbents in ECRs, the KMT is most remarkable for 
how short its time in power was: it lost the presidency a mere four years after the first 
direct election for that office.  Viewed this way, what needs to be explained in Taiwan is 
not why the ruling party lasted so long but why it lost so quickly!  Similarly, ruling 
parties in Kenya, Paraguay, Mongolia, and Turkey lasted decades in power, but did so for 
most of that time by forbidding meaningful opposition contestation rather than by 
stringing together regular victories in contested elections.  As the ruling parties in closed 
autocracies, they were impressively long-lived.  But as ruling parties in new ECRs, they 
managed to squander a formidable set of electoral advantages in a relatively short period 
of time. 
 In addition, some parties are excluded from Table 2.2 because of right-censoring 
of the data: in December 2006 they had not crossed the 20-year threshold for time in 
office at risk of electoral defeat.  As of June 2011 a number of these parties remain in 
power and have either surpassed or look set to cross this threshold in the not-too-distant 
future.  To account for these cases, I have identified all current ruling parties that have as 
of this writing lasted at least 15 consecutive years in power at risk of electoral defeat.  
These include several of the autocratic parties that survived a transition into an ECR and 
have not yet been defeated, as well as several others in more democratic regimes that 
appear well-positioned to survive past 20 years in office, if they have not already.  Table 
2.4 shows these with the duration count updated through June 2011. 
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Table 2.4.  Other Current Ruling Parties Lasting >15 Years  
at Risk of Electoral Defeat, June 2011 
Country Party Start Month End Month 
Tenure At Risk 
(Months) 
Belarus Lukashenko Jul-94 - 203* 
Cameroon CPDM Oct-92 - 224* 
Djibouti RPP May-93 - 217* 
Ethiopia EPRDF May-95 - 193* 
Gabon PDG Dec-93 - 210* 
Guyana PPP/Civic Oct-92 - 224* 
Lesotho LCD Sep-94 - 201* 
Malawi UDF/DPP May-94 - 205* 
Mozambique FRELIMO Oct-94 - 200* 
Namibia SWAPO Mar-90 - 255* 
Russia Yeltsin/UR Dec-91 - 234* 
St. Kitts and Nevis SKNLP Jul-95 - 191* 
Samoa HRPP Apr-88 - 278* 
Seychelles SPPF Jul-93 - 215* 
South Africa (II) ANC May-94 - 205* 
Tanzania CCM Oct-95 - 188* 
Zambia MMD Nov-91 - 235* 
* Incumbent still in power, so tenure calculated through June 2011; 20 years = 240 months 
 
 
 
 If we add these 17 “dominant parties-to-be” to the 24 unambiguous cases in Table 
2.2, there are 41 unique dominant party systems in the dataset.  In all of these cases, the 
ruling party controlled the chief executive office of the regime, or appears likely to, for at 
least 20 consecutive years while at risk of defeat in a contested, multi-party election.  
Identifying this set of cases gives a fuller picture of the phenomenon of dominance: for 
instance, it is now clear that long-lived ruling parties occur both in ECRs that are clearly 
democratic—e.g. Canada, Luxembourg, and Sweden—and autocratic—e.g. Malaysia, 
Russia, and Singapore.  This collection of cases is especially useful for generating ideas 
about the possible causes of ruling party dominance, a task I turn to next. 
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 2.4. The Origins of Dominant Parties 
 In Chapter 1, I raised two questions for research: (1) where do “advantaged” 
ruling parties come from, and (2) what affects the rate at which these ruling party 
advantages decline over time?  The second of these is a rich topic in its own right and 
will be tackled beginning in Chapter 3.  Here, I will bring the data in the previous section 
to bear on the first question, on the origins of advantaged ruling parties.  
 To get a sense of how dominant parties are most likely to originate, I have 
combined the lists of dominant parties in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 and organized them by the 
type of regime in which they initially took power.  As Table 2.5 shows, these ruling 
parties began in one of three ways.  Parties in the first group (13 cases in total) came to 
power in ECRs that already had established regular, contested, multi-party elections for 
office (Regions I or II in Fig. 2.1).  Ruling parties in Austria21, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein (twice), Luxembourg, Sweden, and South Africa were 
previously in opposition before taking power and stringing together several consecutive 
electoral victories.  All of these regimes except South Africa were consolidated 
democracies: during these ruling parties’ tenure, the likelihood of restrictions on press 
freedoms or campaigning, politically-motivated arrests of opposition candidates, or the 
suspension of elections appeared quite remote.   
 Parties in the second group (19 cases) came to power at the same time that the 
regime began, and in most cases played a crucial role in creating the regime as well.  In 
                                                
21 The SPO in Austria is a partial exception, as it was the junior partner in a “grand coalition” with the 
ruling OVP for the entire postwar period until 1966.  This period of OVP control of the chancellor’s office 
also exceeds 20 years in office (Nov. 1945-Apr. 1970).  However, Austrian sovereignty was not formally 
restored until July 1955; because it does not last 20 years in an independent regime, the OVP is not 
included among the list of dominant parties in Tables 2.2 and 2.5.   
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Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Gambia, India, Israel, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Zimbabwe, the first incumbent parties led the push for independence, then won the first 
post-independence elections and retained power for at least 20 years; SWAPO in 
Namibia and the ANC in South Africa have followed this pattern as well and also look 
set to pass 20 years in office.  In Malaysia, UNMO oversaw the merger of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore with Malaya to create the Malaysian Federation, and in 
Singapore the PAP presided over that city’s subsequent establishment as an independent 
state.  In Luxembourg, West Germany and Italy, the ruling parties were the first to 
assume office when full sovereignty was restored to those countries after World War II.  
In Russia, an unbroken line of executive control stretches from United Russia back to the 
tenure of Boris Yeltsin, who oversaw the creation of the Russian Federation and was its 
first president.  And in Guyana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia, opposition coalitions won 
the first elections in new ECRs, defeating autocrats who were attempting to retain power. 
 
 
Table 2.5.  Dominant Party Origins by Regime Type, 1950-2006 
Country Party Start Month End Month 
Tenure At Risk 
(Months) 
Pre-Existing Electorally-Contested Regime 
Austria SPO Apr-70 Feb-00 358 
Australia LP+CP Dec-49 Dec-72 276 
Belgium CVP Apr-74 Jul-99 303 
Canada LP Oct-35 Jun-57 260 
Japan LP/LDP Dec-54 Aug-93 464 
Liechtenstein (I) FBP Jul-28 Mar-70 500 
Liechtenstein (II) VU Apr-78 Apr-01 276 
Luxembourg (II) CSV Jul-79 - 329* 
St. Kitts and Nevis SKNLP Jul-95 - 137* 
Samoa HRPP Apr-88 - 224* 
South Africa (I) NP Jun-48 May-94 551 
Sweden SAP Sep-36 Oct-76 481 
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New Electorally-Contested Regime 
Antigua and Barbuda LP Nov-81 Mar-04 268 
Belarus1 n/p Jul-94 - 149* 
Botswana BDP Sep-66 - 483* 
Gambia PPP Feb-65 Jul-94 353 
Germany, West CDU+CSU Sep-49 Oct-69 241 
Guyana PPP/Civic Oct-92 - 170* 
India INC Aug-47 Mar-77 355 
Israel ILP May-48 Jun-77 349 
Italy DC Apr-48 Jun-81 398 
Lesotho LDC Apr-93 - 164* 
Luxembourg (I) CSV Oct-45 Jun-74 344 
Malawi UDF/DPP Apr-94 - 152* 
Malaysia UMNO/BN Aug-65 - 496* 
Namibia SWAPO Mar-90 - 201* 
Russia Yeltsin/UR Dec-91 - 180* 
Trinidad and Tobago PNM Aug-62 Dec-86 292 
Singapore PAP Aug-65 - 496* 
South Africa (II) ANC May-94 - 151* 
Zambia MMD Nov-91 - 181* 
Zimbabwe1 ZANU-PF Apr-80 - 320* 
          
Incumbents in Previous Closed Autocracy 
Cameroon CPDM Oct-92 - 170* 
Djibouti RPP May-93 - 163* 
Ethiopia EPRDF May-95 - 139* 
Gabon1 PDG Dec-93 - 156* 
Mexico PRI Jul-46 Dec-00 653 
Mozambique FRELIMO Oct-94 - 146* 
Senegal PS Feb-78 Apr-00 266 
Seychelles SPPF Jul-93 - 161* 
Tanzania CCM Oct-95 - 134* 
* Incumbent still in power; tenure calculated through December 2006  
1Personalist incumbent; no leader turnover   
 
 
 Parties in the third group (9 cases) began as the incumbent parties in closed 
autocracies, introduced multi-party elections on their own watch, and then competed in 
and won those elections.  In Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Seychelles, and 
Tanzania, the incumbent autocratic parties presided over a successful (from their 
perspective) transition from closed to electoral authoritarianism and look likely to pass 
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the 20-year threshold.  Ruling parties in Mexico and Senegal also survived a transition to 
contested elections and lasted more than 20 years in electoral autocracies, although both 
have now been defeated.       
 The different paths these parties took to end up as dominant in their respective 
party systems suggests an important difference between the first group and the others.  
The first set of parties, which we might call “emergent” dominant parties, by and large 
clawed their way toward the top of an established party system, dislodging rivals and 
incumbents, then strung together an impressive series of electoral victories to remain 
there.  In contrast, the other parties, which we might call “first mover” dominant parties, 
all began the multi-party era at the apex of the party system—indeed, in many cases, as 
the only party on the scene—then retained enough electoral support to prevent any 
upstart competitor from displacing them in power.   
 Note that this distinction between dominant parties is not the one usually drawn 
between those in authoritarian versus democratic regimes, or between parties in the 
industrialized West versus the developing world.  Rather, the key distinction is whether 
the party was in power when the regime began.  There is good reason to expect the 
processes that produce dominant party systems to be fundamentally different for the two 
sets of cases: emergent dominant parties begin in opposition and gradually build lasting 
advantages over competitors in the party system, whereas first-mover dominant parties 
begin the electorally-contested period in power and retain pre-existing advantages. 
 What is particularly striking about the list of parties in Table 2.5 is the number 
that can fairly be characterized as first movers.  Over 70 percent (29 of 41) of dominant 
parties either presided over a transition to multi-party elections or took office in those 
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first elections.  In other words, most dominant parties begin as the first incumbents in 
new electorally-contested regimes. 
 This pattern suggests that first movers may do systematically better than others at 
retaining power for a long time in ECRs: being first appears to be a significant advantage.  
To know for sure, however, we need to compare the estimated survival function of the 
full set of first movers to that of the non-first movers in the dataset, shown in Figure 2.3.  
The data confirm this hunch: as expected, among all 692 ruling party cases, the first 
movers have better survival rates.  The median first mover lasted an estimated 118 
months in office, while the median non-first mover lasted only 48, or less than half as 
long, and this difference existed at every point in time, from the first month onward.  
Moreover, almost a quarter of first movers lasted more than 20 years in office, while only 
about five percent of non-first movers did.  Clearly, holding office at the beginning of the 
regime sharply boosts expected incumbent survival times. Thus, the answer to when 
dominant party systems are most likely to occur is: at the beginning of new regimes.  Put 
simply, the data here show that ruling parties have a better survival rate if they are the 
first to take power. 
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FIGURE 2.3.  FIRST INCUMBENT VS. NON-FIRST INCUMBENT SURVIVOR FUNCTIONS 
 
 The argument that long-lived ruling parties originate in tandem with the regime in 
which they hold power is not new.  Huntington effectively argued as much over 40 years 
ago, asserting that “one-party systems are always the product of nationalist or 
revolutionary movements from below which had to fight for power” (1968: 418).  Slater 
and Smith (2010) have recently challenged this claim by arguing that counter-
revolutionary rather than revolutionary or nationalist movements are the most likely to 
produce long-lived ruling parties, but even they link dominant party origins to those of 
the regime itself.  Similar arguments have been made about the origins of dominant 
parties in the developed world.  Pempel, for instance, asserted that dominant parties there 
all began in a “mobilizational crisis, that is, a major reorientation of the political 
dispositions of key economic groups,” driven by war, the formation of a new state, or 
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economic turmoil (1990: 341), and DiPalma viewed one-party dominance as one of 
several possible outcomes of a transition to democracy, albeit a rare one (1990: 162-64).  
To my knowledge, however, no one has previously estimated the frequency with which 
dominant parties emerge at the beginning of regimes, or how much more likely they are 
to appear in new versus pre-existing regimes. 22  For that reason alone, then, these data 
considerably improve our understanding of dominant party system origins.  
 Nevertheless, the finding that dominant parties are most likely in newly-founded 
regimes leaves us with two outstanding questions.  First, why are dominant party systems 
most likely to emerge at the beginning of regimes, rather than at other times?  And 
second, which first movers are most likely to become dominant parties?  After all, a full 
three-quarters of first movers do not manage to endure past 20 years in office, so even 
within this group, dominant parties are somewhat unusual.  In the next section, I will 
argue that part of the answer to both questions has to do with the variation in the first-
mover advantage enjoyed by these first incumbents. 
 
 2.5. First Mover Advantage: How Dominant Party Systems Begin 
 A useful analogy for thinking about party system origins and change is that of a 
consumer market.  Consider some contrasting examples of how competition in new 
consumer markets can begin.  The market for a drug protected by a patent is one: 
                                                
22 Reuter (2010a: 337-371) does estimate the frequency with which dominant parties are formed, but for a 
fundamentally different set of cases: he includes ruling parties formed in single-party regimes as well as 
multi-party ones, and he excludes all democracies.  His working definition of “dominant party” is also quite 
different from mine.  He requires only that the ruling party control the executive and a majority of seats in a 
given year, without specifying a longevity threshold.  Ruling parties can thus be “dominant” under his 
definition even if they hold power for only a single year. 
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prohibitions on new entry into the market monopolized by a single firm are removed all 
at once, competition floods in, and the former monopolist tries to hang on to as much 
market share as it can.  Another is when a monopoly ends through the break-up of the 
firm. The telecommunications market in the United States in the 1980s is a good example 
of this pattern—a court order led the monopolist AT&T to be split into several regional 
companies, the so-called “Baby Bells.”   A third pattern is when a firm develops products 
for a completely new market, as Microsoft did with its Windows operating system in the 
1980s, building an effective monopoly and then retaining most of its market share in the 
face of later entry by competitors.  The rise and fall of Eastman Kodak’s control of the 
market for film shows a similar history.  A fourth pattern is when there are several firms 
that together form an oligopoly; deregulation or cartel-busting then leads to new firm 
entry and mergers, as in the U.S. airline industry after 1978.    
 These examples suggest a possible explanation for how markets with no legal 
restrictions on entry can nevertheless remain dominated by a single firm.  More than in 
the other cases, the Microsofts and Kodaks of the world enjoyed a first-mover 
advantage—a long-lasting lead in market share gained by being the first firm to enter 
(Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Mueller 1997).  This initial lead over competitors 
can endure as a consequence both of demand-side and supply-side factors.   
 On the demand side, firms may benefit from being first to the market when there 
exist high uncertainties about the quality of new products, as for instance with 
automobiles, so that later entries are viewed by consumers as much riskier than earlier, 
more proven entries.  First-mover advantages also tend to persist for goods that have 
strong buyer inertia due to habit formation, in which the customer learns about the 
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product by consuming it rather than by receiving information from experts or impartial 
observers.  Colgate, for example, was the first company to sell toothpaste in squeezable 
tubes over a century ago, and has been a leading toothpaste brand in the United States 
ever since. 
 On the supply side, first-mover advantages are likely to accrue in industries in 
which there are high set-up and sunk costs; large economies of scale, which if they take 
time to capture, give the initial entrant more time to expand and benefit from these 
economies while later entrants start up; and large learning-by-doing benefits, in which the 
process of creating the new product is complicated and initial entrants gain large 
advantages by being further up the learning curve than later entrants (Mueller 1997).  An 
industry that satisfies all three requirements is commercial airliner production, where the 
huge capital investments and complicated development of new models of jets have 
limited their production in the United States to a single company, Boeing. 
 
 First Mover Advantage in Party Systems 
 Although the analogy is not perfect, the first-mover advantage concept ports well 
to the political context, and it provides a useful way to think about why some, but not all, 
first incumbents begin with a leading position in the party system.  We can think of vote 
share as roughly equivalent to market share: as firms seek to sell their products to more 
consumers than their competitors, so political parties seek to win more votes than theirs.  
Thus, the central outcome affected by first-mover advantage in party systems is electoral 
performance in the first election.  Parties with a large first-mover advantage win seat 
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shares that dwarf those of any one competitor in the first elections in the new ECR, and 
thereby secure political power.   
 As the previous section showed, the majority of dominant parties that have 
existed over the last 60 years were first movers: they took power in regimes that were 
newly established.  Thus, one answer to the question “why dominance?” is simply that 
dominant parties enjoyed an especially strong first-mover advantage over their 
competitors at the beginning of their tenure, and it took decades for this advantage to 
decay.   
 This answer is hardly satisfying, however, because it simply pushes the question 
one step further back in the causal chain: we still want to know why those ruling parties 
which endured a long time enjoyed a large first-mover advantage.  That is, to say 
something more profound about the causes of dominance, we need not only to observe 
that first-mover advantage exists, but also to explain where it comes from.  And to 
develop such an explanation, we need a sense of what drives variation within the full set 
of first incumbents, both long- and short-lived.   
 To answer this question, I undertook a qualitative examination of all 140 first 
incumbents in the sample.  Drawing on the same sources I consulted to construct the 
dataset23, I looked at the patterns of electoral competition in the first elections after the 
regime was founded and compared first incumbents that endured past 20 years in office 
with the rest.  The key characteristics I focused on in this endeavor included: 
• whether there was an incumbent running in the first election, and whether the 
incumbent won or lost; 
                                                
23 See Section 2.1, especially fn. 3 and the subsequent discussion in the main text. 
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• the vote share of the winning party or candidate relative to its (his/her) 
competitors; 
• the vote share of parties in elections to other offices held around the same time; 
• the electoral bases of party support, as described in the case materials; 
• the origins, organization and previous history, if any, of the winning candidate’s 
party; 
• the conditions under which the election was held, including signs of fraud, 
intimidation, vote-buying, restrictions on the press, harassment of opposition 
campaigns and organizations, etc.; 
• the main issues that appeared to drive voting behavior in the first elections. 
 
 As expected, I found that the longest-lived first incumbents tended to start out in a 
stronger electoral position than the others.  This electoral advantage appeared to derive 
from three sources: those parties that ended up dominant tended to begin with (1) a strong 
party brand that ensured a large group of loyal partisans in the electorate, (2) an 
institutionalized party organization that enabled the party to maximize its candidates’ 
chances of winning elections, and (3) control over the formation of the new regime which 
shaped and constrained subsequent partisan competition for power.  These three factors 
in turn affected the size of the first incumbent’s victory, measured both in terms of vote 
and seat shares, in the first elections of the new regime.  I elaborate on each of these 
below. 
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 Advantage 1: Party Brand 
 The first, “demand-side” advantage was at the level of mass politics and typically 
occurred as a result of the expansion of the electorate.  Some first incumbents enjoyed a 
strong party brand that made them favored over other opponents at the advent of multi-
party competition.  Parties that led their countries to independence or otherwise played a 
central role in establishing the new regime, in particular, often benefitted from a 
tremendous amount of popularity and goodwill among the electorate—what we might 
term a “halo effect” (Pempel 1990: 344).  A good example is the support enjoyed by 
African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa at the end of apartheid: the party had a 
terrifically positive image among black voters, such that voting for the ANC in effect 
meant voting not merely for a new leader but for black self-determination.  As a 
consequence, the ANC won 62.6 percent of the popular vote in the April 1994 election in 
South Africa, the first after the end of apartheid; the nearest competitor, the incumbent 
National Party, won only 20.4 percent.  Such overwhelming support for the founding 
party was also apparent at the advent of the regime in many of the other dominant party 
cases, including the BDP in Botswana, the PPP in Gambia, UMNO in Malaysia, SWAPO 
in Namibia, PAP in Singapore, and ZANU (later ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe. 
 Such popularity obviously made it difficult for other parties to win the first 
elections in the new regime—as Pempel puts it, “[a] party perceived as a national savior 
is hard to oppose” (1990: 344).  But it also may have served to convert initial ruling party 
support into advantages that endured for a generation or more, long after the initial halo 
effect had faded.  For one, in many post-colonial states, there was little or no previous 
tradition of mass electoral politics, meaning that most voters had weak or nonexistent 
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partisan ties. As a large literature has demonstrated, partisanship at the individual level 
tends to be quite robust over time once established, and it strongly influences vote choice 
(e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Richardson 1991; Holmberg 1994; Schickler and Green 1997; 
Toka 1998; Weisberg and Greene 2003; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 
2007).  Thus, by being the first ruling party on the scene and playing a central role in 
creating the new regime, the first incumbents in some of these cases effectively “locked 
in” a large chunk of the electorate as loyal partisan supporters for decades afterwards.   
 In addition, in subsequent elections the first incumbent’s partisan label could 
serve as a coordination device for both candidates and voters: potential candidates knew 
that the party’s endorsement could deliver a large bloc of votes and wanted to run under 
its label, and voters knew that the party’s candidates would be viable contestants for 
office, so its nominees became the beneficiaries of strategic voting (Aldrich 1995: 48-50).  
This electoral advantage tended to endure as long as there was no opposition party brand 
that was equally effective at signaling viability to both candidates and voters—in some 
cases for decades after the regime was founded. 
 
 Advantage 2: Party Organization and Resources 
 The second, “supply-side” advantage was at the level of political elites and 
occurred as a consequence of the need to compete for and win votes in elections for the 
first time.  Parties improved their candidates’ chances of winning office in two critical 
ways: by exploiting economies of scale in electoral campaigns, and by controlling 
nominations. 
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 On the first, parties that were effectively able to increase the value of their brand 
above and beyond the personal appeal of their nominees had a leg up in electoral 
competition as well.  The party’s pre-existing network of supporters and members could 
be mobilized to work on behalf of all its candidates.  Furthermore, many pre-existing 
incumbents enjoyed large resource advantages over their competitors: money, media 
access, and experienced personnel all increased the party’s chances of winning races. 
 On the second, party nominations were scarce: there were more potential 
candidates than there were nominations to go around.  The party most consistently able to 
resolve this competition efficiently—that is, selecting the most appealing candidate while 
still keeping those passed over from defecting and running renegade campaigns—was at 
an advantage over others in elections.  These decisions were usually contentious: after all, 
they were the critical step in determining which aspiring politicians actually obtained 
office and the power and perks that came with it.  Having an established set of procedures 
for choosing nominees that was respected and obeyed by the losers was of significant 
electoral benefit to a party.  And parties that had already been in existence for a while 
were more likely to have these procedures worked out than were those formed for the 
express purpose of contesting the first election.   
 The organizational and resource advantages enjoyed by the incumbent party were 
readily apparent at the beginning of most of the dominant party systems.  For instance, 
the Indian National Congress was by far the largest mass political organization in the 
country at independence, and it had party branches in almost every parliamentary 
constituency, making it the only party that could effectively conduct a national campaign 
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for office.  It also had a pre-existing leadership with clearly-defined mechanisms for 
nominating candidates and solving intra-party disputes (Morris-Jones 1967). 
 The dominant parties that emerged out of closed autocracies also possessed large 
organizational and resource advantages at the beginning of the contested regime.  In the 
first elections, these parties could drawn on the allegiance of most of the country’s 
political and economic elites, pre-established organizational networks for turning out and 
rewarding supporters and punishing opponents, and privileged access to the patronage 
and coercive capacity of the state to deliver votes for their candidates.  Parties that fit this 
characterization include the CPDM in Cameroon, RPP in Djibouti, EPRDF in Ethiopia, 
PRI in Mexico, FRELIMO in Mozambique, PS in Senegal, SPPF in Seychelles, and 
CCM in Tanzania.  
  
 Advantage 3: Control over Formation of the New Regime 
 A third advantage enjoyed by most of the first incumbents that became dominant 
parties was the ability to shape the institutions of the new regime to their benefit.  In the 
typical new ECR, the practices under which the first elections were held were potentially 
quite malleable: in many cases there were no binding precedents for the kind of electoral 
system in use, the access of all parties to the media, the role of money in campaigns, the 
types of issues that were and were not allowed to be discussed, and so forth.  The first 
incumbents that oversaw the establishment of the regime usually influenced the design of 
rules under which they then competed—in some cases, even, shaped them with a free 
hand.  Furthermore, these rules were often enforced by state personnel chosen by the 
incumbent party itself, and who as a consequence were likely to enforce them selectively 
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in ways that most benefitted the incumbent.  In many cases the judiciary systematically 
ruled in favor of incumbent party candidates and against opposition ones, and the legal 
system selectively prosecuted opposition figures for violating campaign laws while 
ignoring infractions by incumbent party candidates.  The military and security services 
also tended to be especially pro-incumbent, and so the coercive capacity of the state 
could often be mobilized for partisan ends as well.  In addition, members of the civil 
service in many cases disproportionately owed their employment to the first incumbent 
party.  And workers at state-owned enterprises were frequently pressured to support the 
incumbent because their employment credibly depended on remaining loyal to the ruling 
party.     
 A good example of a first incumbent using its preeminent position in the regime 
to shape competition to its own advantage is in Mexico.  The PRI used electoral reform to 
hamper coordination among opposition parties in legislative races and to ensure that it 
always had a working majority in Congress (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001).  The 
party’s influence over public-sector employment allowed it to condition state jobs on 
continued support at the ballot box for a large fraction of the electorate, and its extensive 
party organization and enormous membership provided it with a way to deliver state-
supplied material benefits to supporters and deny them to opponents (Magaloni 2006; 
Greene 2007).  In addition, the PRI’s effective control over the electoral commission 
allowed the party to engage in fraud when necessary, and prevent judicial decisions that 
harmed party interests (Domingo 2000; Eisenstadt 2004; Magaloni 2006).  Similar 
advantages appear to have been enjoyed by virtually all of the other ruling parties in 
closed autocracies that initially survived the transition to electoral contestation, including 
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in Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Taiwan, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 
 
 2.6. Measuring First-Mover Advantage 
 To recap, I have argued that the size of first-mover advantage in the first elections 
is a consequence of three factors: (1) a lead in partisan affiliation in the electorate, (2) a 
superior party organization and access to resources, and (3) a prominent role in the 
creation of the regime.  Ruling parties which enjoy all three advantages are most likely to 
win full control of the political system in the first elections in a new regime.  
 In an ideal world, we would test this claim directly by comparing measures of 
partisanship, organizational strength, and regime control to party performance in the first 
elections.  Unfortunately, these data simply do not exist for most of the ruling parties in 
the dataset.  For instance, there is nothing like the American National Election Survey 
(ANES) in times and places such as Botswana in 1966 or Luxembourg in 1945.  It might 
be possible to use proxy measures for some of these variables, but even so, the available 
data are insufficient to test the effects of these advantages for most parties in the sample.  
 For the current project, this lack of data on the potential causes of first-mover 
advantage is not prohibitive.  Since my concern is with explaining duration in power, 
rather than margins of victory in the first elections, measures of initial partisanship and 
the like are not a central component of the study.  The core of the theory developed in the 
following chapters is about what happens after the first election, rather than conditions 
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preceding it.  Thus, I save a more systematic analysis of the determinants of first-mover 
advantage for future work. 
 Nevertheless, for present purposes we still need some measure of “advantaged” 
first-movers that can be used to control for the wide variation in the starting points of 
different party systems.  In other words, we need to differentiate between those parties 
which get a “head start” in the party system, and therefore should on average last longer 
in power, from those which do not.  In searching for such a measure, there is a natural 
temptation here to assume the consequent: that the longest-lived ruling parties must have 
had the greatest first-mover advantage.  Lest we succumb to this temptation, we need to 
be able to measure first-mover advantage independent of duration—to allow for the 
possibility that the mechanisms that initially produce ruling party electoral advantages are 
not the same as those that sustain these advantages over time.   
 To address this need, I have created a simple dichotomous measure of first-mover 
advantage based on whether the first ruling party wins full control of the institutions of 
state in the first elections.  First-movers who are truly “advantaged” should win 
majorities that allow them to govern without coalition partners.  In parliamentary 
regimes, this means winning a majority of seats (and in both houses of parliament if 
bicameral).  In presidential regimes, it means winning both the presidency and a majority 
in the legislature (and in both houses if bicameral).  In semi-presidential regimes, where 
the president is directly elected but the prime minister is accountable primarily to the 
legislature, the first incumbent must win both the presidency and a majority in the 
legislature to be “advantaged.”  This measure is an admittedly simple one, but it has the 
virtues of consistency and generality while still capturing the central idea behind the 
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concept: that large advantages at the beginning of the regime should lead to full political 
control after the first elections.  It also sets a high bar for identifying first-mover 
advantage—I am more likely to exclude parties that in fact do have an advantage than to 
include those that do not.  
 Following this simple rule, I examined the electoral performance of all 140 first 
incumbents in the sample and coded each as either “advantaged” or “non-advantaged” 
first movers. Using these criteria, I identified 80 “advantaged” first-mover parties out of a 
total of 140 first incumbents (57.1%).  These are listed in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6.  Ruling Parties with First Mover Advantage  
Country Party Start Month End Month 
Tenure At Risk 
(Months) 
Advantaged First-Movers       
Albania SPA Mar-91 Apr-92 13 
Antigua & Barbuda ALP Nov-81 Mar-04 268 
Argentina URC Dec-83 Jul-89 67 
Armenia ANM Dec-91 Feb-98 74 
Azerbaijan YAP Oct-98 - 98* 
Bahamas PLP Jul-73 Aug-92 229 
Barbados DLP Nov-66 Sep-76 118 
Bolivia (I)1 MNR Jun-56 Nov-64 101 
Botswana BDP Sep-66 - 446* 
Bulgaria BSP Jun-90 Dec-90 6 
Burkina Faso ODP-MT Nov-98 - 97* 
Cambodia CPP Jul-98 - 101* 
Cape Verde MPD Jan-91 Feb-01 121 
Chad MPS Jun-96 - 126* 
Chile Concertacion Mar-90 - 201* 
Colombia PL Aug-74 Aug-82 96 
Cook Islands CIP Aug-65 Aug-78 156 
Costa Rica PUN Jul-53 May-62 106 
Croatia HDZ Jun-91 Jan-00 103 
Djibouti RPP May-93 - 163* 
Dominican Republic PR Jul-66 Aug-78 145 
El Salvador PDC Jun-84 Jun-89 60 
Ethiopia EPRDF May-95 - 139* 
Fiji FAP Oct-70 Apr-87 198 
Gabon PDG Dec-93 - 156* 
Gambia (I)3 PPP Feb-65 May-82 207 
Gambia (II)1, 3 PPP May-82 Jul-94 146 
Gambia (III) APRC Sep-96 - 123* 
Ghana PNDC Nov-92 Jan-01 98 
Greece ND Nov-74 Oct-81 83 
Grenada NNP Dec-84 Mar-90 63 
Guatemala DCG Jan-86 Jan-91 60 
Guinea PUP Dec-93 - 156* 
Guyana (I)1 PNC May-66 Oct-80 173 
Guyana (II) Civic/PPP Oct-92 - 170* 
Honduras PL Jan-82 Jan-90 96 
India2 INC Aug-47 Mar-77 355 
Italy DC Apr-48 Jun-81 398 
Ivory Coast1 PDCI Oct-90 Dec-99 110 
Jamaica JLP Aug-62 Mar-72 115 
Japan LP Apr-52 Dec-54 32 
Kenya KANU Dec-92 Dec-02 120 
Korea, South (II) DRP Oct-63 Oct-72 132 
Korea, South (III) DJP Feb-81 Feb-98 204 
Lesotho BCP Apr-93 - 164* 
Macedonia SDSM Sep-91 Nov-98 86 
Malaysia2 UMNO Aug-65 - 496* 
Mali ADEMA Jun-92 Jun-02 120 
Malta PN Sep-64 Jun-71 81 
Mauritius2 MLP ar-68 Jun-82 171 
Mexico PRI Jul-46 Dec-00 653 
Mongolia MPRP Jul-90 Jul-96 72 
Mozambique FRELIMO Oct-94 - 146* 
Myanmar (Burma) AFPFL Jan-48 Oct-58 129 
Namibia SWAPO Mar-90 - 201* 
Nepal NC May-91 Nov-94 42 
Nicaragua U O Apr-90 Jul-97 87 
Nigeria P P May-99 - 91* 
Norway AP May-45 Aug-63 219 
Peru AP Jul-80 Jul-85 60 
Philippines (I) LP Jul-46 Dec-53 89 
Romania NSF/F SN May-90 Dec-96 79 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 
SVLP Oct-79 Jul-84 57 
Sao Tome & Principe PDC Feb-91 May-92 15 
Senegal PS Feb-78 Apr-00 266 
Seychelles SPPF Jul-93 - 161* 
Singapore PAP Aug-65 - 496* 
Somalia SYL Jul-60 Oct-69 111 
South Africa ANC May-94 - 151* 
Sri Lanka (II)2,3 UNP Feb-78 Aug-94 198 
Taiwan KMT Mar-96 May-00 50 
Tanzania CCM Oct-95 - 134* 
Trinidad & Tobago PNM Aug-62 Dec-86 292 
Turkey (I) RPP Jul-46 May-50 46 
Turkey (II) ANAP Oct-87 Nov-91 49 
Vanuatu VP Jul-80 Dec-91 137 
Venezuela AD Feb-59 Mar-69 121 
Zambia MMD Nov-91 - 181* 
Zimbabwe (I)3 ZANU-PF Apr-80 Dec-87 92 
Zimbabwe (II)3 ZANU-PF Dec-87 - 228* 
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Non-Advantaged First-Movers       
     
Andorra NLP Jan-82 May-84 28 
Austria OVP Jul-55 Apr-70 177 
Bangladesh BNP Mar-91 Jun-96 63 
Belarus n/p Jul-94 - 149* 
Belize PUP Sep-81 Dec-84 39 
Benin (II) PRB Apr-91 Apr-96 60 
Bolivia (II) MNR Aug-85 Aug-89 48 
Brazil (I) PTB Jan-51 Nov-55 58 
Brazil (II) PMDB Mar-85 Mar-90 60 
Cameroon CPDM Oct-92 - 170* 
Comoros n/p Apr-02 May-06 49 
Cyprus (I)1 n/p Aug-60 Jul-74 167 
Cyprus (II) n/p Dec-74 Sep-77 33 
Czech Republic ODS Jan-93 Dec-97 59 
Dominica DFP Nov-78 Jul-80 20 
Ecuador (I) MCDP Sep-48 Sep-52 48 
Ecuador (II) CFP Aug-79 May-81 21 
Estonia FPE Sep-91 Jan-92 4 
France UNR/UDR Jan-59 Aug-76 211 
Georgia CUG Oct-92 Jan-04 135 
Germany, West CDU Sep-49 Oct-69 242 
Hungary HDF May-90 Jul-94 50 
Indonesia PKB Oct-99 Jul-01 21 
Israel MP/LP May-48 Jun-77 349 
Kiribati n/p Jul-79 Oct-94 183 
Korea, South (I) LP Aug-48 Aug-60 144 
Kyrgyzstan n/p Dec-91 Mar-05 159 
Latvia LTF Sep-91 Aug-93 23 
Lithuania Sajudis Sep-91 Dec-92 15 
Luxembourg CSV Oct-45 Jun-74 344 
Madagascar UNDD Mar-93 Sep-96 42 
Malawi UDF May-94 - 151* 
Marshall Islands n/p Oct-86 Jan-97 123 
Micronesia, F.S. n/p Nov-86 Nov-87 12 
Moldova DAPM/APM Dec-91 Jul-92 7 
Nauru n/p Jan-68 Dec-76 107 
Niger MNSD Dec-99 - 84* 
Pakistan PPP Dec-88 Nov-90 23 
Palau n/p Oct-94 Jan-01 75 
Panama PLA Sep-94 Sep-99 60 
Papua New Guinea PNGUP Sep-75 Mar-80 54 
Paraguay PC May-93 - 163* 
Philippines (II) UNIDO Feb-86 Jun-92 76 
Poland Solidarity/KLD Dec-91 Jun-92 6 
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Portugal PS Jul-76 Aug-78 25 
Russia Yeltsin/UR Dec-91 - 180* 
Samoa n/p Jan-62 Feb-70 97 
Slovakia HZDS Jan-93 Mar-94 14 
Slovenia LDS Jun-91 May-92 11 
Solomon Islands SIUPA Jul-78 Aug-81 37 
Spain UCD Jun-77 Dec-82 66 
St. Kitts & Nevis PAM Sep-83 Jul-95 142 
St. Lucia SLP Feb-79 Jul-79 5 
Sri Lanka (I) UNP Feb-48 Apr-56 98 
Suriname NF Sep-91 Sep-96 60 
Thailand DP Sep-92 Jul-95 34 
Turkish Cyprus NUP Nov-83 Jan-94 122 
Tuvalu n/p Oct-78 Sep-81 35 
Ukraine n/p Dec-91 Jul-94 31 
Uruguay PC Mar-85 Mar-90 60 
* Incumbent still in power; tenure through December 2006 
1Ruling party removed by coup or suspended elections 
2Ruling party unilaterally extended term 
3Ruling party presided over change from parliamentary to presidential regime 
 
 
 
 Note that the first-mover advantage I have posited for these cases will not 
necessarily show up as a strong effect in the survival estimates of first incumbents: 
duration is a consequence as well of the causal processes that unfold after competition 
begins, and I have not yet specified what I think those processes are or how they will play 
out.  (I develop that argument beginning in Chapter 3).  In fact, some of the long-lived 
parties began with a surprisingly weak electoral performance given their subsequent 
lifespan in office.  For instance, one might expect Mapai in Israel to have won a majority 
in the first Israel elections, since it controlled the prime minister’s office for the first 30 
years of the regime; yet it held only 46 of 120 seats (38.3%) in the first Knesset. The 
CDU/CSU in Germany barely held a plurality (34.6%) of seats in the first term of the 
Bundestag in 1949, yet controlled the chancellor’s office for the next 20 years.   And the 
RDPC (later CPDM) in Cameroon fell two seats short of a majority in the 1992 elections 
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and had to take on a coalition partner; its presidential candidate squeaked out reelection 
with a 40 percent plurality when the opposition split the vote between at least three other 
candidates.   
 Despite these examples, however, we should still expect those ruling parties that 
win a majority in the first elections to last longer on average than those which do not.  
There should still be some discernable effect on overall patterns of survival, even if it is 
weakened by subsequent developments in the political system that I have not yet 
modeled.  And in fact, this is what we find, as Figure 2.4 shows: advantaged first-movers 
do indeed survive longer on average than their non-advantaged counterparts.   
 The most surprising finding in Figure 2.4 is that almost all of the higher survival 
rate of first movers seems to be due to the “advantaged” parties: when we break this 
group out separately, the survival function for the other first movers looks remarkably 
similar to that of the non-first movers.  Thus, even this simple dichotomous measure of 
first-mover advantage appears to capture an important initial difference between ruling 
parties that has long-lasting implications for their survival.  Moreover, the data indicate 
that it is not merely the act of being first that is correlated with survival, but one’s 
performance in the first election: win big, and chances are you will be in power a long 
time.  But come to power without majority backing, and your survival prospects are no 
greater than any generic ruling party in an established regime.   
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FIGURE 2.4.  ADVANTAGED FIRST MOVER PARTIES HAVE BETTER SURVIVAL RATES 
  
 
 Implications of Findings 
 This conclusion might seem patently obvious in hindsight: parties that do well in 
the first elections are more likely to do well in subsequent ones.  But it is not self-
evidently true that the advantages that produce the initial victory should endure for a 
generation or more.  In fact, one can make a reasonable argument for the converse: the 
downside of majority control is that you have no one to blame when things go awry.  
Moreover, there are good reasons to think voter expectations will be unreasonably high at 
the beginning of most regimes, with the consequence that the first incumbents inevitably 
get blamed when the idealism of opposition meets the reality of governing.  One need 
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only look at Eastern Europe to see this effect in action: the initial euphoria over the end 
of communism quickly faded as the transition to market-based economies and democratic 
politics proved anything but smooth.  Expecting a rapid convergence to western 
European standards of living, voters instead got shock therapy, economic slumps, and 
massive unemployment (Kolodko 2000).  The anti-communist leaders who took power in 
most of these regimes got blamed, fairly or not, for much of the severe economic and 
social dislocation that occurred during the early stages of the transition, and in many 
cases were enthusiastically booted out of office as soon as they had to face the voters 
again (Grzymala-Busse 2002).  The circumstances may be less extreme in most of the 
other first-mover cases, but the same dynamic is at play: winning everything in a new 
regime is a double-edged sword, and it is not obvious why the benefits of being the first 
in power should in general outweigh the costs.   
 In sum, there is clear evidence that parties which win the first elections outright 
last longer.  But it is much less clear why the advantages these ruling parties initially 
enjoy should continue to sustain them in power for a generation or more.  The answer to 
that question is the subject of the next part of the dissertation. 
 
 2.7. Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter was to describe the patterns of ruling party duration, 
identifying the longest-lived ruling parties and establishing a comparison group from 
which we could begin to explore the possible causes of dominant party systems.  The 
universe of cases from which dominant parties emerged, I argued, was all ruling parties 
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in electorally-contested regimes, or ECRs.  To this end, I identified 692 parties that held 
power in 159 regimes in 142 different states between 1950 and 2006.  Using a 20-year 
threshold to code “extraordinary” longevity, I identified 24 ruling parties that qualified as 
dominant within the time frame of the sample, and another 17 that crossed the threshold 
after the end of the observation period, or appeared likely to.   
 I drew three conclusions from this set of dominant parties.  First, there was a key 
difference between total ruling party time in power and time at risk of electoral defeat—
the longevity of several “dominant” parties, including the KMT in Taiwan, looks much 
less impressive once we consider that they were not at risk of losing an election for most 
of their time in power.  Second, most dominant parties began as the first incumbents in 
newly-established ECRs—what I termed first-mover parties.  An examination of the full 
sample of ruling party cases showed that this pattern was robust: the median first-mover 
party survived twice as long, on average, as did the median non-first-mover. Third, I 
found that most of this boost in expected survival time accrued only to parties that won a 
majority in the first elections—what I termed advantaged first movers.  A qualitative 
review of the cases indicated that this performance was a result of three advantages these 
parties held over their opponents: (1) more partisan supporters in the electorate, (2) a 
superior party organization and resources, and (3) initial control over the institutions of 
the regime.  These findings indicate that the most common path to dominance is for a 
ruling party to take power at the beginning of a new regime, possess advantages that 
initially place them at the apex of the party system, and then retain these advantages over 
their opponents for a generation or more.  First-mover advantage explains a great deal 
about the origins of dominant parties. 
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 If the findings of this chapter answered the question of how dominant party 
advantages are produced, however, they leave open the question of how they are 
reproduced.  It is not obvious why winning a majority in the first election should increase 
expected ruling party survival time.  This question serves to motivate the next part of the 
dissertation, which lays out a theory of party system development when the first 
incumbent enjoys a first-mover advantage.  Chapter 3 describes the mechanisms through 
which ruling party advantages are reproduced over time, and Chapter 4 adds an 
institutional context to this story. 
 
 101 
CHAPTER 3      
THEORY I: THE MECHANISMS OF PARTY SYSTEM ASYMMETRY 
 
 
“The dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its 
vigor, its arteries harden…every domination bears within 
itself the seeds of its own destruction.” 
 
  -- Maurice Duverger (1959 [1954]: 312). 
 
 In Chapter 2, I found that the longest-lived ruling parties began as the first 
incumbents in a new electorally-contested regime (ECR).  Ruling parties were much less 
likely to endure at least 20 years in power if they took office in an ECR that had already 
experienced at least one partisan turnover than if they were the first incumbent in the 
regime.  I termed this a first-mover advantage: parties that win or retain full control over 
the regime at the beginning of the contested period tend to do well in subsequent 
elections, too.   
 This is a surprising finding, given that expectations in the electorate tend to be 
unreasonably high at the beginning of new regimes, and holding full control means that 
the first incumbent has no one else to blame when it inevitably fails to meet them.  On the 
contrary, we might reasonably expect a first-mover disadvantage: parties that start out in 
opposition are better positioned to benefit in the long term when the incumbent fails to 
meet popular expectations.  Indeed, this pattern is what many view as the normal pattern 
of democratic politics: at some point, incumbents inevitably wear out their welcome, and 
once they do, voters turn to the opposition waiting in the wings (cf. Przeworski 1991).  
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The fundamental question that advantaged first-mover party systems pose is why this 
pattern takes so much longer to become established, if it does at all.   
 The explanation I offer in this chapter is that incumbent defeat requires the 
presence of a credible alternative.  And unlike in established regimes, in new ones there 
is no opposition party with previous experience in government.  Voters may have no 
practical way to sanction the incumbent for poor performance if no opposition party 
appears capable of doing a better job.  Thus, long periods of one-party rule are at their 
root due to opposition dysfunction, rather than incumbent party organization and skill.  
And opposition parties are most likely to be unacceptable to the median voter in the 
electorate when both they and the regime in which they have to compete are entirely new 
than when they have a previous track record as a governing party.  Thus, Duverger’s 
evocative metaphor of dominant parties containing within themselves “the seeds of their 
own destruction” is only half-right: dominant party decline is inevitable.  But the timing 
of dominant party defeat is determined not by the progression of their own sclerosis but 
the rate of development of their competitors.  
 The argument proceeds as follows.  The first section introduces the concept of 
party system asymmetry and describes how high asymmetry increases expected ruling 
party survival rates. The remaining sections each cover a different mechanism through 
which party system asymmetry is sustained. The second section describes how 
differences in mass partisanship can produce asymmetry, as one party benefits from 
more loyal partisan supporters than others.  The third section addresses spatial 
positioning, detailing how some parties can be less able than others to reposition 
themselves in ideological space to win more votes.  The fourth section discusses how 
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differences in coordination lead to party system asymmetry: one party may be inherently 
better at converting votes into seats, and seats into a role in government.  The fifth section 
considers how these three mechanisms may work in concert over time, and derives 
hypotheses about when party system might remain high for a prolonged period of time. 
 
 3.1. Theoretical Foundations 
 Party System Asymmetry    
 The theory presented here attempts to account for party system asymmetry.  A 
party system is asymmetric when one party consistently has the highest probability of 
controlling the chief executive’s office over several election cycles.  This greater 
probability is due to structural, systematic factors that are relatively stable over time, in 
contrast to the random elements that also influence any given election outcome such as 
economic shocks or international conflicts.  In a perfectly symmetric party system, 
structural advantages for one party over all others do not exist: the election outcome is 
decided as the joint outcome of many random events.  That is, in a two-party system, 
both the ruling and opposition parties go into the election cycle with an equal chance of 
winning.  In a multi-party system, at least one opposition party has a probability of 
winning equal to that of the incumbent.   
 In a highly asymmetric party system, by contrast, the incumbent party has a large 
and systematic advantage over all other parties in the system.  As a result, it is far and 
away the most likely of all the parties contesting the elections to control the chief 
executive’s office.  In an asymmetric party system with only two parties, one goes into 
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every election with a much higher probability than the other of winning; in a multi-party 
system, one party is the clear favorite over all others. 
 Following this definition, the link between party system asymmetry and ruling 
party survival is straightforward.  Perfectly symmetric party systems should generate 
frequent ruling party turnover: the likelihood of a ruling party surviving a given number 
of years is a function of the number of elections it has had to face.24  In the simplest case 
of a symmetric two-party system with fixed terms, for instance, both parties face a 0.5 
probability of winning each election.  The expected probability of one party controlling 
the executive for two consecutive election cycles is then (0.5)2 = 0.25; for three, (0.5)3 = 
0.125; for four, (0.5)4 = 0.0625, and so on.  In an asymmetric party system, by contrast, 
something highly unusual has to occur for the leading party to lose control of the 
executive, which increases the expected incumbent survival time.  If the party system is 
so asymmetric that one party wins each election with a 0.9 probability, then the 
probability that it survives any given number of election cycles is much higher as well: 
for two, (0.9)2 = 0.81; for three, (0.9)3 = 0.729; for four, (0.9)4 = 0.6561, and so forth.  In 
other words, the key to explaining why long periods of one-party rule occur is to 
understand the causes of party system asymmetry: ruling party turnover occurs rarely in 
asymmetric party systems while it occurs frequently in symmetric ones. 
 
                                                
24 Or months in office, if the ruling party can lose control of the executive without an election. 
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 Mechanisms of Party System Asymmetry 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, party system asymmetry was high at the beginning of 
many electorally-contested regimes.  It is not surprising that new ECRs often begin with 
a clear leading party: entry into the party system has been previously forbidden, and it 
takes time for new entrants to develop the capability to challenge the first incumbent in 
office.  What is not obvious, however, is why this initial asymmetry should persist over 
many election cycles in some cases (e.g. India, Tanzania), and not in others (e.g. Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan).  The wide variation in survival times within the set of advantaged first-
mover parties indicates that what produces party system asymmetry at the beginning of 
the regime does not necessarily reproduce it over time.  In other words, we need a theory 
that is dynamic: one that can account for the persistence or decline of party system 
asymmetry after the founding election of the regime.   
 Accordingly, I identify three causal mechanisms through which party system 
asymmetry is sustained.  By causal mechanism, I mean a series of events governed by 
lawlike regularities that lead from the explanans—the causal factors—to the 
explanandum—the outcome to be explained (Little 1991: 15).  These law-like regularities 
in turn are grounded in a generalized understanding of individual behavior that informs 
each link in the causal chain.  That is, to explain why party system asymmetry occurs, it 
is not enough simply to show a positive association between a causal factor (e.g. material 
resources, ruling party age) and asymmetry; we must also detail how the causal factor 
leads to different behavior of individuals across the parties and how this behavior in turn 
leads to different party probabilities of winning elections.   
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 Focusing on causal mechanisms allows us to specify how this process or the 
magnitude of its effect might change as time passes.  For instance, one important 
mechanism of asymmetry is individual partisanship, which develops in part through 
regular participation in the electoral process and thus should strengthen as the regime 
ages.  In attributing the persistence of party system asymmetry to one party’s larger 
number of partisans, then, we need to specify not only how this advantage came about 
but also the reason new partisans develop at different rates for different parties—
otherwise, the leading party should gradually sink into parity with at least one other party 
in the system.  The discussion of partisanship therefore is focused on what is required for 
new parties to develop a partisan following in the electorate and the conditions under 
which this varies.   
 
 The Causes of Party System Asymmetry: Three Research Traditions 
 What causes party system asymmetry?  There are at least three distinct research 
traditions in political science that speak to this question. The first is the behavioral 
tradition, sometimes called the “Michigan school,” whose seminal work is The American 
Voter (Campbell et al. 1960).  This tradition is characterized by a focus on mass rather 
than elite behavior, draws heavily on political psychology, and explains vote choice as a 
consequence primarily of partisanship—an individual-level tie to or identification with a 
political party that is independent of the issues or candidates involved in any single 
election.  The literature on clientelism, exemplified by Herbert Kitschelt’s work (e.g. 
2000), is arguably a close enough intellectual cousin to be grouped with the Michigan 
school, as well: at the least, it shares a similar focus on patterns of mass voting behavior 
 107 
and particularly the development of long-lasting voter ties to a particular party.  The 
second tradition can be found in the spatial modeling literature beginning with Anthony 
Downs (1957), sometimes called the “Rochester school” for the department from which 
many of its early contributors came (cf. Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita 1999).  This 
tradition is characterized by a greater concern with accounting for elite behavior in 
elections, draws heavily on the methods and assumptions of economics, and typically 
explains vote choice as a consequence of the policy positions candidates or parties take, 
followed by a rational calculation of self-interest by the voter.  The third is the 
institutionalist tradition, most prominently represented in research by Gary Cox (1997) 
and Matthew Shugart (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Shugart and Carey 1992) but 
building on earlier work by Arend Lijphart (e.g. Lijphart 1984)—what, to parallel the 
other two, we might call the “San Diego school.”  This tradition focuses on the way 
formal rules structure partisan competition for office, and it emphasizes variation across 
institutional settings in how popular support is converted into votes, votes into seats, and 
seats into political power.  
 Each of these schools has valuable insights to contribute to a theory of party 
system asymmetry, and each has been referenced in existing work on dominant party 
systems. But as these research traditions have developed at some distance from one 
another, so the various theories of dominant party systems have continued to draw mainly 
from one tradition to the neglect of the others.  For instance, among the recent 
scholarship on dominant parties, the explanations offered by Beatriz Magaloni (2006) and 
Ethan Scheiner (2006) argue for clientelism as the key mechanism sustaining one-party 
dominance: the ruling party’s privileged access to state resources and its superior 
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organization allow it to cement voter loyalty by delivering benefits to its supporters and 
denying them to its opponents.  Explanations offered by Anthony McGann (1999) and 
Ken Greene (2007), by contrast, emphasize the importance of spatial positioning: 
dominant parties persist in office mainly because they occupy the critical centrist position 
in the party system, with opposition parties arrayed toward the extremes.  For McGann, 
this advantage occurs because the distribution of voters is skewed toward one end of the 
ideological spectrum, while for Greene it is because opposition parties are composed of 
ideological extremists who refuse to reposition closer to the median voter.  But for both, 
the central mechanism at work is the political parties’ ideological distance from one 
another and the median voter—a fundamentally Downsian conception of political 
competition.  Work by Cox (Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 1996; Cox 1997), and Lin (1996; 
2006) highlights a third mechanism, that of elite and voter coordination, to account for 
party system asymmetry.  In these explanations, the dominant party’s superior party 
organization and resources, among other factors, allow it to nominate the ideal number of 
candidates and distribute voter support more frequently and effectively than the 
opposition.  Thus, the party’s greater efficiency at converting votes into seats, and seats 
into political power, gives it a competitive advantage over the opposition.   
 In some cases, these competing explanations do predict different outcomes under 
the same initial conditions.  For example, theories of coordination imply that ruling 
parties should be more likely to lose when the opposition camp has a more disciplined 
organization that is better able to solve coordination problems.  Theories of partisanship 
and spatial positioning, by contrast, predict that opposition party organization per se 
should have no effect on the risk of ruling party defeat.    
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 In other cases, different mechanisms are invoked to explain the same effect on the 
party system.  For instance, theories in all three traditions predict that a large incumbent 
party resource advantage will sustain party system asymmetry, but they specify different 
ways in which this advantage should be manifested: the incumbent could remain favored 
to retain control of the executive (a) because it enjoys the support of a large bloc of loyal 
partisan voters cemented through clientelist ties, (b) because it holds a centrist position in 
policy space against extremist opposition parties, or (c) because unlike the opposition it 
can run candidates in every district and more efficiently convert votes into executive 
control.   
 Previous research has typically emphasized the explanatory power of one favored 
mechanism to the exclusion of others.  But there is no good reason to believe that only 
one of these mechanisms is operating; indeed, the safer assumption going forward is that 
all three are relevant.  Rather than attempting to demonstrate that one of these traditions 
“has it right,” I think we are better served by considering the net effects of these different 
mechanisms in combination on party system asymmetry.  To this end, I proceed by 
describing each mechanism in more detail.  I then consider the factors that are likely to 
drive changes in asymmetry over time, focusing in particular on how one mechanism 
might trigger, reinforce or undercut others. In this way, my theory of party system 
development incorporates insights from all three research traditions.  The resulting 
explanation provides a more nuanced understanding of party system asymmetry without 
sacrificing a great deal in parsimony and generality.     
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 3.2. Mechanism 1: Partisanship 
 The first way party system asymmetry can be sustained is through the mechanism 
of mass partisanship. Partisanship is the psychological bond between an individual and a 
political party.25  An individual’s partisanship colors how she views the political world: it 
affects everything from the interpretation of new information to the decision to support 
specific government policies to the intensity and frequency of political participation 
(Campbell et al. 1960).   
 Its relevance to party system asymmetry, however, is most obviously through its 
effect on individual vote choice.  Partisanship remains the single best predictor of how an 
individual will vote in any given election (Dalton and Weldon 2007).  The consequence 
for electoral competition is straightforward: if a large fraction of the electorate identifies 
with one party, it holds a systematic advantage over all other parties in the competition 
for votes.  That is, the electorate as a whole is biased toward one party; all else equal, the 
party with the most partisans has the greatest likelihood of winning control of the 
executive in the election. 
 
 Sources of Mass Partisanship at the Beginning of Electorally Contested Regimes  
 I found in Chapter 2 that there appeared to be wide variation in the fraction of 
partisans in the electorate at the beginning of electorally-contested regimes. The way in 
which the ECR was established mattered a great deal for the initial distribution of 
                                                
25 The meaning of the terms “partisanship,” “party identification,” “party affect,” and “ties to a party” 
overlap, and they are often used interchangeably in practice.  I use “partisanship” to refer to the underlying 
concept of an identification with a political party. 
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partisans in the electorate.  If the previous ruling authority effectively disintegrated, as in 
the Baltic states, or removed itself entirely from politics, as in the transitions from 
military dictatorships in Spain and Portugal, then there tended to be few partisans of any 
stripe in the first elections, and the party system was akin to a blank slate.  That is, none 
of the new parties that sprouted up to contest the elections initially held a clear partisan 
advantage over the others.  If after leaving office the previous incumbent remained part 
of the political scene, however, it often retained some partisan supporters, and the initial 
party system then looked more asymmetric.  The majority of voters may have despised 
the party of the ancien regime but had no ties to any of the alternatives, either—only as 
these developed over time was the former incumbent’s partisan advantage reduced.  For 
instance, in Russia and Ukraine, the Communist Party retained considerable residual 
partisan support after the breakup of the Soviet Union (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Brader 
and Tucker 2001; cf. Grzymala-Busse 2002).   
 If the previous incumbent remained in power through the transition to contested 
elections, it was even more likely to begin with more partisans than any other parties. 
Again, there often existed many voters who were openly hostile to the incumbent, but 
they did not initially have strong partisan attachments to any opposition party.  For 
example, the KMT in Taiwan participated in elections for local offices since the 1950s 
and the legislature beginning in 1969, while opposition parties were officially banned 
until 1987.  As a result, when the national executive was finally opened to direct election 
in 1996, it had by far the largest percentage of partisans in the electorate; shortly before 
the presidential election that year, 32.1 percent of all respondents identified with the 
KMT while only 12.8 percent identified with the strongest opposition party, the DPP 
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(Tsai 2003; Tsai and Chao 2008).  This pattern was also prevalent in Africa; few African 
states had any significant history of multi-party elections before they transitioned to 
ECRs in the early 1990s.  Opposition parties thus had to develop a partisan following in 
the electorate from scratch—they had no previous partisan reference points that they 
could tap into (Lindberg 2006; cf. Ishiyama and Quinn 2006). 
 In contrast, there was less partisan asymmetry in states that had a previous history 
of multi-party competition.  If the new regime marked the resumption of electoral 
contestation, rather than introducing it for the first time, there were often pre-existing 
party identities that were available for the new contestants to tap into.  For instance, most 
of the Latin American states had long histories of multi-party competition in elections 
that were interrupted by military dictatorships, most recently in the 1970s and 1980s.  
When ECRs were eventually reestablished in these states and regular elections returned, 
many voters already had some previous experience of siding with one party or another.  
As a consequence, the new party system often reflected this historical legacy, with a 
similar constellation of parties and patterns of voter support emerging in short order 
(Geddes 1995; Lupu and Stokes 2010; cf. Wittenberg 2006 on Hungary; Kreuzer 2009 on 
post-war Germany).  
 The greatest initial partisan asymmetry tended to occur in regimes featuring a 
mass-mobilizing “founder party”—one that led the country to independence and played 
the central role in creating the regime, such as the ANC in South African and the INC in 
India.  In these cases, the initial incumbent enjoyed broad support and voter sympathy: 
indeed, it was more exceptional for a voter not to be a partisan supporter of the founder 
party, at least initially.  In South Africa, for instance, 58 percent of voters “strongly 
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identified” with the ANC in 1994—well over half the electorate (Habib and Taylor 
1999).  
 Thus, we see a wide range of patterns of mass partisanship at the beginning of 
ECRs, from cases in which the party system was effectively a blank slate with no partisan 
ties whatsoever, such as the Baltics, to those in which there remained some partisan 
holdovers from the old regime or from a previous history of multi-party elections (E. 
Europe, Latin America), to those in which the incumbent remained in office and had 
strong partisan ties to a sizeable minority of voters (Mozambique, Tanzania, Taiwan), to 
those in which a large majority of the electorate felt some partisan attachment to the 
founder party (South Africa, India). 
 
 Change in Partisanship Asymmetry over Time 
 Now, given an initial incumbent advantage in mass partisanship, how might this 
change over time?  The definitive statement on how partisan attachments develop in new 
regimes remains Converse (1969; see also Dalton and Weldon 2007).  Converse proposes 
that partisanship is formed through a combination of two processes: (1) family 
socialization, and (2) voting participation.  As adolescents, citizens are “socialized” by 
those around them, especially their immediate family, to identify with one particular 
party.  Once they come of age and enter the electorate, this initial predisposition toward 
one party is strengthened as individuals vote in elections.  These dual factors of 
socialization and participation generate an age effect: the older the voter, the more likely 
she is to strongly identify with a party, and the less likely she is to change her partisan 
identity.   
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 The major modification to this model since Converse has been to include some 
form of “cognitive updating” whereby voters can shift their identity in response to 
consistent conflicts between their personal political views and the positions and 
performance of “their” party (e.g. Fiorina 1981).  When enough new information 
conflicts with the voter’s partisan identity, partisanship can change (Groenendyk 2009).   
 The key implication of these models of partisanship formation is that a highly 
asymmetric distribution of partisans will change only slowly, as generational replacement 
occurs and incumbent party performance consistently disappoints some former partisans.  
Thus, the initial ruling party advantage can be perpetuated for decades through many 
voters’ stable psychological ties to the incumbent. 
 The second way asymmetry of partisanship can occur is through the ruling party’s 
use of clientelism to cement voter loyalty.  Clientelism refers to the direct exchange 
between elected officials and their constituents of votes for material benefits, including 
patronage, pork, and rents.  The key feature of clientelism that reinforces partisanship is 
the contingent nature of the exchange: elected officials can to a greater or lesser degree 
target these benefits at their supporters and withhold them from their opponents.  As a 
consequence, some share of the electorate becomes directly and materially dependent on 
the reelection of the incumbent party, or at least a subset of its elected members 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).  Thus, another reason an initial partisan asymmetry 
might occur is the opposition’s lack of resources.  Because opposition parties are not in 
government and have no previous history of catering to certain segments of the 
electorate, new opposition parties cannot typically rely on pork, patronage, or vote-
buying to build partisan support, while the incumbent is able regularly to reinforce its 
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partisan ties to voters.  Moreover, this imbalance is not likely to fade until the opposition 
actually wins an election or the incumbent’s resources run out. 
 Both of these models of the sources of partisanship suggest that, to have a realistic 
chance of winning elections, opposition parties must manage the difficult task of building 
a party brand—that is, a recognized party name and appealing image that will “cue an 
established reputation” within the electorate.  Much as travelers know that McDonald’s 
provides a certain product with standards for cleanliness and service, the party brand can 
convey a great deal of information to voters about what a typical candidate of the 
political party is like (Aldrich 1995: 49). The more voters the party’s endorsement alone 
can deliver for its candidates at election time, the more competitive the party will be in 
elections against the incumbent. 
 Thus, asymmetry of partisanship can also decline as one or more opposition 
parties develops an organization disciplined enough and appealing enough to monopolize 
a segment of opinion in the electorate.  Unfortunately for oppositions, however, the 
parties best able to maintain consistency of appeals to voters are also less able to 
reposition themselves closer to the median voter.  This in turn leads to a second kind of 
asymmetry, that of spatial positioning.   
 
 3.3. Mechanism 2: Spatial Positioning 
 Spatial positioning asymmetry arises when one party is systematically more 
flexible in the ideological range of positions that it can take in the political arena.  Such 
flexibility gives the party an advantage in electoral competition to the extent that voters 
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choose a party based on how close its stated policy positions are to their own.  The more 
ideologically flexible party is more likely to end up espousing positions that appeal to the 
median voter on the most salient policy issues of the election, and as a consequence has 
the highest probability of winning executive control.  The key question here is how these 
differences in ideological flexibility between the parties come about.   
 The answer for new party systems with an advantaged incumbent has to do with 
different strategies of recruitment across the parties.  In order to win elections, both the 
incumbent party leaders and those of the opposition need to attract new members.  Parties 
need people to do everything from running as candidates and writing election manifestoes 
to knocking on doors, answering phones, and putting out press releases.  The crucial 
asymmetry between parties begins with differences in their ability to recruit: incumbents 
have access to the resources, offices, and powers of the state, and can therefore provide 
more attractive terms of employment for potential members than can opposition parties.  
New opposition parties cannot usually match these financial incentives, nor can they 
credibly promise to share the spoils of office, because they have never held power before.  
As a consequence, the types of candidates and workers the party is able to attract are 
qualitatively different from those who join the incumbent: they are both more 
ideologically motivated than incumbent party members, and far more extreme than the 
median voter in the electorate.   
 
 Recruitment Option 1: Paying Party Workers 
 To see why this is, consider first the simplest way to attract party workers: to offer 
material rewards.  Paying workers is a straightforward way to get them to work for the 
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party, but it is also a strategy unavailable to those parties without a consistent source of 
funding—and the opposition parties in this scenario are likely to be at a great 
disadvantage in fundraising. For one, an important source of party funding is donations 
from business. Businesses, however, tend to donate to influence decisions on laws and 
regulations that affect them, and they have a clear incentive to direct most donations to 
the party in power unless there is a strong prospect that the incumbent is likely to go 
down to defeat soon. And even with an unpopular incumbent, rare indeed is the brand-
new party that, lacking in candidates, members, and recognition among the public, can 
still credibly claim to be on the cusp of power.   
 Opposition parties may alternatively rely on a wealthy benefactor or two to pay 
the bills, but these are hardly a panacea—major donors are undoubtedly going to want a 
major say as well in shaping the party’s political agenda and probably also in its 
organization and tactics. Thus, attracting large donors requires finding some that 
passionately support the party’s cause. Relying on small donors can be problematic, 
too—the party cannot promise anything material in return to most of those donors, so 
they must find a cause that both appeals to large number of individuals and about which 
they are passionate enough to donate. 
 Alternative sources of funding are sometimes available to new parties, of course.  
Some oppositions are supported by funds from abroad; the United States and European 
Union have provided financial support to opposition parties in Nicaragua, Serbia, and 
Slovakia, for example (Levitsky and Way 2010: 48-49).  Opposition parties sometimes 
can even receive funding from public sources within the country; in Taiwan, for instance, 
all parties winning seats in the legislature now become eligible for public funds in 
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proportion to their seat share. To the extent these alternative sources of funding are 
available, they should improve new parties’ prospects of success.  But these options are 
rarely available; much more commonly, opposition parties will be chronically short of 
money to run their operations and pay their workers. 
 
 Recruitment Option 2: Attracting Volunteers 
 As a consequence of their financial woes, most newly-formed opposition parties 
facing an advantaged incumbent will be forced to rely heavily on volunteers to work for 
the party, or in Kaare Strom’s term, to become “labor intensive” (1990: 576).  By 
donating a great deal of time and energy to party activities without receiving financial 
compensation, volunteers allow parties to overcome the financial hurdles that would 
otherwise make competing impossible.  But a reliance on volunteers has one major 
drawback: it is likely to saddle the party with suboptimal policy positions on which it is 
highly inflexible.   
 To see this, consider how parties typically recruit volunteers.  One way to appeal 
to potential members is by offering a material payoff “down the road,” holding out the 
promise of the benefits of power and office once the party wins an election. However, 
much like the problem with soliciting donations from business, this pitch becomes less 
attractive the more remote the party’s prospects of gaining power appear.  
 That leaves resource-poor parties with poor short-term electoral prospects to use a 
second type of appeal: promoting a cause that attracts passionate supporters. Most minor 
parties in the United States follow this model. The Libertarian Party, for instance, attracts 
members by advocating a life philosophy—self-reliance, individual responsibility, and a 
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belief in the efficiency of free markets—as much as a set of public policies. Those who 
participate in the party’s activities, whether as candidates or organizers, generally do so 
not out of a belief that they will soon be in power but out of a desire to disseminate their 
views more widely in society. A similar dedication to “The Cause” before winning office 
characterizes the membership of other minor parties such as the Socialist Party, the Green 
Party, and the Constitution Party (Hazlett 1992). 
 Such causes can attract many new members in a short time to an upstart political 
party, many of whom are willing to donate a tremendous amount of time, energy, and 
their own material resources to further the party’s activities. The catch is that the 
members of these labor-intensive parties look quite different from the electorate at large.  
First, they are motivated by ideology much more than material rewards; otherwise, why 
would they join an opposition party without resources to pay them?  Second, they hold 
quite extreme views relative to the median voter in the electorate; otherwise, they should 
not be willing to devote so much time and energy to advocate a cause that is so radically 
different from the status quo (Green 2007).   
 
 Commitment Problems in Parties with Ideologically-Motivated Activists 
 In turn, having an ideologically-motivated membership can lead to a serious intra-
party commitment problem once the party begins to participate in the electoral arena.  
This problem is that the leadership often has an incentive to renege on policy promises to 
its rank-and-file membership, either to position the party to win more votes, or to cut 
deals with the incumbent to obtain government portfolios or advance a particular policy 
objective (Strom 1990: 575-6). Would-be party activists will recognize that leadership 
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promises are not credible, and party activism will therefore be undersupplied—fewer 
people will join the party, and those that do will be less willing to work, and less 
enthusiastically, for the party than if the party leadership’s stated policy preferences were 
completely credible to its rank-and-file membership. 
 There are at least three ways parties may overcome this commitment problem, 
each with its own drawbacks (Strom 1990). First, parties can decentralize intra-party 
policy decisions— moving them from a select group of core leaders to an open vote of 
the full party membership, for example. This strategy, however, contributes to suboptimal 
policy positions: the preferences of the median voter in the party membership are much 
more extreme than those of the median voter in the electorate. Opposition candidates will 
therefore be at a systematic competitive disadvantage relative to the incumbent party’s 
candidates, and would be unable to reposition themselves more moderately even if they 
wanted to. 
 Thus, a party composed of ideologically-motivated activists and instrumentally-
motivated leaders and candidates is likely to experience persistent disagreements over the 
party’s stated policy positions and its allocation of endorsements and resources (Aldrich 
1995: 50). Greater intra-party democracy increases the motivation of party activists but 
prevents the party’s candidates from adopting policy positions that maximize their 
expected vote share. Such restrictions in turn can prove debilitating to the party leaders’ 
efforts to compete in elections. One good illustration of this problem is in the struggles of 
the British Labour Party to delete a commitment to large-scale nationalization of British 
enterprise from the party’s charter.  Both Neil Kinnock and John Smith failed to abolish 
this clause, and only when Tony Blair succeeded did the Labour Party again defeat the 
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Conservatives (Strom and Muller 1999: 10). 
 A second possibility is for leaders to make themselves directly accountable to the 
party membership, through short terms and direct elections. This strategy makes leaders 
more responsive to party opinion, but also more vulnerable to intra-party defeat, and thus 
to discount future benefits in favor of short-term gains. And opposition leaders who are 
motivated by the benefits of office and who highly discount the future will be easier (i.e. 
cheaper) for the incumbent to woo away.  
 The demise of the Japanese Socialist Party illustrates how this can damage an 
opposition party’s long-term prospects. After several decades in opposition, the JSP 
finally joined the longtime incumbent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in a coalition 
government in 1994. The move led to the first Socialist prime minister in over 40 years, 
but also required that the party abandon a number of its long-held policy differences with 
the LDP. As a consequence, the party’s activist members rebelled or resigned, its 
traditional supporters abandoned it in droves in the next election, and it all but ceased to 
be a viable party (Scheiner 2006: 41-42). The LDP subsequently returned to the prime 
minister’s office for the next 15 years. 
 To prevent the possibility of this kind of destructive leadership defection, parties 
can also restrict nominations to elected offices to existing activists—that is, party 
nominees may all be required to have spent time, say, doing constituent service and 
organizing in local neighborhoods. The problem with this strategy is that it leads to 
lackluster candidates: the skills that make a good local canvasser and party hack are not 
necessarily (or likely) to be the same as those which make a good candidate for elected 
office.  And once again, it saddles the party with positions that are far from the median 
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voter: by ensuring that party nominees faithfully espouse the policy positions of the 
median party member, the party also guarantees that its platform will be outside the 
mainstream of public opinion. 
 The end consequence of these different recruitment strategies is that opposition 
party leaders in general will be more limited in their autonomy in choosing a party 
platform than the incumbent party, and that party candidates will be less attractive than 
the incumbent party’s. Thus, new parties will tend to emerge as “niche” parties, able to 
recruit a core membership that favors relatively extreme positions, but as a consequence 
are less able than existing parties to reposition themselves to win votes (Greene 2007).  In 
this way, the initial difference in the recruitment strategies of an advantaged incumbent 
and new opposition parties is converted into positioning asymmetry: incumbents tend to 
end up centrist and ideologically adaptable, while opposition parties end up forming at 
either extreme and remain committed to sub-optimal policies even when it is obvious that 
these will lose them votes.  Thus, an advantaged incumbent can continue in office even 
when most voters disapprove of its performance, because its opponents are too extreme 
and divided by ideological differences to form a credible alternative. 
 
 Ideology and Voter Distribution 
 Even if parties in the system have about the same ideological flexibility, however, 
there is one final way that ideology can sustain party system asymmetry: through the 
distribution of voters across the ideological spectrum.  Anthony McGann (1999; 2002) 
has shown that one party can enjoy a positioning advantage over all others merely 
because the distribution of voters in policy space is skewed to one side or the other.  For 
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instance, if the preferred policy positions of most right-wing voters cluster tightly around 
a peak to the right of the median voter, while left-wing voters favor positions spread more 
evenly through policy space to the left, then the parties of the left have to appeal to a 
greater net range of opinion than do the parties of the right.  The party located at the 
modal voter on the right will then win the largest share of the vote, even when there are 
several parties and all take strictly vote-maximizing positions.  As a consequence, a party 
centered on an ideologically compact minority may consistently win executive control in 
competition against parties appealing to a majority dispersed over a broad ideological 
space.  McGann uses this finding to account for long periods of one-party rule in several 
European democracies, including the CDU in West Germany, the SAP in Sweden, and 
the rightist parties in the French Fifth Republic (1999: 105-160).  Implicit in this 
explanation is that ideologically dispersed majorities generate a third kind of problem, 
that of coordination.   
 
 3.4. Mechanism 3: Coordination 
 The third way party system asymmetry may be sustained is through the 
mechanism of coordination.  Coordination among voters and political elites is a central 
part of the process of converting citizen preferences into votes for specific candidates and 
parties.  In parliamentary regimes, it also is required for converting seats into executive 
control.  Indeed, Gary Cox has gone so far as to place coordination at the heart of 
“modern representative democracy,” which “presents at its core a series of coordination 
problems that arise as natural consequences of electoral competition for governmental 
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offices” (1997: 5; italics in original). 
 The fundamental problem of electoral coordination is that, in Cox’s words, “[a] 
group with enough votes to elect some number of candidates in a given (legislative or 
executive) race will in fact elect that number only if it can make its votes count by 
concentrating them appropriately” (ibid.).  Under different patterns of coordination, the 
same underlying voter preferences across all parties in the system can result in very 
different winners.  For instance, if elites on the political left agree to nominate a single 
slate of candidates, and leftist voters duly support that slate, while voters on the right split 
their votes between several rightist parties, then it is more likely a leftist party will win 
the chief executive’s office than a rightist party.  This outcome is independent of the 
underlying distribution of preferences for leftist versus rightist policies in the electorate 
as a whole: the new chief executive, in fact, could be significantly to the left of the 
median voter.  When coordination works consistently to the advantage of one party or 
coalition, then party system asymmetry is the result: one party’s expected share of 
political power is higher than all others for a given level of political support. 
 Although it combines elements of both partisanship and spatial positioning, 
coordination is best thought of as a separate mechanism through which party system 
asymmetry can be generated.  The coordination mechanism is distinct in two ways.  First, 
public expectations play a central role—electoral outcomes depend crucially on what 
everyone expects everyone else to do in the election.  In other words, coordination is 
inherently strategic.  Second, the patterns of coordination can change greatly depending 
on the institutions that structure electoral competition.  In particular, electoral systems 
can generate very different incentives for both intra- and inter-party coordination in 
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elections, and these in turn can affect fundamental features of the party system including 
the number of parties to win seats and the ideological range between them.   
 The key task for us here is to specify the conditions at the beginning of an ECR 
under which coordination will be unequal between parties, and to specify how and when 
this leads to a systematic advantage for one party in the competition for executive power.  
For the moment, I will take up this task without reference to electoral institutions or the 
method of executive selection.  (I consider the effects of institutions on asymmetry in 
Chapter 4.)  Consistent with our interest in the party system at the beginning of an ECR, I 
will also focus on the problems of the opposition as a whole relative to the incumbent 
party. 
 
 Requirements for Opposition Coordination in New Regimes 
 In ECRs in which the incumbent party is expected to win the majority of seats and 
offices up for election, the coordination problem facing the opposition camp is simple: it 
needs to ensure that votes for opposition candidates are concentrated as efficiently as 
possible, and not split between two or more candidates or parties. If the overriding goal is 
to defeat the incumbent, the ideal pattern of coordination is to have only a single 
candidate or slate of candidates which captures the votes of all opponents of the ruling 
party. The more candidates who run for a given office, and the more opposition parties 
which contest a particular election, the more difficult it will be for voters who support the 
opposition to coordinate their votes in a way that maximizes the chance that incumbent 
party candidates will be defeated. 
 In the “mature” party system of a long-lived ECR, endorsements from opposition 
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parties with an established “reputation for viability” provide a ready solution to this 
coordination problem for both voters and elites (Cox 1997: 159). Such party 
endorsements then provide two valuable pieces of information: (1) the endorsed 
candidates will further the goals of the opposition if elected, and (2) past experience 
indicates that most other opposition supporters are also likely to vote for the same 
candidate(s), making them obvious coordination points. The role of the party nomination 
and endorsement process is key: without party endorsements, “groups of like-minded 
voters might end up splitting their votes sub-optimally among a superabundance of 
similar candidates” (ibid.). For the same reasons that endorsements are valuable to 
opposition supporters, they will also be desirable for aspirants to elected office: “to the 
extent that the endorsement holds sway as a focal coordination device among some set of 
voters, it insulates endorsees from strategic desertion, and, indeed, operates to make them 
a net beneficiary of strategic voting” (160). 
 Cox argues that such reputations require a party to establish “a monopoly on 
endorsing within a given segment of opinion, having beaten out or co-opted all other 
would-be coordination devices” (160). Thus, the ideal scenario in a newly-established 
ECR is for all the opposition to coalesce around a single party which (1) monopolizes, or 
very nearly so, the entire anti-incumbent vote, and thereby (2) determines the viability of 
candidates through its endorsement procedures—those who win the party’s endorsements 
receive the votes of all opposition supporters.  If one party in the opposition manages to 
capture all of the anti-opposition vote, then the asymmetry of the party system due to 
coordination problems should be markedly reduced: if neither the partisanship nor the 
spatial positioning mechanisms contribute much to asymmetry, then the opposition 
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should have nearly as good a shot at winning the next election as the incumbent.   
 In new ECRs, however, there are rarely opposition parties with “reputations for 
viability” on which to coordinate.  Those in the opposition have typically never before 
contested an election, let alone won seats.  The opposition party scene at the beginning of 
the regime may be completely in flux: dozens, even hundreds of new parties may register 
to compete in the run-up to the first election, and none have any previous track record 
that might indicate their viability. Thus, the expectations about which party is the best 
alternative to the incumbent are likely to be greatly affected by the first election, once the 
election results make clear which opposition parties have attracted the greatest support. 
 Once the first election has been held, we should expect a rapid improvement in 
opposition coordination, all else equal. For one, everyone has the results of the last 
election to guide their adjustment of expectations and strategies.  Thus, the number of 
“wasted” votes should decline over the next couple of election cycles, as opposition 
supporters get better at concentrating their votes on the candidate or slate of candidates 
that have a realistic shot at winning seats.  As both elites and voters learn through 
electoral experience which parties are most viable, one expects an increase in the 
information needed to form competitive pre-electoral coalitions.   
 But in fact, we do not always see this consolidation despite having good 
information from the previous election about which parties and candidates are most 
viable.  A review of the cases highlights two reasons.  One is that ideological differences 
may divide the opposition camp, for reasons we saw in the previous section: opposition 
parties may end up taking non-centrist positions, while the incumbent is free to claim the 
center.  Thus, there may be good coordination on the left and the right of the political 
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spectrum, but getting both sides to cooperate to defeat the incumbent is impossible.  I 
discuss when this ends-against-the-center problem might be especially problematic in 
more detail in the next section.  The second reason is the role of electoral institutions in 
raising or lowering the difficulty of coordination—a topic I take up in earnest in Chapter 
4.      
 
 
 3.5. Combining the Effects: What Sustains Party System Asymmetry? 
 The “Natural” Decline of Party System Asymmetry 
 Having discussed how each causal mechanism works in isolation, let us now 
consider how they might work in concert to sustain party system asymmetry over time.  
The discussion above points to what we can characterize as a “natural evolution” of the 
party system toward greater electoral symmetry as the regime ages, the ruling party 
inevitably disillusions some supporters, and business cycles take their toll on the party’s 
popularity.  This decline of ruling party advantages should occur through a combination 
of all three mechanisms, as partisan change in turn leads to shifts in opposition party 
recruitment and position-taking, and better anti-incumbent coordination among elites and 
voters. 
 First, we should expect opposition partisanship to develop gradually among voters 
who consistently favor opposition parties, reducing the gap in partisanship between the 
opposition camp and the incumbent.  Both the Converse socialization model and the 
cognitive updating model predict that voters who dislike the incumbent will eventually 
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develop attachments to one of the alternatives; or if they do not, then their children will.  
Thus, over a generation (20 years) or more, the opposition camp as a whole should start 
to enjoy a level of partisan attachment that approaches that of the first incumbent. 
 In turn, the rise of opposition partisans, combined with the inevitable decline of 
incumbent party popularity, should make opposition parties more attractive to 
instrumentally-motivated candidates and other party elites, rather than just ideologically-
motivated ones, as the opposition’s prospects of winning office start to improve.  As the 
initial founders of the party age and depart, these new, more pragmatic individuals will be 
motivated to increase the flexibility of the party’s position-taking, reducing the spatial 
positioning advantage of the incumbent and further improving the party’s chances of 
winning office.  
 Finally, the relative decline in importance of ideological goals among opposition 
parties should lead to improved coordination, as well, as the expected payoff of 
cooperation in elections increases.   As a consequence, we have good reason to expect the 
initial party system dominated by an advantaged first-mover party to evolve gradually 
into something more symmetric.  Over a generation or more, the rise of partisanship, the 
increasing number and influence of instrumentally-oriented party elites, and the stronger 
incentives and ability of opposition party leaders and supporters to coordinate with one 
another should together create the rise of a credible alternative to the incumbent.    
 It is in this way that Duverger, writing more than half a century ago, got the 
central pattern right: the dominant party “bears within itself the seeds of its own 
destruction” ([1954] 1959: 312).  The typical dominant party system is not in permanent 
equilibrium but in a transitional period toward a fully competitive party system.  
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Duverger’s focus on the sclerosis of incumbency to account for dominant party demise 
was misplaced, however.  It is instead the growth of opposition parties that leads 
ultimately to the defeat of advantaged incumbents.  The fundamental question that 
dominant parties pose, then, is not why they lose, but how long they last.   
 
 Factors That Retard or Accelerate The Decline of Asymmetry 
 This framing of the question focuses our attention on factors that may retard or 
accelerate the development of ruling party competitors in new party systems.  There are 
two in particular that are frequently emphasized in the literature, and that appear 
systematically to slow down opposition party growth and therefore increase the expected 
survival rate of advantaged ruling parties.  These are (1) the ruling party’s resource 
advantage, and (2) its capacity and willingness to employ repression to prevent 
oppositions from becoming more competitive.  Each of these generates a clear empirical 
prediction about the survival of dominant parties: when these factors are large, ruling 
parties should survive longer in power.   
 On the first, full control of the state gives the ruling party control over money, 
jobs, and pork that can sustain asymmetry in a couple of ways.  Most obviously, 
resources can be used to buttress partisan loyalties through clientelist ties with key voting 
blocs.  The direct exchange of material benefits for votes makes it much harder for the 
opposition to win over voters who might otherwise be predisposed to support them 
(Magaloni 2006).  But resource advantages work equally to inhibit opposition party 
development as well through both the positioning and coordination mechanisms: the 
opposition parties remain both more extreme and less able to coordinate when they are 
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starved for resources (Greene 2007; Cox 1997).  Thus, we have a clear empirical 
prediction from this literature: the greater a ruling party’s resource advantage, the more 
asymmetric the party system will continue to be.  A decline in resource advantages, on 
the other hand, should greatly improve opposition party prospects.   
 Second, the incumbent may resort to naked force to maintain its grip on power.  It 
may still hold contested elections, but it employs the coercive apparatus of the state to 
harass and intimidate voters and candidates.  This, too, works through multiple 
mechanisms to retard the growth of opposition parties.  Coercion can reduce opposition 
vote totals by preventing voters from exercising a free choice in the elections in many 
districts, as, for instance, when ruling party thugs stuff ballot boxes, beat up people on the 
streets in opposition strongholds, or round up uncommitted voters and physically escort 
them to the polling station.  Threats against and intimidation of opposition candidates 
also keep opposition parties more extreme than they otherwise would be, through the 
recruitment mechanism—they greatly raise the cost of joining, so that only the most 
obstinate individuals remain committed to participating in elections. 
 Thus, both large resource advantages and high levels of repression can produce 
the same result in the party system: weak, divided, and extremist opposition parties 
competing against a centrist, pragmatic incumbent.  Expected incumbent survival under 
these circumstances is extremely high, and this is not likely to change as long as the 
incumbent’s resource advantages and its willingness and capacity to use repression 
remain high.    
 In addition to the effects of resources and repression, there is a third factor that 
appears to be important in several cases of dominant party persistence: group identities.  
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Divisions over national or ethnic group claims on the state have worked in several cases 
to reinforce opposition coordination problems.  For instance, in Malaysia, the opposition 
to the incumbent UMNO has long been divided along ethnic and religious lines.  On one 
side of the divide are the DAP and Keadilan, parties that appeal mainly to ethnic Chinese 
and Indians and secular elites, and which generally oppose special considerations for the 
country’s ethnic Malay majority. On the other side is the pro-Islamic PAS, which 
advocates for a greater Islamization of public life and the preservation or strengthening of 
affirmative action programs for Malays.  Given these diametrically opposed views on key 
issues in Malaysian political life, it is not hard to see why the opposition has consistently 
struggled to present a united front against UMNO.  A similar effect seems to be at work 
in South Africa, where the opposition parties running against the ANC have had to try to 
bridge the racial divide in that country; the ANC, by contrast, needs no support from 
whites to retain office.  Ethnic differences appear to have played a role as well in 
sustaining party system asymmetry in Guyana and possibly Belgium. 
 The effect of identity can also work in the opposite direction, depending on the 
relationship of the incumbent party to the primary identity cleavage in society.  In Sri 
Lanka, for example, the leading party at independence, the United National Party, 
appeared well-situated to remain the governing party after the first elections there.  But 
the multi-ethnic coalition that supported it dissolved within five years of independence 
when Sinhalese nationalists defected and founded the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1951.  
By appealing to, and stoking, Sinhalese nationalism, the SLFP was able to weaken the 
UNP’s base and win the 1956 elections.  Thus, by becoming the leading party of the 
ethnic majority group in Sri Lanka, the SLFP rapidly realigned the party system in its 
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favor.  A similar pattern occurred in Taiwan, where the KMT faced the challenge of 
maintaining support from the majority of “native” Taiwanese in the face of an opposition 
party making appeals to Taiwanese nationalism—a development I explore at length in the 
case study in Chapter 6.   
 
 Conclusion 
 To sum up, there are three factors that appear systematically to sustain party 
system asymmetry: resources, repression, and in certain situations the underlying social 
cleavage structure.  The first two of these, at least, can be tested with the data I have 
available, and I will do so in Chapter 5.  Before we move to empirical tests, however, 
there is another factor that deserves extended treatment in its own right: the effect 
different political institutions have on ruling party survival.  It is to this topic that I turn in 
Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4      
THEORY II: HOW INSTITUTIONS CONDITION RULING PARTY SURVIVAL 
 
“In every pure parliamentary system a vote for any 
particular legislator—or for the party’s list—is indirectly a 
vote for that party’s leader as candidate for prime minister.  
In a sense, a ‘perfect correlation’ exists between that 
party’s votes for executive and legislative candidates.   
 
“Yet in systems with popularly elected presidents, parties 
cannot take for granted the automatic alignment of the 
electoral bases of their executive and legislative ‘branches.’  
Indeed, the notion of presidential coattails…suggests that in 
such systems parties expect variation between their 
executive and legislative vote totals.  When voters have two 
ballots, parties must hope that their presidential candidates 
encourage voters to also cast votes for their candidates in 
the legislative race.” 
 
 --Samuels and Shugart (2011: 1) 
 
 
 In Chapter 3, I presented a theory of opposition party development in newly-
founded electorally contested regimes (ECRs).  The central argument was that the first 
incumbents in the regime often benefitted from large inter-party asymmetry in electoral 
competition: they were systematically more effective than opposition parties at 
converting popular support into executive control.  This asymmetry between the 
incumbent and opposition challengers was produced through three mechanisms: those of 
(1) mass partisanship, (2) spatial positioning, and (3) coordination.   
 In this chapter I consider how formal institutions affect this asymmetry of 
electoral competition.  I will show that institutions have a modifying effect on 
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competition—they work to exacerbate or mitigate pre-existing inequalities between the 
incumbent and the opposition.  In particular, they change the magnitude of the effect on 
ruling party survival of both mass partisanship and spatial positioning asymmetry. For 
instance, in highly-centralized parliamentary regimes, the benefit of being centrist is 
large—a centrist incumbent’s chances of renewing its control of the executive are quite 
high.  In decentralized presidential regimes, this benefit is much smaller—in the more 
personalized, candidate-centric setting of a presidential race, opposition party candidates 
are less constrained by extreme positions that their nominating parties may hold, and as a 
consequence the ruling party’s grip on the executive is more tenuous.    
 Put differently, institutions are intervening variables in my model of ruling party 
duration: inter-party asymmetry’s effect on ruling party survival interacts with that of the 
institutions of the regime.  I expect this interactive effect to be strongest where the formal 
rules of competition are respected by all participants: coercion, vote-buying and electoral 
fraud are limited, opposition parties are allowed to form and contest, and there are few 
formal barriers to campaigning.  It is under these circumstances that long periods of one-
party rule are most puzzling, and that institutional explanations are most relevant. 
 By institutions, I mean at minimum variation in three features of the formal rules 
that govern the selection of regime leaders and the authority they hold. The first is the 
electoral system: how are the members of the executive and legislature selected?  The 
second is executive selection: is the system presidential, parliamentary, or some 
combination of the two? The third is administrative centralization—how much authority 
is vested in local offices, rather than central government bureaucrats, and are local 
officials elected or appointed?  
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 I will show how these formal institutional features systematically alter the 
expected ruling party survival rate for a given level of asymmetry in the party system.  It 
turns out that the most complex effect is generated by the electoral system: in general, it 
is not possible a priori to predict which electoral systems are most likely to sustain 
dominant parties.  By contrast, we can derive unambiguous predictions about the effects 
of executive selection and administrative centralization: all else equal, party system 
asymmetry has the strongest effect on ruling party survival in centralized parliamentary 
regimes, while it has the weakest effect on survival in decentralized presidential regimes.   
 
 4.1. The Electoral System: Why Dominant Parties are Equally Likely under 
Different Electoral Rules 
 Electoral system effects are frequently invoked as part of explanations of 
dominant party persistence in individual countries.  But there is little agreement in the 
literature about what types of electoral systems are most likely to lead to dominant party 
systems, let alone any commonly accepted explanation for why.  In leading studies on the 
topic, different scholars have asserted or implied that dominant party systems are more 
likely to occur under Proportional Representation (Pempel 1990: 336-339), Single Non-
Transferable Vote (Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 1997: 238-250; Lin 2006: 119-120; Lin 
2011: 367-370), plurality rule in single member districts (Greene 2007: 61-62), Mixed-
Member Majoritarian (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001: 274) and Party Bloc Vote 
(Mauzy 2002: 248-249).  Viewed collectively, this is a remarkably tangled and 
contradictory set of claims.  They are necessarily at odds with one another: to say that PR 
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makes dominant parties more likely is to assert as well that other non-PR systems make 
dominance less likely.   
 In this section, I will resolve these claims by showing that they are derived from 
different mechanisms through which electoral rules should affect the asymmetry of 
competition for office.  One set invokes positioning asymmetry as the source of 
opposition disadvantages in dominant party systems, while the other focuses exclusively 
on coordination asymmetry.26  Electoral system effects tend to modify these two 
mechanisms in opposite directions: rules that increase the effect of positioning 
asymmetry in general lower the effect of coordination asymmetry, and vice versa.  Thus, 
the reason for the contradictory predictions above is that they tend to focus on one 
mechanism to the exclusion of the other.   
 
 How the Electoral System Affects Positioning Asymmetry 
 Let us begin by examining the effects of electoral rules in the simplest case.  First, 
consider a pure unicameral parliamentary system, where winning seats is what matters 
for control of the executive.  (I will consider how presidentialism differs in section 4.2.)  
Second, assume that there is a significant partisan advantage for the incumbent, whether 
through a “halo effect” or through a resource advantage that supports ties between the 
electorate and the ruling party.  As I argued in Chapter 2, this is true at the beginning of 
most dominant party systems.  
                                                
26 I will not attempt to derive any predictions about how the third mechanism, mass partisanship, is affected 
by regime institutions.  Given the large variation in partisanship across parties even in the same party 
system, it appears likely that the formation of partisan loyalties is only modestly influenced, if at all, by the 
formal institutions in a way that is generalizable. 
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 Under these conditions, incumbents can hold a systematic advantage over the 
opposition through their greater flexibility in taking positions in the policy space—what 
in Chapter 3 I termed positioning asymmetry.  Because they have more ideologically-
motivated members, new opposition parties tend to be more constrained in their ability to 
move toward vote-maximizing positions than is the incumbent party.  As a consequence, 
electoral campaigns in incumbent-advantaged party systems tend to fall into a pattern of 
ends-against-the-center competition: the ruling party is positioned at the center of the 
policy space, closest to the median voter, while oppositions are arrayed at more extreme 
positions to either side. 
 The electoral system conditions this incumbent positioning advantage by affecting 
the importance of being moderate to winning seats.  In single member districts with 
plurality rule, the winning party tends to take moderate positions, because it usually has 
to win the support of the median voters in a majority of districts to get elected.  Parties 
less able to position themselves close to the median voter are at a large disadvantage to 
those that have high ideological flexibility and seek only to maximize their vote share.  
By contrast, in high-magnitude districts—those with many seats awarded, not just one—
being centrist is less of an advantage in elections.27  Opposition parties which are well to 
the left or right of the median voter can still win seats, so their greater policy rigidity is 
less of a liability in electoral competition.  Thus, opposition parties who have less 
flexibility in positioning should be at a greater electoral disadvantage in single-member 
districts (SMDs), where they must obtain a plurality of the vote to win a seat, than in 
                                                
27 Indeed, the vote-maximizing strategy for a party in high-magnitude districts may be to move further 
away from the median voter—what Cox (1990) calls a “centrifugal incentive” generated by the electoral 
system. 
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multi-member districts where they can win seats while taking relatively extreme 
positions. 
 To state the claim more precisely, in the competition for seats, the threshold of 
exclusion—the highest percentage of the vote a party can win in a district and still be 
denied a seat, or TE—conditions the effect of positioning asymmetry between parties on 
the incumbent’s predicted likelihood of survival.28  The higher the threshold of exclusion, 
the higher the percentage of the vote an opposition party must win in order to be 
guaranteed a seat, and the more the incumbent party’s positioning advantage improves its 
re-election chances.  Another way to express this idea is in terms of how disproportional 
the conversion of vote into seat shares is in a given electoral system.  A centrist party will 
tend to enjoy the greatest seat bonus—that is, winning a share of seats larger than its 
share of votes—when TE is high.  But as the conversion of votes into seats becomes more 
proportional, the asymmetry of positioning has less benefit for the centrist, and is less 
detrimental to the electoral prospects of non-centrist parties. Thus, TE should condition 
the electoral effect of positioning asymmetry: a higher TE increases the effect, while a 
lower TE decreases it.
29 
                                                
28 The threshold of exclusion is the highest fraction of the vote that a party (or candidate, or slate of 
candidates) can win and still not be awarded a seat in a district under a given set of electoral rules.  Under 
SMDs, the threshold of exclusion is 0.5—two parties can both win exactly half the votes, and one loses in a 
coin flip.  In multi-member districts, the threshold is a direct expression of the district magnitude.  A 
district with 9 seats awarded under SNTV rules has a threshold of exclusion of 1/(9 + 1) = 1/10, or 10 
percent of all votes cast.  The general formula is given by TE = v/(M+v) * 100%, where M is the district 
magnitude and v is the number of votes each voter can cast (Lijphart and Grofman 1986: 157). 
29 I use the threshold of exclusion here because it can be calculated solely as a property of the electoral 
system, independent of the number of parties receiving votes.  Note that the threshold of inclusion, TI, is 
not satisfactory for this reason: TI = 100%/(M + nV – 1), where nv is the number of parties competing.  
Among other things, we want to explain how the incentives for opposition parties to form a unified 
electoral coalition vary as a consequence of the electoral system: that is, how nV varies across systems.  
Using TI would require us to assume a value for nI a priori (cf. Taagepera 1998).   
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 To give a concrete example, consider the difference between a TE of 0.1, as would 
occur under SNTV rules in a district with a magnitude of 9, and a TE of 0.5, as occurs in 
SMDs.  It is much easier for a right- or left-wing opposition party to win a seat in the first 
case than the second: at maximum, it needs only 10 percent of the total district vote 
versus 50 percent in an SMD.  Thus, switching from SMD-P to SNTV mitigates the 
positioning problem for that opposition party in the election.  By this same logic, 
switching from SNTV to SMD-P puts right- and left-wing parties at a greater 
disadvantage in electoral competition, and consequently increases the electoral advantage 
of centrist parties.  
 This argument about the effect of the threshold of exclusion applies regardless of 
whether the electoral system includes some form of vote-pooling across candidates, such 
as in Alternative Vote (AV), Single Transferable Vote (STV), or Proportional 
Representation (PR).  The main feature that matters for positioning, again, is TE.  In AV, 
STV, and medium-magnitude PR systems, this is a function of the district magnitude: TE 
= 1/(M+1), while in high-magnitude PR systems a higher threshold is often legally 
imposed. The expected effect is the same: as TE declines, the spatial positioning of the 
parties has less effect on how votes are converted into seats. In comparative terms, this 
means that the magnitude of positioning problems decline as one switches from SMD-P 
or AV (where TE = 0.5) to SNTV or STV (where, typically, 0.1 < TE < 0.5) to PR (where, 
typically, TE < 0.1).  Thus, at the election stage
30, positioning asymmetry should be much 
less of an obstacle for opposition parties in high-magnitude PR systems than in 
majoritarian ones: as long as they capture enough votes to cross the threshold of 
                                                
30 The government formation stage is a different story, as we will see in a moment. 
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exclusion, opposition parties can guarantee seats in the legislature roughly in proportion 
to their overall share of the vote.   
 Ken Greene (2007: 61), among others, has invoked this mechanism to argue that 
dominant party resource advantages are most effectively converted into electoral 
advantages in high-threshold systems such as SMD-P.  In SNTV and PR systems, by 
contrast, resource advantages are less consequential to opposition party chances.  For 
Greene, this modifying effect is a key part of why a relatively modest resource decline in 
Taiwan led to ruling party defeat there: Taiwan’s SNTV electoral system31 meant that 
opposition parties could win seats without having to take centrist positions in electoral 
campaigns, while candidate defection from the ruling party was more costly and difficult 
for the incumbent to prevent (266).       
  To sum up, we have the following prediction: as the threshold of exclusion rises, 
so does the effect of positioning asymmetry on the incumbent’s likelihood of survival.  
The predicted relationship is shown graphically in Figure 4.1.       
 
                                                
31 One problem with this argument is that Taiwan was a presidential regime, so winning legislative races 
was not directly relevant to retaining control of the executive.  I elaborate on this difference in the next 
section. 
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FIGURE 4.1.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THRESHOLD OF EXCLUSION (TE) AND THE EFFECT OF 
POSITIONING ASYMMETRY (EP) ACROSS PARTIES IN ELECTIONS  
 
 This prediction is directly relevant to the dominant party cases in the sample.  It 
suggests that in countries which employed low-threshold PR to elect the legislature at the 
beginning of the regime, such as Italy and Israel, new opposition parties should have 
faced relatively mild positioning problems in elections.  By contrast, in countries that 
employed high district thresholds, such as Malaysia and Botswana, new opposition 
parties should have been greatly disadvantaged by positioning problems.  And in fact, in 
both those countries, the SMD-plurality electoral systems often produced highly 
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disproportionate conversions of votes into party seats in parliament, consistently to the 
incumbent party’s benefit  (du Toit 1999; Case 2005; Mauzy 2008).32   
 
 How the Electoral System Affects Coordination Asymmetry in Elections 
 In addition to positioning asymmetry, the electoral system also affects the 
likelihood of incumbent survival through a second mechanism, that of coordination.  
Winning the executive requires coordination at two separate stages: (1) in elections, and 
(2) in government formation.  Let us consider each in turn.   
 First, at the election stage, electoral rules condition the effect of one party’s 
superior ability to coordinate in converting votes into seats.  Like that of positioning, the 
effect of coordination asymmetry on ruling party survival is a function of the threshold of 
exclusion, TE.  Importantly, however, the effect is in the opposite direction: poor 
coordination ability is most problematic for opposition parties when TE is low, and its 
effect on ruling party survival declines as TE increases.   
 To see this, first consider the nature of the opposition coordination problem in an 
electoral system without vote pooling, such as SMD-P or SNTV.  Oppositions must solve 
two coordination problems in this case: (1) nominate an optimal number of candidates to 
run, and (2) get opposition supporters to coordinate their votes on this slate of nominees.  
If neither elite nor voter coordination takes place, then the share of seats captured by the 
opposition camp may fall far short of its total share of votes (cf. Cox 1997: 238-250).  
                                                
32 An additional difference is the greater importance of gerrymandering and malapportionment in single 
member districts than in high-magnitude PR.  The ruling coalition in Malaysia, among others, has made 
frequent use of such tactics to disadvantage the opposition (Chin 2002: 213-214).  Malapportionment is not 
limited to SMD systems; under SNTV in Japan, the LDP systematically benefitted from overrepresentation 
of rural areas (Scheiner 2006: 178-182). 
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These electoral coordination problems are simplest to solve in single member districts 
with a plurality winner rule (SMD-P)—that is, those with a magnitude of one.  For the 
opposition camp, the optimal number of nominees to run in each district is one, and the 
optimal voter allocation strategy is for all supporters in the district to vote for the same 
candidate.  The incumbent party candidate will almost certainly win the seat if opposition 
voters fail to coordinate on a single challenger.  Party elites can remove this possibility by 
agreeing on a single nominee to represent the entire opposition.33  Thus, if elites in all 
opposition parties most value maximizing the number of seats the opposition camp as a 
whole wins, they have a clear incentive to jointly nominate a single candidate in each 
district.   
 These dual coordination problems become much more complex as district 
magnitude increases and one moves from an SMD to an SNTV world.  Raising the 
district magnitude from one to five, for instance, greatly complicates both challenges for 
both the opposition and the incumbent.  Rather than simply to decide whom to nominate 
as their candidate, they now have to decide as well how many to nominate—anywhere 
from one to five candidates.  And rather than direct all supporters to vote for the same 
single candidate, they must now develop a way to get voters to distribute votes as evenly 
as possible across all nominees.  Determining the optimal number of candidates requires 
good estimates of the level of support the combined opposition will receive on election 
day—information which may be hard to come by, especially if voting patterns are 
volatile or some parties and candidates have never before run in the district.  And getting 
                                                
33 This is, of course, the same logic that underpins Duverger’s (1954) Law—that countries which employ 
SMDs with plurality rule will tend toward two-partism at the district level. 
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voters to distribute votes evenly across all opposition nominees requires a loyal and 
relatively sophisticated block of supporters willing to follow party instructions and vote 
strategically rather than sincerely—also unlikely when parties are new or there is great 
uncertainty about what other voters will do.   
 Thus, in a non-vote-pooling world, the ability to coordinate effectively in 
elections becomes much more important to a party’s chances of winning seats as district 
magnitude rises.  If one party is systematically better at coordinating in elections than the 
others, this advantage will be magnified in low-threshold electoral systems.  And 
incumbent parties are most likely to have this advantage: by virtue of their stronger party 
organization, including greater experience, superior information networks, firmer grasp 
on large blocs of voters, and control over more resources to reward voting groups for 
following the party’s allocation strategy and to punish candidates from deviating from it, 
they should be better equipped than the opposition to mitigate these coordination 
problems (cf. Cox and Niou 1994; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995; Liu 1999; Tsai 
2005; Baker and Scheiner 2007). 
 For this reason, Gary Cox (e.g. 1997: 238-250), among others, has argued that 
electoral systems which feature high average district magnitudes and no vote pooling, 
such as those found under SNTV in Japan and Taiwan, tend to be super-proportional—
that is, incumbent parties do systematically better at converting votes into seats than do 
challenger parties.  This “seat bonus” gained through superior coordination in turn helps 
cushion the incumbent party against loss of support in the electorate.  Contra Greene, Cox 
predicts that dominant party systems should be more likely to be maintained under SNTV 
rules, not less.  The reason these predictions are at odds with one another is the reliance 
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on different mechanisms of asymmetry: Greene invokes spatial positioning as the source 
of dominant party persistence, while Cox invokes coordination.  When we consider that 
both mechanisms can operate simultaneously, though, it is no longer clear which way the 
net effect on ruling party survival will go: as the importance of positioning goes up, that 
of coordination goes down.     
 The electoral coordination story is quite different in systems with vote pooling—
that is, those in which votes cast for one candidate can be transferred to other candidates.  
In contrast to SNTV systems, coordination problems at the election stage under AV, 
STV, or PR rules are usually quite benign, because the formal electoral rules in effect do 
the work of coordination for voters.  In Alternative Vote (also known as Instant Runoff 
voting), voters create a rank-ordering of at least some of the candidates on the ballot; if 
no one secures a majority of first-place votes, the last-place candidate is eliminated and 
his votes distributed among the remaining candidates.  The procedure is repeated until 
one candidate secures a majority of the votes.  In Single Transferable Vote, the same 
procedure is used, except multiple seats are awarded from one district.   
 In both AV and STV, the transfer of ballots from last-place finishers to more 
competitive candidates effectively solves parties’ coordination problems for them.  For 
instance, imagine a three-way race between an incumbent who wins 40 percent of first-
place votes and two opposition candidates who win 31 and 29 percent of the vote, 
respectively.  In SMD-P, the failure of opposition elites to nominate a single candidate, 
and of opposition voters to support either one or the other en mass, allows the incumbent 
to retain the seat with less than a majority.  If all opposition supporters prefer either 
opposition candidate to the incumbent, however, then AV will prevent this kind of failure 
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from costing the opposition the seat: the third-place finisher is eliminated, and all his 
votes are transferred to the other opposition candidate.  As a result, the opposition will 
win the seat easily despite having failed to coordinate on a single candidate during the 
election.   
 By the same logic, STV eliminates the difficult coordination problem that 
routinely bedevils parties in its non-pooling SNTV cousin.  Opposition parties do not 
need to decide how many candidates to nominate nor come up with a vote-allocation 
strategy to ensure support is relatively even among them.  Instead, the electoral system 
does all the work.  As long as opposition supporters rank all the opposition nominees 
above the incumbents, opposition seat shares should mirror their vote shares in each 
district.   
 The effect of coordination asymmetry on ruling party survival is similarly 
weakened in proportional representation systems, in which voters typically cast a ballot 
for a party instead of, or in addition to, a candidate.  Votes are pooled across all 
candidates of the same party, so there is no need to get opposition voters to follow 
complicated vote-distribution schemes as there sometimes is under SNTV.  Opposition 
leaders need only worry about winning enough support to pass the threshold of exclusion, 
and the PR rules will do the rest.  As in AV and STV, the vote-pooling that occurs under 
PR limits the disproportionality that can occur from coordination asymmetry between 
parties.34   
                                                
34 This is not to assert that opposition parties will never lose seats because of coordination failure in these 
systems: parties that do not win enough votes to cross the threshold are shut out of the vote reallocation, so 
the conversion of votes into seats can still be disproportional—highly so when TE is high.  What vote-
pooling does, however, is ensure that all parties that cross TE benefit equally from this disproportionality, 
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 Thus, we have the following two predictions about how electoral systems should 
condition the effect of coordination asymmetry.  First, in electoral systems without vote 
pooling, as the threshold of exclusion rises, coordination asymmetry has less effect on 
ruling party survival.  Second, in electoral systems with vote pooling, coordination 
asymmetry’s effect on ruling party survival is unrelated to the threshold of exclusion.  
These predicted relationships are shown graphically in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THRESHOLD OF EXCLUSION (TE) AND THE EFFECT OF 
COORDINATION ASYMMETRY ACROSS PARTIES IN ELECTIONS (EC(1)) 
 
 
                                                
not just the incumbent.  Thus, vote pooling substantially reduces asymmetry between all the parties 
winning seats—each gets proportionally the same boost in seat share over vote share. 
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 How the Electoral System Affects Coordination Asymmetry in Government Formation 
 Let us now consider how electoral rules affect coordination in the second stage, 
government formation.  In parliamentary regimes, winning enough seats to deny the 
incumbent a majority is not enough to end its reign: gaining control of the executive also 
requires opposition parties to cooperate at forming a governing coalition, as this process 
will determine which parties control the prime minister’s seat and the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios in the executive.  Because presidential systems are winner-take-
all—the winning presidential candidate typically gains full control of the executive—
coordination in government formation is almost exclusively a problem facing oppositions 
in parliamentary systems.35  The difficulty of government formation is in turn a function 
of two variables: (1) the number of opposition parties needed to form an alternative 
government to the incumbent, and (2) the ideological distance between then. 
 The threshold of exclusion systematically affects both of these variables, and as a 
consequence the electoral system has an additional, separate effect on the incumbent’s 
likelihood of survival at the government formation stage.  In general, the number of 
opposition parties winning seats in the parliament will be larger when TE is low, and their 
ideological distance from one another will be greater.  In high-magnitude PR systems, for 
instance, the threshold is sometimes so low that even small extremist parties that attract 
two or three percent of the vote can win seats.  In order to forge a coalition that excludes 
a large, centrist incumbent party, the opposition alternative then often has to include 
several extremist parties from both ends of the political spectrum.  In such circumstances, 
                                                
35 Presidents do not, of course, always control a majority in the legislature, and therefore may have to form 
a policy coalition with other parties after taking office.  But as far as securing control of the executive 
branch is concerned, the task is quite simple in a presidential regime: win the election.  See the next section.  
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the incumbent stands a much better chance of picking up a junior coalition partner or two 
than the opposition does of coalescing into a workable alternative.   
 As a consequence, low-threshold electoral systems make opposition coordination 
at the government formation stage especially difficult to achieve.  By contrast, when TE is 
high, the number of opposition parties should be much lower, and their ideological 
distance from one another less, all else equal.  Opposition coordination should then be 
easier to achieve and more likely to result in the incumbent party losing the executive.  
To state the prediction explicitly, as the threshold of exclusion rises, the effect of 
coordination asymmetry in government formation on the likelihood of incumbent survival 
falls.  Figure 4.3 illustrates this predicted relationship.     
 
 
FIGURE 4.3.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THRESHOLD OF EXCLUSION (TE) AND THE EFFECT OF 
COORDINATION ASYMMETRY ACROSS PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION (EC(2)) 
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 This prediction comes with a couple important caveats.  First, it may only show 
up empirically in comparisons between countries with similar social structures.  That is, 
the all else equal clause is especially important here.  The reason is that in countries with 
strong regional cleavages, single-member districts can produce a party system that looks 
more like the high-magnitude PR case: opposition winners may be from different parties 
in different regions, and they may be separated by deep divides over linguistic, religious 
or cultural issues that map onto regions.  In these circumstances, cooperation with the 
incumbent may well be preferable to forming a governing coalition with each other.  This 
kind of inter-regional coordination problem appears to have been an important factor in 
long ruling party duration in several countries with SMD-P electoral systems.  During a 
long period of Liberal Party rule (1935-1957) in Canada, for instance, the opposition was 
divided between pro-business conservatives who polled strongest in the Maritime 
provinces and Ontario, and “prairie populists” whose base was in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Manitoba (Carty 1996).  In India, the incredible linguistic and religious diversity 
across Indian states had a similar effect on the opposition parties competing against 
Congress from 1947-1977 (Morris-Jones 1966; Burger 1969).  And in Malaysia, the 
opposition remains split along racial and religious lines that are reinforced by regional 
and urban-rural differences, hindering the formation of a united alternative to the ruling 
Barisan Nasional (Chin 2002: 218-220).    
 Second, the threshold of exclusion in effect imposes only an upper bound on the 
number of parties and their ideological distance from one another.  It does not, however, 
ensure that either the number of parties or their ideological range will actually reach the 
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maximum permitted by the electoral system.  The social cleavage structure may in fact be 
highly reinforcing, so that even in a low-threshold PR system, two parties are sufficient to 
express differences on most of the salient cleavages in the electorate, as was the case in 
postwar Austria.  Thus, the electoral system has some systematic effect on the difficulty 
of coordination at the government formation stage, but it is by no means always 
decisive—social differences are at least as important in shaping the number and range of 
parties in the party system.  Nevertheless, the prediction still stands as long as social 
structure is held constant across regimes: opposition winners should still be more similar 
in high TE  systems than in low ones, all else equal; and opposition coordination to oust an 
incumbent should be more likely to occur. 
 Among the regimes to experience dominant parties, Israel appears to be the best 
example of how an incumbent can be advantaged at the government formation stage 
when TE is low.  From 1948 to 1992 the Israeli parliament, or Knesset, was elected from 
a single nation-wide district with 120 seats and a low threshold of 1 percent.36  The low 
barrier to new party entry allowed small, ideologically-motivated parties to win many 
seats between them, raising both the number of and the ideological distance between 
opposition parties. While the high district magnitude freed opposition elites from having 
to coordinate before election day and opposition supporters from having to vote 
strategically, it increased the difficulty of opposition cross-party coordination at the 
government formation stage and helped sustain a central role for a large moderate party 
in the ruling coalition. This appears to be a key reason every prime minister from 1948 to 
                                                
36 The threshold was raised to 1.5 percent in 1992, and 2 percent in 2003—still quite low by comparative 
standards. 
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1977 was from Mapai (later renamed the Labor Party), even though it never controlled a 
majority of legislative seats during that time period (Levite and Tarrow 1983; Hazan 
1998: 153). 
 Remember that what we ultimately would like to predict is the combined effect of 
coordination at both stages, in elections and in government formation.  This can be 
obtained simply by adding together EC(1) from Figure 4.2 and EC(2) from Figure 4.3.  The 
conditional effect of the electoral system and the combined coordination asymmetry is 
then shown below in Figure 4.4.   
 In systems without vote pooling, coordination problems fall rapidly as TE 
increases, because coordination at both the election stage and the government formation 
stage should become simpler.  The closest real world comparison to this change would be 
moving from the relatively high-magnitude world of Taiwan’s SNTV system37, where as 
many as 16 seats were elected from a single district, to Japan’s lower magnitude system, 
where the maximum magnitude was 6.  In practical terms, the predictions here are that 
(1) Taiwan’s opposition parties should have greater difficulty converting votes into seats 
than Japan’s, and (2) they should have greater difficulty coordinating to form a majority 
that excludes the incumbent, because the number of and ideological distance between 
opposition parties is potentially greater than in Japan. 
 
                                                
37 I use this example for illustrative purposes only; because Taiwan is a presidential regime, the payoff to 
coordinating against the incumbent in the legislature is quite different there than in Japan. 
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FIGURE 4.4.  THE COMBINED EFFECT OF COORDINATION ASYMMETRY IN ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
FORMATION (EC(1+2)) ON INCUMBENT SURVIVAL UNDER DIFFERENT ELECTORAL RULES  
 
 In systems with vote pooling, there is still a decline in coordination problems as 
TE rises, but it is entirely because of the expected reduction in the number and ideological 
distance between parties winning seats.  A real-world example of this kind of change 
would be switching from Ireland’s STV system, with median district magnitude of 4, to 
Australia’s AV system, with magnitude of 1.38  Here, the difficulty of coordination in 
elections is not affected by TE, but the same reduction in the number of and distance 
                                                
38 An even better example is the difference between Australia’s House, elected using AV, and Senate, 
elected using STV.  After the most recent federal elections, the Green Party held 9 of 76 seats (11.8%) in 
the Senate, while it held only 1 of 150 seats in the House (0.66%). 
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between opposition parties mean that coordination problems should be less severe at the 
government formation stage in Australia than in Ireland.  
 Other PR systems also follow this same pattern.  Moving from the minimum 
value of TE to a moderate value is akin to switching from the electoral system of Israel to 
Sweden.  Coordination at the election stage is similarly uncomplicated in both, but the 
number of parties and the ideological distance between then should be larger in the Israeli 
case.  And in fact, this is what we typically observe: in the current Swedish parliament, 
eight parties hold seats, while in the current Israeli one there are 13.  By the argument of 
this section, coordination in government formation should be more difficult, all else 
equal, in Israel than in Sweden as a result. 
 
 The Net Effect of Electoral Rules on Ruling Party Survival 
 Now let us consider what happens when both the spatial positioning and 
coordination mechanisms are operating at the same time.  That is, we are interested 
primarily in the net effect of both positioning and coordination asymmetry in 
combination on the likelihood that ruling parties persist in power, rather than either one 
in isolation.  And an important ambiguity becomes apparent when one attempts to 
combine both arguments into a single prediction about the net effect of electoral rules on 
ruling party survival.  This is that the threshold of exclusion works in opposite directions 
through the two types of asymmetry.  Increasing TE should make positioning asymmetry 
harder for the opposition to overcome, all else equal.  But it should make net (election + 
government formation) coordination asymmetry easier to deal with. 
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 To see this graphically, note the opposite slopes in Figure 4.1 versus Figure 4.4.  
Without knowing more about which type of asymmetry—positioning or coordination—is 
more severe in the party system, we cannot use the threshold of exclusion alone to predict 
which electoral systems are more likely to sustain dominant parties.  Lower thresholds of 
exclusion increase the effect of coordination asymmetry, but they also reduce positioning 
asymmetry. And while vote-pooling systems greatly mitigate coordination problems at 
the election stage in high-magnitude systems, the net effect on ruling party survival is 
reduced or even reversed at the government formation stage: high district magnitudes 
also increase coordination asymmetry through the presence of multiple small, 
ideologically-oriented parties.   
 To see whether dominant parties are in fact more common in some kinds of 
electoral systems, I categorized each of the parliamentary39 dominant parties in my 
sample by level of threshold (high, medium, or low) and vote-pooling (present or not).  
The patterns are shown in Table 4.1.  
 
                                                
39 In presidential regimes, control of the executive does not depend on the outcome of legislative races.  
Thus, I do not include the electoral systems used to elect the legislature in presidential regimes.   
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Table 4.1.  Electoral Systems and Their Effects on Asymmetry 
Electoral 
System 
TE  
(Typical 
Range) 
Vote 
Pooling 
Positioning 
Asymmetry 
Coordination 
Asymmetry 
Government 
Formation 
Asymmetry 
Dominant 
Party Cases 
High-Threshold Systems           
              
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Botswana 
Canada 
Ethiopia 
India 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Samoa 
S. Africa (I) 
SMD-P  TE = 0.5 No High Low Low 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
       
SMD-AV  TE = 0.5 Yes High Low Low Australia 
       
PBV TE = 0.5 Yes Very High Low Low Singapore 
              
Medium-Threshold Systems           
       
SNTV 0.05 < TE < 0.5 No Medium High Medium Japan 
       
STV 0.05 < TE < 0.5 Yes Medium Low Medium None 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
W. Germany 
Guyana 
Liechtenstein 
(I, II) 
Luxembourg 
(I, II) 
PR  
(med M) 
0.05 < TE < 0.1 Yes Medium Low Medium 
Sweden 
       
Low-Threshold Systems           
       
Italy 
Israel PR  
(high M) 
TE < 0.05 Yes Low Low High 
South Africa 
(II) 
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 As the table shows, dominant parties have occurred in six of the seven different 
types of electoral system shown here.40  Most have occurred in either SMDs with 
plurality rule or in PR systems with a medium or high median district magnitude.41  We 
cannot infer that dominance is more likely in these systems, however, because together 
they make up the large majority of electoral systems in use worldwide: the only 
parliamentary regimes that have employed SNTV are in Japan and Vanuatu; STV has 
been used only in Ireland and Malta; AV only in Australia and Papua New Guinea; and 
PBV only in Singapore (Golder 2005).  What the data do show, instead, is that dominant 
parties occur both in systems where spatial positioning should be very important (SMD-
P) to winning seats and where it should not (PR), and where coordination should be 
highly problematic (SNTV) and where it should not (SMD-AV).  They also occur in 
electoral systems which promote high numbers of ideologically extreme parties (high-
magnitude PR) and those which do not (PBV).   
 The argument I have laid out in this section provides us with a better 
understanding of this pattern.  It is not that electoral rules have no effect on the likelihood 
of ruling party survival, but rather that they have countervailing effects.  The threshold of 
                                                
40 To keep the discussion as general as possible, I have left out several other electoral systems that are 
either unusual or have ambiguous effects.  The net effects of mixed-member parallel systems, in particular, 
are impossible to predict without saying more about the details of each regime’s rules: the effects of an 
SMD lower tier will work in the opposite direction from those of a PR upper tier, for instance, so it is 
necessary to know the number of seats awarded from each to make predictions.   
41 I have included West Germany’s mixed-member compensatory system in the medium-threshold PR 
category, because the net effect of the rules are nearly the same as a pure PR system with TE=0.05.  In 
Samoa, the majority of seats are elected using SMD-P, but several contain two seats elected using bloc vote, 
where each voter has two votes to cast.  For its second contested election after liberalization, Lesotho 
adopted a mixed-member system combining 80 single-member districts with 40 seats awarded through a 
compensatory PR tier.  The net effect, however, is still more majoritarian than proportional. 
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exclusion works in opposite directions through two different mechanisms.  And the net 
effect on the likelihood of ruling party survival is impossible to predict without knowing 
the severity of each type of asymmetry.   
 In fact, the only firm prediction one can make about net electoral system effects is 
that adding vote pooling in low-TE systems reduces the likelihood of one-party 
dominance, all else equal, by reducing the importance of coordination asymmetry at the 
election stage.  In practical terms, this describes only one type of electoral system change, 
from non-vote-pooling SNTV to vote-pooling STV.  If district magnitude is the same in 
both, coordination problems at the election stage will be much simpler in STV, so one 
party’s superior coordination ability will have less consequence for winning seats, and 
long-lived one-party rule will consequently be less likely.  By this logic, one-party 
dominance should be more likely in pre-1996 Japan than in Ireland or Malta.  For any 
change in TE, however, the net effect is impossible to predict without additional 
information about party system asymmetry. 
 In sum, the logic laid out here ends with an ambiguous conclusion: in general, the 
effect of electoral rules on ruling party duration is indeterminate.  Dominant party 
systems appear equally possible under SNTV, PR, and plurality rule SMDs—we cannot a 
priori identify any major class of electoral system as especially prone, or hostile, to long 
spells of one-party rule.   
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 4.2.  Executive Selection: Why Dominant Parties are More Likely in Parliamentary 
Regimes 
 In contrast to electoral systems, the difference across regimes in executive 
selection generates an unambiguous prediction: party system asymmetry has a smaller 
effect on the likelihood of ruling party survival in presidential regimes than in 
parliamentary ones.  The effects of partisanship, spatial positioning, and coordination 
advantages on incumbent survival are all weaker in presidential races than in 
parliamentary ones.  Thus, long-lived one-party rule should be much less likely in 
presidential regimes, all else equal, than in parliamentary ones.  
 By executive selection, I mean here the way the chief executive42 of the regime is 
chosen and held accountable. In general, the chief executive in presidential regimes, the 
president, has a fixed term in office, does not depend on legislative confidence, and is 
directly elected in a popular, nation-wide vote.  The chief executive in parliamentary 
regimes, the prime minister, is selected by the legislature, depends on the support of a 
majority in the parliament for his control of the office, and can be removed before his 
term is up through a vote of no-confidence.  In addition, cabinet appointments are shared 
among members of the parliament, whereas in presidential regimes these appointments 
usually cannot be individuals who are also sitting legislators. 
 Of these differences, the crucial one here is whether the executive is chosen 
indirectly by the legislative assembly or directly through a popular vote.  The way the 
executive is selected conditions the effect of party system asymmetry: presidentialism 
weakens the effect of the incumbent’s partisanship and spatial positioning advantages on 
                                                
42 To simplify the argument, I omit any theoretical consideration of semi-presidential regimes for the 
moment.  I discuss how I deal empirically with dual-executive regimes in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.     
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the probability of winning, and it reduces the asymmetry of coordination as well.  I 
consider how presidentialism modifies the effect of each mechanism in turn.    
 
 How Presidentialism Weakens The Effect of Partisan Advantage in Elections 
 In party systems where the incumbent holds a large partisan advantage in the 
electorate, presidential races blunt this advantage.  This is for two reasons: (1) 
presidential elections are more personalist and (2) presidential election outcomes are 
higher variance than parliamentary ones. 
 Presidential elections tend to be more personalist than parliamentary ones in the 
sense that, in addition to the parties to which they belong, the intrinsic characteristics and 
policy preferences of the candidates matter a great deal to voters (Cain, Ferejohn, and 
Fiorina 1987). The direct election of the executive creates opportunities for charismatic 
outsiders to win executive power without the support of strong party organizations 
(Samuels and Shugart 2010: 62-65). In these elections, voters face a choice not only 
between a set of policy platforms or offerings of pork or patronage for their district or 
interest group, but also between individuals who would be president.  As a result, 
opposition parties that perform poorly on a generic partisan ballot may nonetheless have 
a good shot at capturing executive office if they nominate a candidate with wide popular 
appeal—what we might term a “superstar effect.”  In other words, in presidential 
regimes, the winning party is more likely to benefit from the candidate’s independent 
popularity rather than the other way around.  This kind of “outsider” campaign for office 
tends to be much harder to pull off in parliamentary regimes, where major party 
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nominees almost always are members of the legislature and have served for many years 
in various party positions (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 77).  
 In addition, even in highly authoritarian contexts, one expects the opposition to be 
better positioned to win if it needs only to recruit a single star candidate rather than a 
whole slate of them.  The lack of a deep political “bench” of candidates to run and the 
threat of harassment by the state agents of the ruling party should have a much greater 
impact on opposition chances across legislative races than in presidential ones.  For one, 
the payoff to winning the presidency is quite large: the most attractive potential 
opposition challengers are more likely to risk harassment by the authorities, loss of career 
opportunities in the private sector, personal threats against them and their family 
members, and other potentially large costs of running against the incumbent party if 
winning means capturing full control of the executive rather than simply a seat in 
opposition in the legislature. In other words, presidential contests are more appealing to 
ambitious office-seekers because they are winner-take-all: an opposition victory removes 
the incumbent from executive power in one fell swoop and transfers full control to the 
winner. As a consequence, opposition candidates for president often are willing to risk 
great harm to themselves for a shot at knocking off the incumbent.  In Zimbabwe, for 
example, the opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai endured beatings and jail time to 
challenge the incumbent president Robert Mugabe.  Such intimidation did not keep him 
out of the race, and in order to retain power the ruling party had to resort to ever more-
brutal tactics against opposition supporters, and eventually, massive electoral fraud 
(Bratton and Masunungure 2008). 
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 In contrast, parliamentary regimes tend to offer popular opposition figures a much 
less straightforward way to national power than do presidential ones.  In parliamentary 
regimes, winning control of the executive typically requires recruiting not just one strong 
candidate who can win a single national race, but putting forward a whole slate of them 
and winning many races—a task which typically requires investing valuable time and 
resources in developing a party organization.  Thus, presidential races provide a better 
opportunity for opposition parties to win the executive: one popular candidate can negate 
most of the partisan advantage the incumbent may possess (cf. Scheiner 2006: 216).    
 As a practical illustration of this claim, consider the patterns of partisan support in 
the United States after WWII.  From at least 1954 to 1992, and probably stretching back 
to the New Deal coalition of the 1930s, the Democrats enjoyed a significant partisan 
advantage in the American electorate: on average, about 53 percent of voters identified 
with the Democratic Party on ANES surveys, while only 37 percent identified with the 
Republican Party (Campbell 1996: 48-9).  At no point during this period did Republican 
partisans ever outnumber Democratic ones. But the Republican Party still could, and did, 
capture the presidency by running candidates with broad cross-over appeal, whose own 
personal popularity could overcome the generic weakness of the party in the national 
electorate.  Thus, Dwight D. Eisenhower won two terms by wide margins not because he 
was a Republican but despite it—he was a popular war hero with a reputation as a 
moderate (cf. Campbell et al. 1960: 136-142).  Indeed, the argument here suggests that 
the U.S. in the 20th century has not had sustained periods of one-party control of the 
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executive in part because of this feature of presidentialism: the weaker of the two parties 
can still win a given election by finding an Eisenhower.43 
 Presidential contests are more dangerous for advantaged ruling parties, however, 
not merely because candidates’ personal qualities have a greater effect on who wins, but 
also because control of the executive depends on the outcome of a single winner-take-all 
election.  A more personalized campaign by itself does not necessarily lower a ruling 
party’s chances; over a large number of races, ruling parties with a resource advantage 
tend to recruit more high-quality candidates than the opposition does (Greene 2007).  
Thus, when executive control depends on the joint outcome of many races, an incumbent 
party with a partisan advantage is all-but-assured of retaining power. Were the incumbent 
to nominate unappealing candidates in 10 percent of all parliamentary races, for example, 
it would barely affect the expected outcome of the election: the ruling party might win a 
few less seats, but it would still retain a majority.  The law of large numbers ensures this: 
opposition parties may beat the odds and win a race here and there, but over a hundred 
races, the incumbent will secure a seat share that is in rough proportion to the asymmetry 
in the party system. 
 By making executive control dependent on the results of a single race, however, 
presidentialism injects a greater element of chance into the election. The incumbent’s 
survival in office is much more dependent on the popularity of its single presidential 
                                                
43 In the U.S. at the state and local level there are many more examples of opposition party candidates 
winning executive races in localities with a highly asymmetric party system.  Rudy Giuliani and Michael 
Bloomberg, for instance, both won multiple terms as Republicans in New York City, where registered 
Democrats outnumber Republicans 5-to-1.  Both ran the same kind of charismatic, “independent outsider” 
campaigns that effectively turned the race into a referendum on their personal qualifications to be mayor, 
rather than their partisan affiliation. 
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nominee, rather than the whole slate of candidates running for the legislature.  
Nominating a lackluster candidate for president can lose the ruling party the entire 
executive, while nominating one for the legislature risks only a single seat. Thus, there 
should be greater variance in a party’s performance in the competition for power in 
presidential regimes than in parliamentary ones.    
 This simple difference in executive selection can lead to radically different 
expected incumbent survival rates over several elections.  To see this, consider a highly 
stylized example.  Assume that the incumbent party enjoys a partisan advantage over all 
other parties, such that its probability of winning any given race is 0.6, and that the party 
must contest elections in a parliamentary regime with 100 MPs elected from single 
member districts.  In order to remain in power, the party has to win at least half, or 50 
seats.  By the cumulative binomial distribution, the probability that it finishes with at 
least 50 seats is over 0.98; that is, the party faces a less than 2 percent chance of losing 
power when it expects to win any given race with a probability of 0.6.  But in a 
presidential regime, given the exact same partisan advantage, the ruling party’s 
probability of retaining the executive is only 0.6!  The one-shot nature of presidential 
contests puts the ruling party’s hold on power in much greater jeopardy.   
 That is not all.  Remember that what we really care about is a ruling party’s 
ability to retain power through multiple elections.  If we assume a term of four years and 
the same advantage in each election, then the likelihood that a ruling party with a 0.6 
probability of winning any given race survives past 20 years is simply the joint 
probability of winning in each election.  In parliamentary regimes, this is (0.9832)5 , or 
about 0.92.  In presidential regimes, it is (0.6)5 , or about 0.08.  The difference is huge: in 
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a parliamentary regime, the advantaged incumbent would survive past 20 years over 90% 
of the time; in presidential regimes, less than 8%! Clearly, under these circumstances, an 
advantaged ruling party is much safer contesting parliamentary elections than presidential 
ones. 
 We might term this the “Cinderella” effect: contests decided by a single victory 
are better for underdogs—the Cinderellas of the world—while those that require multiple 
victories are better for the favorites.  The number of rounds required to win thus 
drastically affects the probability of an upset. We can see the same principle at work in 
sports competitions.  Basketball championships, for instance, are decided differently in 
college and the NBA: while the NCAA decides winners based on one game, the NBA has 
best-of-seven series.  As a result, chance plays a much greater role in the NCAA 
tournament.  The more talented teams can lose for all kinds of quirky reasons: the lower 
seed surprises with an innovative game plan; the favorite’s star player gets into early foul 
trouble; a bench player on the underdog shoots the lights out; and so on.  Over the NBA’s 
seven-game playoff series, though, these random events tend to even out: teams make 
adjustments, players’ shooting reverts to their season averages, and the better team’s 
strengths become decisive.  Thus, less talented teams often steal a game or two, but they 
rarely win a series.  In the 2001 NBA finals, for instance, the Philadelphia 76ers won 
Game 1 in overtime against the defending champions and heavily favored LA Lakers, 
featuring Shaquille O’Neal in his prime.  It was LA’s first loss of the entire playoffs: they 
had gone 12-0 to that point.  Had this been the NCAA tournament, the 76ers’ win would 
have been celebrated as one of the greatest sports upsets of all time, akin to the U.S. 
Olympic hockey team’s “Miracle on Ice” in 1980, or the New York Giants’ win over the 
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New England Patriots in Super Bowl XLII.  Instead, the NBA’s best-of-seven format 
meant Game 1 was a mere bump on the Lakers’ march to the title: having had time to 
make adjustments, they won the next four games by an average of 10 points, and the 
76ers victory is now little more than the answer to a trivia question.  
 Parliamentary elections are a lot like an NBA playoff series: the party with the 
structural advantage will win the most seats with a high degree of certainty, which in turn 
puts them in the best position to control the executive.  Many improbable events have to 
occur simultaneously for an underdog to win.  Presidential elections are a lot more like 
the NCAA championship: executive control is determined by a one-shot, high-variance 
contest, where the strongest party on a generic party ballot is much more likely to be 
upset.  Over several elections, this difference results in a much higher survival rate for 
advantaged incumbents in parliamentary than in presidential regimes.   
 This conclusion rests on a highly stylized example, of course, and there are 
several objections that might be raised against it. One is that, even in parliaments elected 
from many districts, the outcomes in each race are not independent of one another: the 
probability of opposition victories in each district are likely to shift up or down together.  
But this is merely a way of saying that the ruling party’s advantage is systematic: if it 
declines in one district, it tends to decline elsewhere.  What I have argued above implies 
that the ruling party’s chances of winning are lower in presidential regimes even when we 
hold its advantages constant. 
 Another possible objection is that many parliaments are elected using PR rather 
than plurality rule, and from only a few or even a single district—as, for instance, is 
Israel’s.  Thus, the law of large numbers mechanism does not operate in these cases.  The 
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counter is that in PR, seats shares usually closely mirror partisan support in the electorate, 
regardless of the quality of the party’s nominees.  If the partisans of one party make up 40 
percent of the electorate, while the nearest opponent’s are only 20 percent, then the first 
party is highly likely to win the most seats, regardless of its nominating strategy or the 
popular appeal of its candidates.  And winning the largest number of seats puts that party 
in the driver’s seat for coalition formation—although we will have to invoke a second 
mechanism, that of spatial positioning, to complete the argument.  (See the next section.)  
 The best counter to these objections, however, may be to look at empirical 
evidence of the different partisan winners in presidential versus legislative races when 
both occur simultaneously.  In a recent book project, Shugart and Samuels (2010: 143-
146) do exactly this: across 38 presidential and semi-presidential systems, they find an 
average difference across all districts between the vote for a presidential candidate and 
his or her partisans of about 10 percent; in elections in 17 countries at least one party had 
a difference greater than 20 percent.  In other words, presidential candidates routinely 
receive electoral support that differs significantly from that of their legislative co-
partisans.   
 The United States provides several good illustrations of what this difference 
means in practice to an advantaged party’s chances of retaining the executive.  The 
Democratic Party held a consistent partisan advantage over Republicans in the electorate 
throughout the 1980s, for instance, but that advantage did not prevent the party’s loss in 
three consecutive presidential elections.  This dismal performance is particularly striking 
when contrasted with Democratic performance in House elections: in 1980, for example, 
Democrats across the country won 243 seats on 50.3 percent of the vote, while 
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Republicans won 192 on 47.6 percent.  Yet the Democratic incumbent president, Jimmy 
Carter, won only 41.0 percent of the vote, while the Republican challenger Ronald 
Reagan won 50.7 percent.  The advantages that Democrats enjoyed in House races 
evidently did not carry over to the presidential contest; indeed, Samuels and Shugart find 
that the difference between the vote share of the average Democratic House candidate in 
1980 and the share for Carter in that district was over 25 percent, indicating that a 
sizeable fraction of voters split their tickets. 
 The same pattern of split-ticket voting shows up frequently at the state level in the 
U.S., where a large partisan advantage typically delivers long-term control of the 
legislature to one party, but does not prevent the weaker party from occasionally winning 
the governorship.  There are a remarkable number of “disadvantaged” party candidates 
who managed to win governor’s races in states with partisanship highly skewed toward 
the other major party.  In just the last decade, for instance, Democratic candidates won 
governor’s races in several states where Republicans had a large and long-lasting 
majority in the legislature, including Kansas, Wyoming, and Arizona, while Republicans 
did the same in Massachusetts, Connecticut, California, and New Jersey.  Were executive 
control in these states determined by the majority in the legislature, as in parliamentary 
regimes, this kind of partisan alternation seems much less likely to occur.   
 
 How Presidentialism Weakens the Effect of Spatial Asymmetry in Elections 
 The second way presidentialism makes long-lived one-party rule less likely is by 
weakening the effect of spatial positioning asymmetry in the party system.  Recall from 
Chapter 3 that positioning asymmetry occurs when one party has a greater ability to take 
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positions that maximize its expected vote share.  Presidentialism weakens the link 
between having greater ideological flexibility and winning control of the executive in two 
ways. 
 First, presidential candidates tend to be less bound by their party’s previous policy 
statements than are candidates for prime minister, and thus better able to take vote-
maximizing positions.  Sitting presidents are less subject to control by their party’s 
membership than are prime ministers.  Presidents do not depend on the confidence of the 
rank-and-file in the legislature for their office: the fixed terms, separate origin, and 
different constituency of the presidency means they can more credibly promise to take 
policy positions independent of their party (Samuels 2002).  As a consequence, 
presidential candidates can position themselves closer to the median voter on issues on 
which their party membership is relatively extreme.  Parliamentary leaders are, by 
contrast, much more constrained in election campaigns: party leaders’ efforts to take 
moderate, vote-maximizing positions in election campaigns are often undercut by their 
dependence on a more ideological, extremist membership.  Thus, even when opposition 
party leaders are more personally popular than the incumbent prime minister, they may 
be hamstrung by a party membership than can sanction them ex post (cf. Samuels and 
Shugart 2010: 49-51).  
  Second, executive control is more likely to be captured by a centrist party in 
parliamentary regimes than in presidential ones.  In parliamentary regimes, there is 
another stage after the election: if no party wins a majority, parties negotiate to form a 
government.  Policy flexibility and centrist positions are especially valuable at this stage.  
In presidential regimes, by contrast, there is no government formation stage—the 
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incumbent party must win a plurality in the election to ensure it remains in office.44  
Thus, there is greater variance in the likelihood that holding a centrist position results in 
winning control of the executive.  
 In fact, in presidential regimes, centrists often lose three-way contests.  For 
instance, Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election evolved into a three-way race between a 
centrist candidate from the incumbent KMT, a more rightist renegade KMT candidate, 
and a more leftist opposition DPP candidate.  The DPP candidate won a plurality with 
less than 40 percent of the vote, followed closely by the KMT renegade; the centrist 
KMT candidate came in a distance third, with less than 25 percent.  Similarly, in Mexico, 
the 2000 presidential election turned into a three-way race between candidates of the 
rightist PAN, centrist PRI, and leftist PRD.  The PAN’s candidate won the election with 
43 percent of the vote, while the PRI won 36 percent and the PRD 17 percent.     
 It is instructive to consider the counterfactual in these cases: what if these results 
were in parliamentary regimes, and they decided the composition of parliament rather 
than the presidential winner?  At the government formation stage, both the KMT and the 
PRI would have been well-placed to remain in the governing coalition, at least.  
Certainly, their chances of being part of government would be better than the certainty of 
being shut out of the executive. It is in this way that parliamentarism offers an additional 
bulwark against defeat to a centrist incumbent: if it performs poorly in the election, the 
party may still maneuver into power at the government formation stage.  Presidentialism, 
by contrast, offers no such safety net: second place is worth nothing.    
                                                
44 Or at least, a large enough share of the vote to advance to the second round, if the electoral system is a 
two-round system.  Even in the two-round case, it may make sense to be extreme rather than centrist in the 
first round.  See France, where many first-round winners are the more extreme of the major party 
candidates (Tsebelis 1990: 187-234; Cox 1997: 123-138). 
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 How Presidentialism Leads to More Symmetric Electoral Coordination  
 Presidentialism also lowers an advantaged incumbent’s chances of retaining 
power in a third way, by reducing the coordination advantage that the incumbent enjoys 
through its superior party organization.  As we saw in the previous section, opposition 
coordination problems can arise at both the election and government formation stages in 
parliamentary regimes, and they can sustain ruling parties in power.  In presidential 
regimes, by contrast, coordination problems occur only during the election, and they tend 
to be both simpler to understand and easier to solve.  As a consequence, coordination 
asymmetry on average is much more important to who wins the executive in 
parliamentary than in presidential races: incumbent parties cannot depend on poor 
opposition coordination to retain power in presidential regimes. 
 As I detailed in the previous section, coordination problems can be quite complex 
at the election stage in some electoral systems.  Under SNTV rules, for example, both 
nominating an optimal number of candidates in each district and getting supporters to 
allocate their votes evenly across all the party’s nominees can be quite difficult.  Vote-
pooling systems drastically reduce or eliminate these problems, however, so that 
elections in most PR systems and STV result in a fairly proportional conversion of votes 
into seats. 
 The real bite of coordination asymmetry instead comes at the government 
formation stage, where the opposition may consist of several parties from opposite ends 
of the political spectrum.  For instance, under high-magnitude PR, there tends to be a 
high effective number of parties and a large ideological range across the opposition.  
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Removing the incumbent from office requires that these opposition parties cooperate with 
one another rather than with the incumbent to form a government.  And this is by no 
means a foregone conclusion; during much of Italy’s postwar party system, for instance, 
removing the DC from the prime minister’s office would have required parties of the far 
right to cooperate with the Communists, and in Canada the Liberals retained power in 
part because the Conservatives and the various “prairie populist” parties were deeply 
opposed to one another’s positions on state intervention in the economy (Tarrow 1990: 
317; Carty 1996).  In these and other cases, the ideological commitments of the 
opposition parties left them much more predisposed to support a prime minister from the 
centrist incumbent than one drawn from the far extreme of the political spectrum.  Thus, 
in parliamentary regimes the government formation stage introduces an additional step at 
which opposition coordination can fail, and the incumbent can survive in power. 
 This kind of post-election coordination problem simply does not exist in 
presidential regimes.  Control of the executive is decided as soon as all the votes are 
counted: the candidate who comes out ahead is the winner, and that is that.  The 
coordination problem in presidential races is entirely one of pre-election coalition 
formation—of getting opposition elites and voters to support the same ticket.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the complex coordination dilemmas that parties face in 
parliamentary races in some systems like SNTV, the opposition coordination problem in 
presidential races is quite simple: nominate one candidate, and get all the anti-incumbent 
elites and voters to coordinate on him.  Succeed at this task, and the opposition has a 
fighting chance of winning.  Fail, and the incumbent can start planning the inauguration 
ceremony.  This is not to say that all the anti-incumbent groups will coalesce behind a 
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single opposition candidate—they often do not.  But because the optimal solution to the 
coordination problem is obvious to everyone involved, the chances are better that either 
opposition elites will work out a way to nominate only one candidate, or if they fail, that 
opposition supporters will vote strategically to achieve the same outcome.    
 In addition, there is a powerful incentive for the opposition in presidential regimes 
to cooperate pre-election: the contest for the presidency is both single-stage and winner-
take-all.  If the opposition does not cooperate in the election, there is no second stage at 
which to work out a compromise.  Instead, everyone in the opposition remains shut out of 
power.  The presidency is also an enormous and indivisible prize: the president controls 
all the bureaucracy and does not depend on the confidence of any group in the legislature 
to do so.  Thus, there is less opportunity to bargain for a share of power ex post.  By 
contrast, in parliamentary regimes a small opposition party can hold out hope of 
becoming a junior coalition partner in the government, and by doing so, winning a payoff 
in executive power and perks that far exceeds the share of seats it contributes to the 
government.  As a small opposition party, then, the expected payoff of running alone in a 
parliamentary election tends to be higher than it is in a presidential one, making pre-
electoral cooperation less appealing (cf. Magaloni 2006: 235).  Thus, in general the 
opposition should have less incentive to coordinate under parliamentarism than 
presidentialism (cf. S. Golder 2006: 23-26; Hicken and Stoll 2008).  
 Interestingly, the reverse appears more often true of an advantaged incumbent 
party: effective intra-party coordination is harder to achieve in presidential regimes than 
in parliamentary ones.  The reason is what we might term the “renegade problem”: how 
to keep candidates denied the nomination from running independent campaigns and 
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splitting the ruling party vote.  Ruling party nominations are both valuable—because of 
the high likelihood of winning—and scarce—because there are more aspirants to office 
than there are nominations to be given. As a consequence, there will inevitably be 
aspiring candidates denied a nomination.  The problem for the party arises when one or 
more of these candidates has strong personal appeal—they could win a great deal of 
electoral support even without the ruling party’s nomination, and as a consequence have a 
stronger incentive to run a “renegade” campaign against the party’s official nominee.   
 In parliamentary regimes, this problem is typically solved through a promise by 
the party leader to share power with popular rivals after the election—perhaps by 
allocating important cabinet ministries or by committing to policies that they advocate.  
Rivals can ensure these deals are credible by maintaining the support of some of the 
party’s members of parliament: the party leader can then be kept from reneging on a pre-
election agreement by the threat of a no-confidence vote or an intra-party leadership 
challenge once the new parliament is seated.  In this way, the typical prime minister is 
merely “first-among-equals”: his hold on the office depends on the support of his own 
party members, constraining his independence and requiring him to share decision-
making and build intra-party consensus to advance his agenda. Indeed, a key part of a 
prime minister’s survival strategy is sharing portfolios with potential rivals in the party 
(Ono 2010).  As a result, popular rivals can have considerable ex post leverage within the 
party, ensuring continued influence and access to the perks of power.   
 In presidential regimes, by contrast, this kind of power-sharing promise is much 
less credible.  Presidents almost always have a fixed term of office and cannot be 
removed except in extraordinary circumstances such as impeachment. Thus, they do not 
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face existential threats from their own party or supporting coalition in the way that prime 
ministers do (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 95). They are also the undisputed principal in 
the executive branch to which all other officials report, so there is typically nothing to 
stop presidents from reneging on agreements to give intra-party rivals broad influence 
within the executive once they are in office. They may still need to win support from 
rivals to get policy objectives accomplished, but they can fire or reshuffle cabinet 
appointees without consulting their party membership.  This lack of post-election 
leverage over the executive means that a presidential candidate’s promise to share power 
is worth considerably less to popular rivals than that of a candidate for prime minister.  
As a consequence, the expected payoff of winning the party’s nomination for chief 
executive is generally much higher, and that of losing the party’s nomination is lower, in 
presidential than in parliamentary regimes.  Put simply, presidentialism raises the stakes 
of the intra-party nominating contest: the winner is better off, and the losers worse off, 
than under parliamentarism.   
 It follows that the rewards of leaving the incumbent party—even a highly 
advantaged one—and running as a renegade are potentially much higher in presidential 
regimes.  Not only is the expected utility of staying in the ruling party lower under 
presidentialism, but that of running an independent campaign is also greater, as the more 
candidate-centric nature of presidential contests gives popular rivals a better shot at 
converting their personal appeal into electoral victory.  Moreover, these renegade 
campaigns are potentially disastrous in presidential races, where splitting the incumbent 
party vote can open the door to an opposition candidate victory with much less than a 
majority; by contrast, in parliamentary regimes such splits may only force the incumbent 
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party into a coalition with its splinter faction.  Thus, we should be more likely to see 
damaging incumbent party splits as a result of competition over the nomination for chief 
executive in presidential regimes than in parliamentary ones.45  The end consequence is 
that there should be less coordination asymmetry in the party system in presidential 
contests: they increase the opposition’s chances of effective coordination and decrease 
the incumbent’s.   
 
 Evidence: Dominant Parties in Presidential Regimes 
 To recap, I have argued that advantaged ruling parties should be more vulnerable 
to defeat in presidential than in parliamentary regimes, for three distinct reasons.  First, 
party competition for the executive is higher-variance in presidential regimes, because the 
winner is determined by the outcome of a single, candidate-centered race where partisan 
advantages are less decisive.  Second, spatial positioning asymmetry matters less in 
presidential regimes, because presidential candidates can more credibly distance 
themselves from the extreme positions of their party, and because there is no government 
formation stage where a party’s centrist positions are especially advantageous.  Third, 
coordination between parties is more nearly equal in presidential regimes: the problem is 
simpler to understand and solve, the winner-take-all nature of presidential races increase 
                                                
45 Interestingly, the PRI in Mexico developed an unusual institutional solution to the renegade problem. It 
retained a constitutional rule of nonconsecutive reelection for all elected offices, increasing the circulation 
of elites between different offices and raising potential renegades’ continuation value of remaining within 
the party.  It also forbid reelection of the president, which meant that those denied the nomination would 
have a shot in six years.  By giving the sitting president enormous power to handpick his successor and 
nominate PRI candidates for other elected offices as well, the PRI also created stronger incentives for 
aspirants to the presidency to remain loyal to the party and discouraged the formation of intra-party factions 
around strong candidates (Magaloni 2006: 46-49).  This innovation appears to have helped the PRI reduce 
the threat posed by renegades in presidential elections and contributed to the PRI’s exceptional longevity in 
power. 
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both the benefits of opposition coordination and the costs of not coordinating, and the 
incentives for renegade incumbent campaigns are greater.  As a consequence, long-lived 
one-party rule should be much less likely in presidential regimes than parliamentary ones, 
all else equal. 
 The question now is whether the patterns of dominance that I identified in 
Chapter 2 are consistent with this prediction.  At first glance, they do not appear to be: in 
Table 4.2, which shows all 41 parties categorized by whether they held power in a 
presidential or parliamentary regime, there is a roughly equal number occurring in both 
regime types.  Moreover, there are 514 cases of ruling parties in parliamentary regimes, 
and only 178 in presidential regimes.  So of 514 parliamentary cases, only 26, or 5.1 
percent, survived at least 20 years in office, while of 178 presidential cases, 15, or 8.43 
percent, survived that long.  By these numbers, long-lived ruling parties certainly do not 
appear to be any less common in presidential regimes.   
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Table 4.2.  Dominant Parties by Type of Executive Selection 
Country Party Start Month End Month 
Tenure at Risk 
(Months) 
Parliamentary Regimes 
Antigua and Barbuda LP Nov-81 Mar-04 268 
Austria SPO Apr-70 Feb-00 358 
Australia LP+CP Dec-49 Dec-72 276 
Belgium CVP Apr-74 Jul-99 303 
Botswana BDP Sep-66 - 483* 
Canada LP Oct-35 Jun-57 260 
Ethiopia EPRDF May-95 - 139* 
Germany, West CDU+CSU Sep-49 Oct-69 241 
Guyana PPP/Civic Oct-92 - 170* 
India INC Aug-47 Mar-77 355 
Israel ILP May-48 Jun-77 349 
Italy DC Apr-48 Jun-81 398 
Japan LP/LDP Dec-54 Aug-93 464 
Liechtenstein (I) FBP Jul-28 Mar-70 500 
Liechtenstein (II) VU Apr-78 Apr-01 276 
Lesotho LDC Apr-93 - 164* 
Luxembourg (I) CSV Oct-45 Jun-74 344 
Luxembourg (II) CSV Jul-79 - 329* 
Malaysia UMNO/BN Aug-65 - 496* 
St. Kitts and Nevis SKNLP Jul-95 - 137* 
Samoa HRPP Apr-88 - 224* 
Singapore PAP Aug-65 - 496* 
South Africa (I) NP Jun-48 May-94 551 
South Africa (II) ANC May-94 - 151* 
Sweden SAP Sep-36 Oct-76 481 
Trinidad and Tobago PNM Aug-62 Dec-86 292 
          
Presidential Regimes 
Belarus1 n/p Jul-94 - 149* 
Cameroon CPDM Oct-92 - 170* 
Djibouti RPP May-93 - 163* 
Gabon1 PDG Dec-93 - 156* 
Gambia PPP Feb-65 Jul-94 353 
Malawi UDF/DPP Apr-94 - 152* 
Mexico PRI Jul-46 Dec-00 653 
Mozambique FRELIMO Oct-94 - 146* 
Namibia SWAPO Mar-90 - 201* 
Russia Yeltsin/UR Dec-91 - 180* 
Senegal PS Feb-78 Apr-00 266 
Seychelles SPPF Jul-93 - 161* 
Tanzania CCM Oct-95 - 134* 
Zambia MMD Nov-91 - 181* 
Zimbabwe1 ZANU-PF Apr-80 - 320* 
* Incumbent still in power; tenure calculated through December 2006  
1Personalist incumbent; no leader turnover    
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 These data, however, are rather deceptive.  In fact, the argument I have made is a 
conditional one: all else equal, presidentialism is easier for oppositions to win in than 
parliamentarism.  But all else is not equal across the parties in Table 4.2; in particular, 
most of the presidential regimes are quite authoritarian and place significant restrictions 
on the opposition’s ability to campaign and otherwise contest elections.  Most of the 
parliamentary dominant parties, by contrast, occur in democratic regimes.  To distinguish 
between parties in these two regime types, I used the overall score on PolityIV’s 
democracy-autocracy scale: if the regime in which the party held power was always a 7 
or above, I classified it as a democracy; otherwise, it was an autocracy.  By this measure, 
20 cases were in democracies and 21 in autocracies.  I then separated parties in each 
regime type by their method of executive selection, shown in Table 4.3.  
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 The pattern that emerges once we take political openness into account is quite 
striking: dominant parties simply do not occur in presidential democracies.  Indeed, 
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Table 4.3.  Countries w/ Dominant Parties, by Type of Executive Selection
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among democracies, all 20 ruling parties that endured over 20 years in office were in 
parliamentary regimes, while there is not a single case of a ruling party controlling the 
executive for over 20 years in a presidential regime.  Since there are many more cases of 
incumbents in parliamentary regimes than in presidential, however, a better comparison 
is to look at the relative frequency of dominant parties in each group.  By frequency, 20 
of 460 parliamentary incumbents in democracies survived at least 20 years in office, or 
4.35%, while 0 of 96 presidential incumbents did: 0.00%.  [Difference of Means test]  In 
autocracies, by contrast, 13 of 82 presidential incumbents, or 15.85%, survived at least 20 
years in office, while 6 of 54 parliamentary incumbents, or 11.11%, survived at least that 
long.46  
 What these relative frequencies suggest is that there is an important difference 
across regime types, but only when the right of opposition parties to contest is fully 
respected.  In the authoritarian regimes, the ruling party advantages that produce 
asymmetry in the party system may be so great as to render any institutional effects 
irrelevant to ruling party survival.   
 One far-reaching implication of this finding is that as presidential regimes become 
more politically open, the chances of ruling party defeat should begin to diverge from 
those in parliamentary regimes (cf. Scheiner 2006: 24).  A good example is in Mexico: 
even as the regime liberalized during the 1980s and 1990s, the PRI should have been 
well-positioned to remain in power. It had a partisan advantage: more in the electorate 
self-identified as PRI partisans than PAN or PRD supporters combined.  It had a 
                                                
46 Both Gambia and Zimbabwe switched from parliamentary to presidential during the ruling 
party’s tenure in office.  If we reclassify both as parliamentary, the rate for presidential regimes is 
slightly lower (13.75% vs. 14.29%) but the difference is still not significant. 
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positioning advantage: it was the centrist incumbent flanked by the leftist PRD and 
rightist PAN. And it had a coordination advantage: the electoral rules used to choose 
Mexican Congress created incentives for both the PAN and PRD to run candidates 
separately in single-member districts, while the PRI ran centrist candidates (Diaz-
Cayeros and Magaloni 2001).  Because of this, and because of the huge ideological gulf 
between the PAN and the PRD, opposition cooperation in elections remained very 
limited even after the regime became more liberal and the opposition camp as a whole 
drew as much voter support as the PRI.  As a result, the PRI was consistently over-
represented in Congress relative to its overall vote share, and it continued to hold the 
critical centrist position even when it lost its majority in 1997.   
 Yet in the 2000 presidential election, these advantages proved insufficient to keep 
the PRI in power: a three-way presidential race, with a lackluster PRI candidate and a 
strong PAN candidate, produced an opposition winner with only a plurality of the vote.  
The PAN’s Vincente Fox far outperformed his party’s vote share in any previous national 
election, and so the PRI went down to defeat despite holding the leading position in a 
party system that remained quite asymmetric.  The PRI probably would have won the 
2000 election had it been decided entirely by elections to Congress, where it derived 
greater benefit from advantages over its competitors.  Mexico’s political liberalization 
created the conditions for meaningful opposition contestation, but it was presidentialism 
that delivered the death blow to PRI dominance.  
 
 
 184 
 4.3.  Centralization of Authority: Why Dominant Parties are More Likely in Highly 
Centralized Regimes 
 In addition to electoral system and method of executive selection, there is a third 
institutional feature that conditions the impact of party asymmetry: the degree to which 
political authority is centralized.  In some states, authority is highly concentrated in the 
national executive: local officials such as governors and mayors are appointed by the 
center rather than elected, and most significant political decisions are made in the capital.  
In others, local officials are elected by the people over whom they have jurisdiction: their 
constituency is not officials in the central government but local citizens.  When their 
offices also come with significant resources and autonomy, provincial, state and city 
leaders have not only the incentives but the ability to act independently of the central 
government.  Local autonomy is a potential threat to ruling party control at the central 
level because it provides opportunities for opposition parties to pursue a bottom-up party-
building strategy.  Control of local offices enables opposition parties to reduce their 
disadvantaged position in the party system in three ways. 
 First, by winning control of powerful local offices, opposition parties gain access 
to resources that they can use to change the type of members that the party recruits.  As I 
argued in Chapter 3, without the promise of material benefits, opposition parties have to 
make ideological appeals to attract members, and this limits their ability to reposition 
themselves in policy space.  Control of elected office, however, opens access to resources 
and patronage, and thereby allows opposition parties to recruit more pragmatic office-
seekers who are willing to sacrifice ideological principles for a better shot at winning 
elections.  Given enough of these new recruits, the party can gain substantial ideological 
flexibility, making it much more competitive with the incumbent in subsequent elections.  
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In other words, local offices provide a resource stream that, over time, substantially 
reduces positioning asymmetry between the opposition party and the incumbent. 
 Second, opposition parties can also use local offices to increase the number of 
partisans in the electorate and the value of the party brand to potential office-seekers 
among the elite.  By becoming the “governing party” in a particular state or city, they can 
counter the reputations for ideological extremism and rigidity that can be so damaging to 
their national electoral appeal.  They can claim credit for any improvements in the 
jurisdictions under their control and use these to demonstrate what they would do if they 
won the next national election.  A successful term as the governing party also increases 
the value of the party’s endorsement to office-seekers, and it marks a party as a more 
serious contestant for national office.  Thus, electoral victories in local races can reveal 
which opposition party is the strongest and should be the beneficiary of strategic 
coordination by anti-incumbent voters and elites in national elections. 
 Third, local offices provide valuable opportunities to develop high-quality 
candidates for national office (cf. Scheiner 2006: 132-145).  Mayors and governors tend 
to make strong candidates in presidential races: their executive experience is directly 
relevant to the job, and their personal popularly is closely related to their electoral 
prospects.  Opposition candidates who manage to defeat advantaged incumbents at the 
central level are often local executives and prominent political figures in their own right.  
For instance, in Taiwan, the DPP’s winning presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian had 
previously been the mayor of Taipei, Taiwan’s capital and largest city, and in Mexico, 
the PAN’s candidate Vincente Fox was a popular and prominent governor of 
Guanajuanto state before running for president.  The most successful also tend to be 
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pragmatists: they can counter the extremist reputations of their parties by pointing to their 
accomplishments at more concrete tasks like getting roads paved, improving sanitation, 
reducing crime, and furthering economic development. 
 Although the benefits that the opposition accrues by winning local offices should 
improve their electoral prospects, these depend as well on the method used to choose the 
central government executive: the personal popularity of local executives is more easily 
converted into electoral appeal in presidential elections, as both Chen and Fox were able 
to do.  By contrast, in parliamentary regimes, personal popularity matters less in the 
election and is harder to turn into executive control.  In Japan, for instance, non-LDP 
members frequently won local governor’s races and proved popular once in office; 
prominent examples include Ryokishi Minobe in Tokyo (1967-1979), Ryoichi Kuroda in 
Osaka (1971-1979), and Torazo Ninagawa in Kyoto (1950-1978).47  None, however, 
were able to convert their national following and popularity into a serious run at the 
prime minister’s office; Japan’s highly centralized parliamentary regime effectively 
closed the door to these kinds of outsider campaigns.   
 Winning local offices can nevertheless be beneficial to opposition parties in 
parliamentary regimes, as they can still increase their ideological flexibility and improve 
their party brand by doing so.  For instance, in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
became a more credible alternative to Congress at the federal level once it had captured 
several state governments in North India (Malik and Singh 1992).  In general, however, 
the lack of a directly elected president forces opposition parties to engage in more 
intensive, bottom-up party building in order to translate these local advantages into 
                                                
47 I am indebted to Yoshikuni Ono for these examples. 
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improved prospects in national elections.  The route to national power is less clear, and 
the process more involved, in parliamentary than presidential federal regimes.  
 To sum up, decentralization of authority reduces the effect of party system 
asymmetry on ruling party survival in two ways: by winning local offices, opposition 
parties can (1) increase their share of partisans and (2) develop a more ideologically 
flexible organization.  The effects of partisanship and positioning asymmetry are 
therefore weakened in competition for national office, making advantaged incumbents 
more vulnerable to defeat.  This decline in ruling party survival occurs regardless of 
regime type: switching from a unitary to a federal state should lower advantaged ruling 
party survival rates in both parliamentary and presidential regimes.  In addition, the 
decline should be steeper in presidential than parliamentary regimes, because even strong 
federal parliamentary regimes reduce the possibility of local “superstar” candidates 
emerging as independent threats in national elections. 
 Thus, the effect of party system asymmetry on the likelihood of ruling party 
survival should be weakest in regimes that are both presidential and strongly federal: 
regimes such as the United States, Brazil, and Argentina.  It should be strongest in 
regimes that are both parliamentary and highly centralized: regimes such as Britain, 
Israel, and the Netherlands.  And among the intermediate cases, it should be greater in 
parliamentary regimes than presidential ones with roughly the same degree of 
centralization: for instance, greater in Malaysia than in Mexico, and greater in Japan than 
in Taiwan.   
 Stated more formally, we have three predictions.  First, as the degree of 
centralization rises, the effect of positioning asymmetry on ruling party survival 
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increases.  Second, the ruling party’s likelihood of survival is higher in parliamentary 
regimes than presidential ones.  Third, moving from a decentralized to a centralized 
regime produces a greater increase in the effect on ruling party survival in presidential 
regimes than in parliamentary ones. These hypotheses are shown in graphical form in 
Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIME CENTRALIZATION AND THE EFFECT OF PARTY SYSTEM 
ASYMMETRY (EASY) ON RULING PARTY SURVIVAL 
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I then broke these categories out by type of executive selection.  The patterns are shown 
in Table 4.4.   
 
 
 
 Unlike the presidential-parliamentary comparison, dominant parties do occur in 
both centralized and decentralized regimes.  The combination of decentralized 
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presidentialism does have the fewest number of dominant parties in it, but we cannot say 
whether this is meaningful without also considering the frequencies of each regime 
combination in the comparison group of non-dominant parties.  To do that, we will have 
to confront several complications.  One is that several of these regimes have become 
significantly more or less centralized over time.  For instance, in Russia, Putin effectively 
ended most of what regional autonomy remained in 2004 by eliminating the election of 
governors and replacing them with presidential appointees.  In order to test for the effects 
of centralization, then, our empirical strategy needs to allow for the possibility that this 
institutional feature may vary over time.  We also must deal with how to operationalize 
the concept of “centralization,” as there are several competing measures, of which Watts 
(1996) is only one.  There is also the need to test for interactive effects—for instance, it is 
possible that presidentialism with decentralization has a multiplicative rather than an 
additive effect on ruling party survival.  And most importantly, we are better served 
modeling the dependent variable—duration in power—as continuous rather than as a 
simple dichotomy for whether the ruling party survived 20 years in office or not.   
 Thus, we have just about reached the limit of empirical inferences we can draw 
from a simple comparison of dominant party cases to one another.  For that reason, I 
undertake a more comprehensive evaluation of the determinants of ruling party duration 
in the next chapter.  Before concluding, however, I address one final theoretical concern, 
about when institutions can rightly be expected to have independent causal effects.   
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 4.4.  Institutions as Dependent Variables: Why Do Incumbents Choose 
Presidentialism? 
 To this point, I have considered institutions as fixed and having independent 
effects on party asymmetry.  But as I noted in Chapter 2, institutions are themselves 
especially malleable at the advent of a new electorally-contested regime.  Dominant 
parties are typically in position to reshape the formal rules of competition to their 
advantage, because they often begin the contested period with full control of the state.  
Thus, we face a danger in attributing independent effects to institutions, when those 
institutions themselves may be the consequence of previous choices by the incumbent 
party. 
 This concern has been articulated especially well by Tom Pepinsky.  He argues 
that in authoritarian contexts, we should be skeptical about the ability of formal 
institutions to shape and restrain power-holders from taking actions that they prefer.  
Institutions only modify behavior as long as no decisive coalition of the relevant actors 
forms to overturn them.  Most authoritarian dominant parties, however, are the decisive 
coalition: because they enjoy unfettered control over the state, they can change the rules 
of competition at will.  This creates a problem for theories that attribute independent 
effects to institutions in authoritarian contexts.  In Pepinsky’s words,  
 
“if dominant party institutions under authoritarian rule are vulnerable to 
manipulation because political actors believe that institutional 
manipulation will help them to shape political outcomes in their favor, 
then it is probably also true that those factors that explain the origins of 
(and changes in) dominant parties also directly shape those political 
outcomes” (Pepinsky 2011: 5). 
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 This criticism should be taken seriously.  It has the potential to undercut much of 
the institutional argument I have presented to this point, at least as it pertains to the more 
authoritarian regimes.  Rather than the institutional configurations themselves having 
independent causal effects, they themselves may well be the outcome of some deeper 
cause, and focusing on the institutions themselves obscures this more fundamental 
process.   
 Indeed, a glance at some of the institutional manipulations of dominant parties in 
the sample indicates widespread and frequent changes in the rules that govern electoral 
competition.  UMNO in Malaysia, for example, has unilaterally altered the constitution 
hundreds of times, created new hurdles for opposition party registration, changed district 
boundaries to disadvantage opposition candidates, increased the representation of its rural 
strongholds at the expense of the more competitive urban constituencies, and applied 
national security laws for blatantly partisan objectives (Chin 2002).  In Mexico, the PRI 
changed the electoral system several times, including adopting a mixed-member system 
with a PR tier that increased the incentives for opposition parties to run against each other 
and split the anti-incumbent vote in single member districts (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 
2001).   
 Nor are these changes limited to the authoritarian cases.  The LDP in Japan, for 
instance, was one of the great rule-changers among dominant parties: McElwain (2008) 
has documented dozens of seemingly minor “reforms” it adopted that effectively 
protected incumbent party candidates, including shortening the official campaign season, 
limiting advertising, and lifting restrictions on private donations while blocking public 
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funding of campaigns.  It also prevented reapportionment that would distribute more 
seats to urban areas at the expense of its rural base (Christensen and Johnson 1995).   
 Put simply, the problem these examples raise is, how can we claim institutions 
have independent effects on ruling party survival when they can so easily be changed by 
the incumbent?  In particular, if presidentialism is so much worse for ruling party 
survival, then why don’t ruling parties simply change to parliamentarism?  After all, they 
should know better than any armchair theorist which institutional setting makes them 
better off.  As we saw in Figure 4.5, most of the authoritarian dominant parties occurred 
in presidential, not parliamentary, regimes, which seems odd if parliamentarism is so 
much better for long-term party survival. Moreover, in the full set of regimes in the 
sample, switches from parliamentarism to presidentialism have occurred in several, 
including France, Sri Lanka, Gambia, and Zimbabwe, while there are no instances of 
switches from pure presidentialism to pure parliamentarism.48  Why then do autocratic 
parties, who have the fewest constraints on their ability to rework the institutions of the 
state, adopt or retain the type of executive selection that ultimately makes them more 
vulnerable to defeat? 
 There are three reasons Pepinsky’s concern does not undercut the claims I have 
made in this chapter.  First, even if advantaged ruling parties can change the rules of the 
electoral game at will, it is useful for us to know how these changes work to the 
incumbent’s advantage.  One way to view the conclusions in this chapter is as a set of 
                                                
48 There are a couple cases of significant weakening of presidential powers in semi-presidential regimes, in 
Portugal in 1982 and Croatia in 2000.  In the latter case this effectively transformed the regime into a fully 
parliamentary one.  In addition, Israel switched to a direct election of the prime minister for two elections, 
in 1996 and 2000, before returning to selection by parliament.  See Samuels and Shugart (2010: 162-192) 
for a discussion of the effects of this change on the Israeli party system. 
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predictions about what institutional changes incumbents will be tempted to make under 
different kinds of asymmetry.  When the ruling party enjoys a large coordination 
advantage over its competitors, for instance, it makes sense to adopt or maintain electoral 
institutions that make coordination more difficult.    
 Second, not all institutions are easily changed at all times: some changes are 
costlier for the ruling party than others.  Redistricting seats or changing the rules for 
filing candidacies can often be done with little public outcry. But other changes, such as 
redrawing provincial borders or eliminating local elections, are potentially more 
damaging: they may be long-standing practices in some regimes, and attempting to alter 
them can whip up popular opposition.  In Taiwan, for instance, local elections were a key 
source of the regime’s internal and external legitimacy; as a party initially dominated by 
mainlanders, the KMT never dared to eliminate them entirely (Lin Chia-lung 1998: 137-
156).  Moreover, many institutions exhibit a form of path dependence: the longer they are 
around, the more the relevant actors in the political system come to benefit from them, 
and the more costly it is to change to something different (cf. Pierson 2000).  Thus, rules 
that the incumbent party adopts at the beginning of the regime may ultimately become 
impossible to change even when they no longer serve the party’s interests.  Institutional 
changes can also have unforeseen consequences.  A good illustration is the defeat of the 
Republican People’s Party in Turkey in 1950, which was ensured by the use of highly 
majoritarian electoral rules that the incumbent party itself had adopted.  The RPP was 
wiped out when the upstart opposition managed to attract a plurality of the vote, a 
possibility that the RPP’s leaders had apparently not considered when they introduced 
multi-party elections four years earlier.   
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 Third, even if the ruling party as a whole can form a decisive coalition to change 
the institutions of the regime, there is no guarantee that the interests of all the relevant 
actors within the party align.  In some cases, institutional arrangements can bind leaders’ 
behavior because other powerful actors within the ruling party benefit from them.  For 
instance, the PRI in Mexico successfully enforced a one-term limit on its presidents for 
70 years.  And in Japan, members of the LDP prevented changes from SNTV even when 
their leaders argued it would benefit the party as a whole (McElwain 2008).   
 I would suggest that it is this third factor, intra-party conflict of interests, that 
accounts for why so many autocratic dominant parties retained or adopted 
presidentialism.  Put simply, it is in the advantaged ruling party’s long-term interest to 
maintain parliamentarism, but in general it is in the party leader’s interest to adopt 
presidentialism.  As I argued at length above, in parliamentary regimes, leaders are 
subject to sanction by their party membership.  Because their appointment as prime 
minister depends on the tacit support of a majority of their own membership, they can be 
removed from power if they do not respond to party concerns. By contrast, party leaders 
who become president are much less directly accountable to their party membership: they 
serve fixed terms in office and do not depend on parliamentary confidence.  In addition, 
parties select the two types of executives based on different criteria: prime ministers tend 
to be chosen based on their service and loyalty to the party, while general popularity 
among the electorate factors much more heavily in presidential nominations (Samuels 
and Shugart 2010: 47-51).  Thus, by design, parliamentarism creates greater incumbent 
party constraints on executive action than does presidentialism.   
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 This difference in accountability to the full party membership creates a strong 
preference for presidentialism among party leaders.  It is not a stretch to assert that most 
party leaders would prefer greater freedom of action than the membership of their party 
permits, and presidentialism promises this additional leeway.  Thus, party leaders have an 
incentive to switch the regime to presidentialism, along with those who favor the party 
leader over his opponents within the party.  The rest of the party, however, should prefer 
parliamentarism for the same reasons: it gives them greater control over the behavior of 
the chief executive.   
 It is likely that only party leaders who already have centralized power within the 
party will be able to overcome opposition from the rank-and-file to make the switch to 
presidentialism; a more collegial party leadership with power diffused more widely is 
likely to succeed in opposing such a change.  As a consequence, switches to 
presidentialism are most likely to occur as the consequence of a power struggle that the 
incumbent party leader wins.  Once presidential regimes are established, the fixed terms 
and separate origin of the president further weaken the party’s control over the leader, 
making it more difficult for the party to replace their leader.  In other words, we are more 
likely to see parties effectively constrain leaders in parliamentary dominant parties, while 
we should see unconstrained leaders in presidential ones.   
 Although there are only four examples of changes from parliamentary to 
presidential regimes in the sample, these do offer some support for this story.  In France, 
Charles de Gaulle was the main force behind the founding of the Fifth Republic, and he 
assumed the office of president as soon as it was created in 1959.  In Gambia, Dawda 
Kairaba Jawara had held the leadership of the ruling PPP since independence in 1965, 
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and he won the first direct presidential election in 1982.  In Sri Lanka in 1977, newly-
elected prime minister J.R. Jayawardene pushed through a constitutional amendment 
creating the office of president and allowing him to assume that title and the expanded 
powers that came with it without having to be popularly elected.  And in Zimbabwe, the 
creation of the office of the president in 1987 was led by Robert Mugabe of ZANU, 
backed by the new national military and initiated in part as a reaction to violence in parts 
of the country sympathetic to the other major independence party, ZAPU.  In all four 
cases, the figure leading the ruling party at the time the change was adopted subsequently 
became the first president.   
 At the least, then, it is not inconsistent to argue both that presidentialism is worse 
for long-term one party rule and that many leaders of dominant parties seek to switch to 
presidential rule.  The struggle for power within the ruling party may result in an 
institutional decision that is suboptimal for the party’s long-term interests. 
 More generally, Pepinsky’s concerns notwithstanding, institutions can still have 
independent causal effects on ruling party survival even under one-party rule.  If intra-
party power is diffuse, so that multiple groups with different interests have veto power 
over institutional changes, then the institutions of the regime can serve to constrain even 
the leaders of the ruling party.  And even if the formal rules are malleable at the advent of 
the regime, the cost of changing them may rise over time, increasing their ability to shape 
inter-party competition.  
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 4.5.  Summary and Implications 
 In this chapter, I developed a theory of how formal institutions affect the 
persistence of dominant parties.  I focused on three features of the regime: (1) the 
electoral system, (2) the way the executive is selected, and (3) the degree of political 
centralization.  The electoral system has been the focus of most institutional explanations 
of dominant party systems, but I showed that it is impossible without additional 
information to derive clear theoretical expectations about which systems are most likely 
to sustain long periods of one-party rule.  Dominant parties are equally plausible under 
high-magnitude PR, SMD-plurality, or SNTV electoral rules.  By contrast, the way the 
executive is selected does have a consistent effect: for a given degree of asymmetry in the 
party system, the ruling party’s survival rate is lower in presidential than in parliamentary 
regimes.  I also derived a third prediction: that partisan asymmetry has a greater impact 
on ruling party survival in highly centralized regimes.  I ended with a consideration of the 
origins of such institutional choices, and I argued that the institutions best suited to 
promote the long-term survival of the party as a whole are not necessarily those desired 
by its leader.  Thus, presidentialism can be preferred by a party leader even when it 
worsens the long-term survival prospects of the ruling party.     
 The implications of these arguments are wide-ranging.  The first and most 
obvious is that institutional theories of dominance still have considerable explanatory 
power.  Work that downplays formal institutional explanations of one-party rule tends to 
do so largely based on contradictory or inaccurate predictions about electoral system 
effects (e.g. Greene 2007: 22-24; cf. Scheiner 2007).  What this chapter shows is that 
both proponents and critics of institutional theories have been focusing on the wrong set 
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of institutions: executive selection, rather than electoral system, is the institution that most 
directly and consistently affects ruling party survival rates.   
 A related implication is that to properly test theories of electoral system effects on 
ruling party survival, one should separate elections in parliamentary regimes from those 
in presidential ones.  Most previous work has treated legislative elections in both regime 
types as equally important to dominant party survival, but they clearly are not: in 
parliamentary regimes, retaining a majority in the legislature is decisive, while in 
presidential regimes it is not.  Thus, it is odd to talk of SNTV contributing to ruling party 
defeat in Taiwan, as several scholars have done, when that defeat occurred in a 
presidential, not parliamentary, election.  Party system asymmetries simply do not have 
the same consequences in presidential elections as they do in parliamentary ones.    
 A third implication is that scholars risk misinterpreting the causes of ruling party 
defeat in a number of prominent instances where those defeats occurred in presidential 
rather than parliamentary elections.  The Mexico and Taiwan cases, in particular, have 
attracted a great deal of scholarly attention because of how much better-organized and 
resourced the ruling parties were when they were defeated.  The explanation I have 
presented in this chapter suggests that these defeats should not have been so shocking 
after all—the advantages that both parties enjoyed in legislative races did them much less 
good in presidential contests.  In particular, the causal impact of the resource decline that 
affected both parties may consequently be overstated in existing explanations of their 
defeat.  Conversely, the continued survival of dominant parties in parliamentary regimes, 
such as the UMNO in Malaysia and PAP in Singapore, should be attributed in part to the 
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method of executive selection in use in those countries.  Party system asymmetries matter 
more in the competition for executive control in the parliamentary cases.   
 Finally, this difference in regime type should show up not only in the data on 
dominant parties, but also in the survival rates of all other ruling parties in the sample as 
well.  The best test of the institutional theory I have put forward is to see if ruling parties 
in presidential and parliamentary regimes face meaningfully different hazard rates over 
time, all else equal.  It is to this task that I turn in Chapter 5.    
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CHAPTER 5      
EMPIRICAL TESTS: THE COVARIATES OF RULING PARTY DEFEAT 
 
 
“I intend to live forever.  So far, so good!” 
--Woody Allen 
  
 
 In the previous empirical chapter, Chapter 2, I used simple cross-tabs and Kaplan-
Meier plots to examine the patterns of ruling party duration.  Chapters 3 and 4 
subsequently developed a theory to explain some of that variation—in particular, why 
cases of long-lived one-party rule appeared to be absent in presidential democracies.  In 
this chapter I return to and extend the empirical analysis in Chapter 2.  I describe 
additional data I collected on possible covariates of ruling party survival, and I employ a 
parameterized model to test for these effects. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  I first discuss the hypotheses from Chapters 3 
and 4 to be tested.  I then describe the data and measures employed in the empirical 
analysis.  Following that, I address the difficult issue of model specification—in 
particular, how to address a serious non-proportional hazards problem that arises in 
attempting to assess the effect of presidential versus parliamentary regime type.  The 
analysis follows.  Using a Royston-Parmar flexible parametric model, I find several 
interesting results.  Being a first-mover party and high party system asymmetry both 
lower the ruling party hazard rate, as do economic growth and age of the regime.  In 
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contrast, openness of the regime and term limits raise the hazard rate.  Most importantly, 
I find that the effect of regime type depends greatly on the degree of party system 
asymmetry: when asymmetry is high, presidential parties are much more likely to be 
defeated than parliamentary parties under the same conditions, while when asymmetry is 
low, presidential parties are more likely to survive than are parliamentary parties.  The 
results thus support the central contention of Chapter 4: advantaged ruling parties are 
more vulnerable to defeat in presidential than parliamentary regimes.   
 
 5.1.  Hypotheses and Data 
 The discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 generated a host of hypotheses about the 
determinants of ruling party survival.  I review these here. 
 
 Party System Asymmetry Variables 
 The first hypothesis is a resources effect: a large ruling party resource advantage 
should be associated with a lower hazard rate.  The key here is deciding how to measure 
“resources.”  The term as used in previous work refers to some combination of state jobs, 
rents, and spending used for overtly partisan ends on the one hand, and party-owned 
assets on the other.  These are all quantities that are hard to measure systematically across 
a large number of states and particularly over time (cf. Greene 2009). 
  In response, I have used a proxy variable, the state share of the economy—that is, 
the ratio of total state consumption relative to total consumption. This is admittedly a 
noisy measure of the potential resource advantage an incumbent may have.  Nevertheless, 
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in the absence of much more refined measures of “partisan resources,” the state share 
proxy is the best we have.  Thus, I expect the presence of a large state sector to increase 
both the opportunity for and the potential impact on the electorate of partisan use of state 
resources.  The state size measure (kg) is taken from the Penn World Tables, version 7.0. 
 Stated more formally, the hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The state’s share of the economy should be negatively associated with ruling 
party defeat. 
 
 The second hypothesis is a repression effect: the level of regime openness to 
competition should affect the ruling party’s survival prospects.  If opposition party 
candidates and organizations are systematically harassed or jailed, or if campaign rallies 
and political advertising are strictly curtailed, then opposition parties should have a 
harder time running competitive campaigns for office.  The measure that I use for regime 
openness is the regime’s aggregate Polity score, which is scaled from -10 to 10, with 
more open regimes receiving higher scores.49   
 Stated more formally, this hypothesis is: 
 
H2:  A higher Polity score should be positively associated with ruling party 
defeat.   
 
                                                
49 As an alternative measure, I also substituted Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy score for Polity.  Coefficient 
estimates for the other variables in the model did not change significantly, but the Vanhanen measure was 
not significant while the Polity measure was.   
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 The third hypothesis is about the asymmetry of the party system when the 
incumbent first came to power.  Because the underlying concept is central to my theory, I 
will discuss in more detail the measures I used to capture asymmetry.   In Chapter 3 I 
defined party system asymmetry as a condition in which one party consistently has the 
highest probability of controlling the chief executive’s office.  This advantage could be 
produced in at least three different ways.   
 First, one party could have more partisans in the electorate—in effect, having to 
attract fewer independent and undecided voters to its cause than any other party, and 
thereby having the best chance of winning the election.  In an ideal world we would 
measure this feature of the party system through surveys, as is regularly done with the 
ANES, for instance.  Unfortunately, this kind of detailed survey data is not available for 
the large majority of ruling party cases in the dataset, particularly those that came to 
power in the distant past. 
 Second, one party could have a spatial positioning advantage over all others.  In 
an ideal world we would be able to capture this advantage through some kind of 
aggregate ideological score for each party—something akin to NOMINATE scores in the 
U.S. context—and measure the distance to the median voter in the electorate.  Again, 
however, to the extent it would even be possible to develop these measures for all the 
cases in the sample, the effort entailed in collecting the appropriate data is currently 
prohibitive. 
 Third, one party could be better than others at coordinating in elections—that is, 
at converting votes into seats, and seats into executive control.  One measure of this 
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advantage is the difference between a party’s vote and seat share in elections.  These data 
are considerably easier to assemble, and I have done so for most of the cases in the 
sample.   
 Ultimately, however, we are less concerned here with the individual effects of 
each kind of asymmetry than we are with the net size of the initial asymmetry.  And this 
“distance” between the first and second parties in the party system should be reflected in 
two readily observable outcomes: the size of the winning party’s vote share in the 
elections in which it came to power, and of its seat share, relative to the second-place 
party.  Thus, I measure party system asymmetry in two ways.  The first is the difference 
between the first and second-place parties in the lower house elections most nearly 
concurrent to the time the incumbent took office.  The second is the difference between 
the first and second party’s share of seats in the lower house for the same election.  I was 
able to gather these data for most of the ruling party cases in the sample. 
 Stated more formally, the hypothesis is: 
  
H3: High party system asymmetry, as measured by both the difference in lower 
house vote and seat shares in the initial election, should be negatively associated 
with ruling party defeat. 
 
 Institutional Variables 
 In addition to party system asymmetry, I also developed several hypotheses about 
the modifying effects of institutions on ruling party survival.  The primary focus was on 
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the different expected effects of presidential versus parliamentary regimes.  From this 
discussion I derived two hypotheses.  First, 
 
H4: Ruling parties face different hazard rates in presidential and parliamentary 
regimes. 
 
Second,  
 
H5: The method of executive selection has a conditional effect on ruling party 
defeat: the larger the initial party system asymmetry, the greater the presidential 
hazard rate relative to the parliamentary one. 
 
 In the previous chapter I also devoted considerable space to the effects of the 
electoral system and of local elected offices on ruling party survival.  In the end, I derived 
no general prediction about the effect of different kinds of electoral systems; I therefore 
do not include any electoral system feature in the analysis in this chapter.  I did, however, 
predict that autonomous, directly-elected local offices would increase the likelihood of 
ruling party defeat.  Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate data for more than a 
handful of regimes in the dataset on this question; thus, I will have to leave its evaluation 
for future research.   
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 Control Variables 
 In addition to the hypotheses derived from my theory, we also need to control for 
several other potentially important confounding effects on ruling party survival.  
Foremost among these is economic growth: there is a strongly positive association 
between short-term economic performance and incumbent reelection prospects (Duch 
and Stevenson 2008).  Thus, I expect positive economic growth in the previous year to 
improve ruling party survival.  The measure I use for economic performance is taken 
from the Penn World Tables version 7.0. 
 Another theoretically important factor is the length of the executive’s term—
intuitively, parties are at greatest risk of defeat at election time.  Thus, I expect a longer 
executive term to be negatively associated with ruling party defeat.  Term length data 
were taken from the Database of Political Indicators (DPI); for those pre-1975 regimes, I 
coded term length using the same sources as for party turnover.   
 In addition, some presidential executives are subject to term limits, while others 
are not.  By contrast, parliamentary executives are almost never subject to formal term 
limits. As I argued in Chapter 4, the fact that a battle for succession takes place in the 
run-up to an election is a serious disadvantage of presidentialism from a ruling party’s 
perspective.  This disadvantage is lessened if the incumbent runs again, however.  Thus, 
ruling parties should be at greater risk of defeat if the incumbent is term-limited out of 
office.  Term limits data I coded myself from the Nohlen et al. handbooks. 
 The age of the regime also is an important variable.  I argued in Chapter 3 that in 
regimes with an advantaged first-mover party, there should be a “natural” process of 
evolution toward a more symmetric party system, such that older regimes should be less 
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likely to see long periods of one-party rule than newer regimes.  In that case, age should 
be positively associated with defeat.  Alternatively, the age of regime measure may pick 
up the effect of party system instability in new ECRs where there is no advantaged first-
mover, in which case age should be negatively associated with defeat.  The age variable 
used in the analysis was constructed by taking the natural log of the number of years 
since the regime began.  For regimes that pre-date the first party in the sample, I used the 
year that multi-party elections were first held, if after 1900.  For ECRs that began even 
earlier, I counted the age beginning in 1900. 
 Finally, in the process of coding ruling party turnover, I found that semi-
presidential regimes appeared to have different patterns of turnover: in several cases, 
turnover of the premier occurred much more frequently than did either the legislature or 
the presidency.  To control for a possible semi-presidential effect, then, I created a 
dummy recording whether the premier could be removed by either the president or the 
legislature—that is, had two principals.   
 
 Descriptive Statistics for the Long-Form Dataset 
 A few comments are in order about the construction of the dataset used in the 
analysis.  First, because several of the variables vary over time, I generated a long-form 
version of the dataset in which each observation is a month in the life of a ruling party 
rather than a ruling party case.  I then added in the time-varying covariates (TVCs), 
including economic growth, size of the state, Polity, and regime age.  Note that the term 
limit variable can also vary over time for the same ruling part; for instance, the 
Republican president Ronald Reagan faced a term limit in his second term, from 
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February 1985 to January 1989, but not in his first, from February 1981 to January 1985.  
Thus, the term limit dummy is a 1 for Reagan starting in February 1985, then reverts to 0 
beginning with George H. W. Bush’s presidency in February 1989.       
 Second, for a significant number of ruling party cases, I was unable to locate data 
on one or more of these variables for at least part of the time in which they held office.  I 
dealt with this issue in one of two ways.  When data was missing for only the first part of 
a ruling party’s period in power, I dropped these observations and adjusted the recorded 
entry into the dataset to correspond with the first month for which data was available—
that is, these cases are treated as left-truncated. Thus, the month in which the party takes 
office is recorded, followed by a period in which it is at risk but not observed, and then 
another period in which it is.  As with the parties taking power before 1950, identifying 
separate origin and entry points allows the statistical model to incorporate these cases 
into the model without biasing the estimates. However, when data was missing for the 
entire time period, I dropped the case entirely.  As a consequence, the number of ruling 
parties included in the parameterized analysis is smaller than in the survival estimates 
shown in Chapter 2.   
 Third, I estimate parameterized models using two separate measures of party 
system asymmetry: the vote-share difference and the seat-share difference between the 
ruling party and its nearest competitor.  In a handful of cases, party seat-share data was 
available but vote-share data was not.  In response, I generated two slightly different 
versions of the dataset: one containing only observations for which vote-share data was 
available, and a slightly larger one containing all observations for which seat-share data 
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was available.  Thus, the descriptive statistics for the independent variables are slightly 
different depending on the measure of party system asymmetry used.     
 Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables calculated separately 
for the two datasets.   
 
 
Table 5.1.  Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
  Vote-share dataset Seat-share dataset 
  M SD M SD 
Vote-share difference 0.366 0.482   
Seat-share difference   0.234 0.311 
Polity 7.211 3.990 7.107 4.082 
Age of democracy (ln) 2.878 1.032 2.860 1.036 
Term length (years) 4.568 0.735 4.583 0.742 
Semi-presidential 0.096 0.295 0.097 0.295 
State share of economy 10.211 5.018 10.241 5.059 
GDP growth rate 0.026 0.053 0.026 0.053 
     
No. of parties     
Duration (months)         
     
 
 
 
 5.2.  Method 
 In the analysis in Chapter 2, I estimated non-parametric survivor functions, 
meaning the estimates did not control for any potential confounding variables.  Here I 
build on that analysis by employing duration models, which allow me to estimate how 
survival patterns may differ across regime type while controlling for other, non-
institutional factors.  The test of the primary hypothesis—that advantaged ruling parties 
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face lower long-term survival prospects in presidential than in parliamentary regimes—is 
not straightforward.  Instead of a claim about the average time in power in the two regime 
types, it is centrally about a different in the shapes of hazard rates that ruling parties face.  
As a consequence, the statistical model that I use must be able to estimate two possibly 
very different shapes of hazard rates with time.   
 In choosing a method of analysis for this problem, I follow the lead of Maeda and 
Nishikawa (2006), who examine the same question but for a much smaller set of ruling 
party cases in democratic regimes.  Maeda and Nishikawa’s analysis is particularly 
interesting and relevant to this study for two reasons.  First, they make several arguments 
parallel to mine about the different hazard rates of ruling parties under presidential and 
parliamentary regimes. Second, they make a compelling case for the estimation of a 
flexible parametric, or Royston-Parmar, model rather than the much more widely-used 
Cox proportional hazard model.  As they note, both Cox and other survival models such 
as the Weibull require the researcher to assume proportional hazard rates across different 
groups of cases.  In other words, if we want to use a Cox model to compare the different 
hazard rates across presidential and parliamentary regimes, we have to assume that they 
are proportional to one another over the entire period of observations.  But it is precisely 
this assumption that I have hypothesized does not hold; instead, my theory implies that 
the hazard rates may have wildly different forms over time in the two executive types.  
Thus, we have strong theoretical reasons to avoid the Cox model if there is a viable 
alternative.   The Cox model has the additional disadvantage of not estimating a baseline 
hazard function—a particular problem if the shape of the hazard function is central to 
one’s analysis. 
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 Fortunately, Royston (2001) and Parmar have developed an attractive alternative 
to the Cox model.  The Royston-Parmar approach differs from the Cox and other 
standard parametric approaches in that, rather than assuming a particular distribution 
function a priori, it uses splines to model the baseline hazard function.  The observed 
time period is divided into several segments and the estimated hazard rates for each 
segment are smoothed so that they connect with one another to produce a continuous 
curve.  As a result, the shape of the overall hazard can be estimated more flexibly, and its 
potential time-dependency can be more readily observed.  Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
(2004: 88-89) note that for research questions primarily involving time dependency in the 
data, the Royston-Parmar approach “offers an attractive middle ground between the 
standard parametric models and the Cox model.”  Hence, a flexible parametric model 
employing splines appears to be the most suitable method for this study.   
 
 5.3.  Analysis and Results 
 One challenge of the Royston-Parmar approach is that one has to select both the 
parent distribution (either log cumulative hazard or log cumulative odds) and the number 
of splines in the model.  These decisions can substantially change the estimation results 
and shape of the estimated hazard function, so model selection is a tricky issue.  Royston 
and Lambert (2011: 74-78) suggest making this determination by comparing the Akaike 
information criterion, or AIC, across several different spline functions.  By this rule, the 
log-odds function with five degrees of freedom (four knots) appeared to be the best fit.  
 The estimates presented in Table 5.2 are for this model with 10 variables: 
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executive type (execleg), lower house vote difference (lvsdif), political openness (polity), 
regime age (lnregmage), first mover party (firstmover), term limits (tlim2), term length 
(term2), semi-presidentialism (semipres), state share of the economy (kg), and previous 
year’s growth rate (grch).  In addition, I include an interaction term between lower house 
vote difference and executive type (execleg_lhvdif).  I also ran the model specified 
several other ways.  Of the most relevance is the effect of lower house seat differential—
Model 2 in Table 5.2—which produced similar results to the vote-share differential. 
 Several of the coefficient estimates are statistically and substantively significant.  
First, the polity variable is positive and significant; as expected, an increase in regime 
openness is associated with a higher risk of ruling party defeat.  State share of the 
economy, however, is not significantly different from zero.  Although this result does not 
provide support for a resource theory of ruling party survival, the measure is also a proxy 
and quite a bit removed from the real factor of interest—use of state resources for 
partisan ends.  Thus, we should be careful not to view this as evidence against a resource 
explanation.  A more conclusive test of this hypothesis will have to wait until better 
measures of resources than this are available.   
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 Both age of regime and first mover are negative and significant, as well, 
indicating that both are associated with a lower risk of defeat.  The first mover result is 
expected and consistent with the finding in Chapter 2 that these parties lasted longer on 
average than non-first movers.  The negative effect of regime age is more surprising; it 
suggests that, overall, ruling party duration increases as the regime gets older, consistent 
Table 5.2. Estimated Effects on the Ruling Party Hazard Rate by Executive Type 
 Model 1 (vote-share) Model 2 (seat-share) 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
     
Presidentialism -1.279 .383** -1.364 0.349** 
Presidentialism x vote-share diff 2.305 1.162*   
Vote-share difference -6.446 0.680**   
Presidentialism x seat-share diff   2.052 0.751** 
Seat-share difference   -4.164 .448** 
Polity 0.136 0.041** 0.127 .039** 
Age of regime -0.670 0.115** -0.612 .113** 
First-mover -1.476 0.293** -1.434 .292** 
Term limits 0.812 0.338* 0.727 .323* 
Length of term -0.217 0.137 -0.121 0.134 
Semi-presidential 0.603 0.237* 0.599 .237* 
State share of economy 0.003 0.0171 0.0005 0.0167 
Economic growth -5.197 1.905** -3.652 1.781* 
     
Spline 1 x presidentialism 0.811 0.464 0.479 0.349 
Spline 1 constant 2.634 0.143** 2.569 .139** 
Spline 2 x presidentialism -0.558 0.441 -0.582 0.318 
Spline 2 constant -0.007 0.116 -0.027 0.114 
Spline 3 x presidentialism -0.180 0.267 -0.077 0.212 
Spline 3 constant -0.091 0.0811 -0.08 0.079 
Spline 4 x presidentialism 0.056 0.1377 0.06 0.125 
Spline 4 constant 0.092 0.0545 0.113 0.054* 
Spline 5 x presidentialism -0.013 -0.0895 -0.094 0.083 
Spline 5 constant -0.110 0.0357** -0.0102 0.0357 
     
Parent distribution odds  odds  
Number of knots 4  4  
     
N 34,754  35,617  
Log likelihood -479.21   -502.93   
**p<.01; *p<.05     
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with the view that party system consolidation lowers the risk to incumbents.  Term limits 
also, not surprisingly, appear to be positively associated with ruling party defeat, while 
economic growth is negatively associated, as expected.    
 Most relevant for the central argument of this study, however, is the effect of 
presidentialism.  The coefficient on presidentialism is negative and significant, indicating 
that parties in presidential regimes, all else equal, last longer in office than those in 
parliamentary ones.  At first glance, this result appears to be at odds with my central 
hypothesis.  Remember, however, that this coefficient estimates the effect of institutional 
type on the hazard rate over the entire observation period in the sample, and for the 
average ruling party.  When we look at advantaged ruling parties instead, as measured by 
vote-share differential, the picture is very different.  The coefficient on the interaction 
term of presidentialism with vote-share differential is positive and large, suggesting that 
moving from a parliamentary to a presidential system greatly increases the risk of defeat 
when party system asymmetry is high.  Put differently, although ruling parties are on 
average at greater risk of defeat in parliamentarism, this difference declines as party 
system asymmetry rises.  Moreover, this effect is substantively the same for both the 
vote-share (Model 1) and seat-share (Model 2) measures of asymmetry.   
 Because the Royston-Parmar model determines the baseline hazard function by 
smoothing the splines, however, we cannot easily tell from these estimates how the effect 
of executive varies over time.  Instead, the difference is best interpreted graphically.  
Figure 5.1 shows the estimated out-of-sample prediction of presidential and 
parliamentary hazard rates when party system asymmetry and all the control variables are 
set at their means.   
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FIGURE 5.1.  ESTIMATED HAZARD RATES OF PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY RULING PARTIES AT 
MEAN VALUES OF COVARIATES 
 
 
 For both presidential and parliamentary ruling parties, the hazard appears to be 
largest in the first 8-10 years at risk of electoral defeat.  Initially, parliamentary hazard 
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cannot.  The early spike in hazard rates occurs at between 4 and 5 years in office and has 
a clear substantive implication: given that executive terms are typically 4 or 5 years, 
parties are at greatest risk when their terms end and they have to face the voters in an 
election.  After this initial spike, however, the hazard rates diverge significantly.  
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about 22 percent of all parties still in office in presidential regimes are predicted to lose 
power, while only about 11 percent of parties in parliamentary regimes will.   
 What we are most interested in, however, is not just how ruling party hazard rates 
differ between executive types but how this effect of executive itself changes with party 
system asymmetry.  To examine this interactive effect, then, we need to estimate the 
hazard rates for the two executive types across the range of party system asymmetry.  In 
Figure 5.2 I have plotted the hazard rates under various conditions: at low (two standard 
deviations below the mean), medium (at the mean) and high (two standard deviations 
above the mean) levels of party system asymmetry, measured by vote-share differential, 
and by non-first-mover parties (top row) and first-mover parties (bottom row).  
 
 
FIGURE 5.2.  ESTIMATED HAZARD RATES AT LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH LEVELS OF PARTY SYSTEM 
ASYMMETRY, FOR NON-FIRST-MOVER (TOP) AND FIRST-MOVER PARTIES (BOTTOM)    
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 The patterns in Figure 5.2 provide strong support for my central hypothesis.  As 
expected, the hazard rates facing ruling parties in both executive types decline as party 
system asymmetry increases: they are quite high early on when asymmetry is low, with 
ruling parties in both regime types facing hazards as high as 50 percent or more at about 
4 years in office.  Moving from the graphs on the right to those in the center and on the 
left shows that increases in asymmetry lower hazard rates for both executive types.  
Importantly, however, the difference between presidential and parliamentary hazard rates 
grows. The difference occurs regardless of whether the ruling party is a first-mover or 
not, as well, although begin a first-mover does result in lower hazard rates for both 
executive types.   
  
 
FIGURE 5.3.  ESTIMATED HAZARD RATES AT HIGH PARTY SYSTEM ASYMMETRY FOR FIRST-MOVER PARTIES   
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 Figure 5.3 shows the most extreme case, where the vote-differential is two 
standard deviations above the mean and the ruling party is a first-mover.  In this case, the 
gap between presidential and parliamentary hazard rates is quite large: at 20 years in 
office, a party in a parliamentary regime has only about a 2 percent chance of defeat in a 
given year, while a party in a presidential regime has about a 16 percent chance, or about 
eight times as great!  Thus, we have additional evidence that the marginal effect on 
survival of switching regime type is largest when vote-share differential is greatest. 
 To check the robustness of these findings, I have also estimated the hazard rates 
using the seat-share differential instead of vote-share.  The corresponding hazard rates are 
shown in Figure 5.4.  As before, the panels on the left show the hazard rates when the 
seat-share differential is two standard deviations below the mean for non-first-mover 
(top) and first-mover (bottom) parties; the panels in the center show the effect at the 
mean seat-share differential; and the panels on the right show the effect at two standard 
deviations above the mean.  The picture is substantively the same: a rising seat-share 
differential leads to a greater effect of regime type on ruling party hazard rates.  When the 
seat-share differential is highest, ruling parties are much more likely to survive in a 
parliamentary than a presidential regime.      
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FIGURE 5.4.  HAZARD RATES BY REGIME TYPE USING SEAT-SHARE DIFFERENCE   
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parties face significantly lower hazard rates in parliamentary regimes, and therefore are 
more likely to be extraordinarily long-lived, than are advantaged ruling parties in 
presidential regimes.  Above all, these results indicate that the type of executive selection 
matters a great deal for ruling party survival.  
 The central finding about the better survival prospects of advantaged ruling 
parties in parliamentary regimes has some far-reaching implications for our interpretation 
of instances of advantaged party defeat.  If presidential regimes feature inherently higher-
variance contests for the executive than do parliamentary regimes, then in cases such as 
Taiwan and Mexico where advantaged parties lost, we may be attributing their defeat to 
the wrong causes.  Indeed, that is precisely what I will argue in the next chapter: the 
KMT in Taiwan remained well-positioned to win most elections on the island, but its 
advantaged were substantially blunted in the 2000 presidential contest.  Rather than being 
a consequence of declining partisan resources, the KMT’s defeat was first and foremost 
the result of adopting direct election of the president.  
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CHAPTER 6      
THE CASE OF TAIWAN: WHY THE KUOMINTANG LOST  
 
!"#$%&'()* 
In the fight between the snipe and the clam, it is the 
fisherman who benefits. 
  
--Chinese proverb+
 
 
 In the preceding chapters I developed a general theory of dominant party origins 
and decline and presented cross-national data on ruling party survival in support of the 
argument.  In this chapter I focus on the events leading up to a specific instance of ruling 
party defeat, of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang ,-.+/ or KMT) in 
Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election.    
 My analysis of the party system in Taiwan has two objectives.  The first is to 
show the theory in action—to “put some meat on the bones” of the argument by 
illustrating how the mechanisms of party system asymmetry affect ruling party survival 
in a real-world example.  The second is to reinterpret a case that contradicts existing 
theory.  The defeat of the KMT, I will argue, is not well explained by a resource theory of 
dominant party decline.  Instead, part of the reason the KMT lost power is that the 
primary cleavage in Taiwanese politics was, and remains, over national identity, which 
reduced party system asymmetry despite the KMT’s enormous resource advantage.  The 
other part of the explanation is that Taiwan’s institutions, particularly the direct election 
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of the executive, made the KMT more vulnerable to defeat.  The adoption of a 
presidential system inadvertently increased the likelihood of an opposition victory; 
without that single transformation, the KMT would probably not have lost control of the 
central government.   
 
 6.1. The Puzzle: Why Did the KMT Lose Power? 
 Taiwan’s recent political history presents a puzzle.  At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the leadership of the KMT voluntarily adopted contested elections for the national 
legislature and presidency, creating for the first time the possibility that it could lose 
power through the ballot box.  There were few indications at the time that the party’s 
control would be seriously threatened by these reforms: it had extensive experience 
running in and winning competitive races for local offices, it remained popular among the 
electorate, and the nascent political opposition was poorly equipped to mount an electoral 
challenge to its rule.  And in fact, the KMT initially performed quite well in these 
elections, winning nearly 60 percent of the seats in the first legislative elections in 1992 
and capturing 54 percent of the vote in a four-way race for the presidency in 1996.  The 
party appeared to have managed the gradual liberalization of Taiwan’s political system 
without seriously threatening its grasp on power.50   
 Yet this string of electoral successes ended quite suddenly in the 2000 presidential 
election.  In the months leading up to that election, the KMT’s base was divided by a 
                                                
50 For a representative contemporary view, see Chu Yun-han’s optimistic take on the KMT’s survival 
prospects (1999a). 
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renegade campaign led by a former KMT member, James Soong ( 012 ).  Soong’s run 
as an independent created the opportunity for Chen Shui-bian ( 345 ), the nominee of 
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang -6. , or DPP), to win the 
race with less than 40 percent of the total vote.  Surprisingly, the KMT’s official nominee 
and sitting vice president Lien Chan ( 78 ) came in a distant third place behind both 
Chen and Soong, obtaining less than 25 percent.  Thus, despite having won clear 
majorities in all previous national elections, the KMT for the first time in its 55-year 
history on Taiwan suddenly found itself in opposition, no longer in control of the central 
government.  It was a watershed moment in Taiwanese politics. 
  
 The KMT’s Puzzling Defeat in Comparative Perspective 
 What makes the KMT’s defeat all the more striking is that, according to our 
existing theories of dominant party systems, it should not have happened. While in many 
other cases the “stunning” electoral defeats of former autocrats were predictable to just 
about everybody except the autocrats themselves51, in Taiwan the incumbent regime 
remained quite formidable through the 1990s.  The ruling KMT had presided over several 
decades of stellar economic growth, which had transformed Taiwan’s economy from a 
small, poor, mainly agricultural one into an industrial powerhouse.  It had a proven track 
record of winning competitive elections at the local level, having contested county offices 
since the 1950s.  The party had a vast patronage machine and financial resources that 
dwarfed any of its opponents, enjoyed a dominant advantage in the island’s print and 
                                                
51 See, for instance, Samuel Huntington’s (1991) entertaining descriptions of electoral defeats of a long list 
of autocrats in The Third Wave. 
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broadcast media, and maintained firm control over the civil service, the military, and the 
security services.  At the time of its defeat in 2000, it remained one of the most 
formidable ruling parties in the world.  
 Given these advantages, the comparative literature on dominant party systems 
leads us to expect that the KMT should have persisted in office indefinitely. Most 
existing scholarship on dominant party durability has focused on the resource advantages 
these parties enjoy.  As Ken Greene notes, dominant parties such as the KMT typically 
have access to several types of “illicit public resources they can use for partisan 
purposes,” including the diversion of funds from state-owned (and in the KMT’s case, 
party-owned) enterprises and directly from the public budget; the use of public-sector 
jobs for patronage and spoils; the manipulation of state laws to solicit kickbacks and 
illegal campaign contributions from businesses and to prevent those businesses from 
funding opposition challengers; and the use of state administrative resources to support 
party mobilization of voters (2006: 9; see also Aldrich et al. n.d.).   
 Taken together, these resource advantages enable dominant parties to stay in 
power, by discouraging party elites from defecting (Magaloni 2006), providing ruling 
party candidates with financial advantages and clientelist networks of supporters to tap 
during election campaigns (Scheiner 2006), and forcing opposition parties to rely on 
more ideologically driven activists, to run more extreme candidates, and ultimately to 
develop as “niche” parties consistently unable to appeal to the median voter in the 
electorate (Greene 2007). 
 Yet in attempting to show the KMT’s defeat as a consequence of declining 
resource advantages, scholars have had to resort to extraordinary manipulations of the 
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historical evidence.  Greene, for instance, argues valiantly but unconvincingly that it was 
the decline in state-owned enterprise production from seven to five percent of Taiwan’s 
GDP over the 1990s that fatally weakened the KMT.  The result, he argues, was that 
“[t]his reduction deprived the federal [sic] government of substantial assets and large 
numbers of jobs that could have been used for patronage purposes.”  In addition,  
 
“the KMT’s businesses came under more pressure for efficiency gains to 
compete in increasingly open domestic markets and internationally.  As a 
result, these firms were transformed from protected organizations that 
could be milked as cash cows for patronage into competitive ones in 
which managers more strictly controlled budgets” (2007: 266).   
 
Together with a permissive electoral system, Greene argues, the erosion of this resource 
advantage allowed the opposition parties to attract more pragmatic, office-seeking 
candidates, which in turn made them more competitive in head-to-head competition with 
the KMT.  The split in the incumbent party, and the DPP’s victory in the 2000 election, 
he suggests, are therefore attributable primarily to declining dominant party resources. 
 This argument should strike knowledgeable observers of Taiwan’s recent political 
development as quite odd.  In truth, explanations like these that center on resource 
asymmetries (Greene), economic crisis (Magaloni), and the breakdown of clientelist 
networks (Scheiner) are difficult to reconcile with the KMT’s defeat.  During its 50 years 
in power, the party governed Taiwan as one of the most effective single-party regimes the 
world has ever seen.  Unlike dominant parties in Mexico and Japan, the party had an 
impressive, sustained track record of economic stewardship right up through the 2000 
election: starting from a poor, predominantly agricultural base in the 1950s, Taiwan’s 
economy had rapidly been transformed into one of the richest and most advanced in Asia, 
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and its economy continued to grow at a robust 6-8 percent clip for most of the 1990s 
(Chu 1999b).  It also weathered the Asian Financial Crisis better than just about any other 
country in the region; by the 2000 presidential election the island’s economy had 
rebounded to its pre-crisis growth rates (Chu 1999b; Nobel and Ravenhill 2000).  
 Likewise, the argument that the KMT’s party machine was suffering from 
“resource decline” seems highly questionable.  It remained one of the richest political 
parties in the world at the time of its defeat, with a net worth in 1998 estimated at about 
US $5 billion, and evidence that the party drew liberally on those resources to support its 
candidates in elections at all levels of government was not hard to find (e.g. Wang Chin-
shou 2004).  The KMT’s enormous private wealth dwarfed the DPP, which remained 
close to broke and often unable to pay party worker salaries throughout the 1990s (Arrigo 
1994: 163-66; Rigger 2001: 67-69; Chu Yun-han 2001: 94, fn. 11; Randall and Svasand 
2002: 18; Chin Ko-lin 2003: 134-139). The KMT also controlled a majority in the 
legislature through the 2000 presidential election, which allowed it to manipulate public 
budgets and government agencies for political purposes (Arrigo 1994; Luor and Wann 
1999).  The party maintained its advantage in the media, as well: while the number of 
opposition-oriented radio stations and newspapers grew rapidly after martial law was 
lifted in 1987, KMT- or central government-owned print and broadcast media still 
possessed a qualitative advantage in funding, readership, and range throughout the 1990s 
(Liu Kuang-hua 1999).   
 In addition, the KMT had considerable residual support in the electorate for its 
managerial know-how: its export-oriented industrialization policies had delivered near-
double-digit economic growth for a generation, and by the early 1980s the island’s level 
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of inequality was the lowest of any developing country in the world (Chu 1999a: 68).  
The party had accumulated vast experience in its campaigns for local elected office and 
built up a formidable and entrenched electoral machine, which benefited from several 
large captive blocks of supporters including most military veterans and their families, 
government employees, and workers in the large number of state-owned and operated 
enterprises (Bosco 1994; Chang Kuang-ming 1995; Lin Jih-wen 1996; Liu I-chou 1999).  
As a consequence, from the time opposition parties were first allowed in 1986 through its 
defeat in the 2000 presidential election, the KMT competed on an electoral playing field 
tilted heavily in its favor.   
 
 
FIGURE 6.1.  VOTE SHARE OF TAIWANESE POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTIONS, 1986-2004 
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 One can get a good sense of the electoral consequences of these advantages by 
looking at the KMT’s vote share compared to its competitors over this time period.  
Figure 6.1 shows the shares of each party beginning with the first multi-party election in 
1986, for supplementary seats to the Legislative Yuan, switching to fully-contested 
elections in 1992, and continuing on through the post-2000 split of the KMT.  In all five 
multi-party elections held before it lost the presidency, the KMT outdistanced the DPP by 
no less than 13 percent of the vote.  If the KMT really was suffering from resource 
decline, it does not appear to have seriously threatened the party’s majority in legislative 
elections: in 1998 it won 46.6 percent of the vote, while the DPP was a distant second 
with 29.6 percent, and the party retained nearly 55 percent of the seats to the DPP’s 31 
percent, as Figure 6.2 shows.  Only after it lost the presidency in 2000, and with it much 
of its remaining direct control of patronage and state resources, did the KMT’s vote and 
seat shares share fall below the DPP’s. 
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FIGURE 6.2.  SEAT SHARE OF TAIWANESE PARTIES IN LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTIONS, 1986-2004 
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Soong in the 2000 presidential race, and the presence of Chen Shui-bian, an unusually 
well-liked and well-qualified DPP opponent, was an improbable worst-case scenario for 
the ruling party (e.g. Niou and Paolino 2003).  Variations on this theme highlight the 
idiosyncratic personality conflict between the incumbent president Lee Teng-hui ( 9:
; ) and Soong, Lee’s poor choice of a successor in Lien Chan, or the fact that Chen 
Shui-bian had a compelling poor-local-boy-makes-good personal story that appealed to 
many Taiwanese voters (e.g. Diamond 2001).  Another favorite explanation is that Lee 
Teng-hui was a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” who secretly harbored nativist sympathies and 
intentionally sabotaged the ruling party from within (e.g. Lin and Tedards 2003).    
 These kinds of “just-so” stories can tell us something about why the particular 
events of the 2000 presidential campaign played out the way they did.  But in focusing on 
factors peculiar to a specific time and place and on the highly idiosyncratic personalities 
involved—in effect, explaining the outcome as a consequence of random events—these 
stories completely ignore any deeper systematic causal processes that might be at work.  
And it will be my contention that there were systematic factors that made an opposition 
victory not so far-fetched under the conditions present in Taiwan’s political system in the 
1990s.  In my view, Lee Teng-hui played an important role in the ultimate defeat of the 
KMT, but for a quite different reason: he attempted to concentrate power in his own 
hands at the expense of others in the party, and in so doing pushed for direct election of 
the president.  Put differently, we need not assume exceptional cunning or nefarious 
intentions of Lee; knowing that he was a politician, and therefore probably most 
concerned with preserving his own influence and weakening his rivals, is all we need to 
support an institutional explanation of the KMT’s defeat. 
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 The Argument in Brief 
 The theory and data presented in the previous chapters suggests that we should 
look beyond resources to understand what caused the KMT’s defeat.  In the following 
sections, I present an alternative, non-resource-based explanation.  It has two parts. 
 First, the presence of a highly salience national identity cleavage both aided the 
partisan development of the DPP and generated new strains within the KMT elite as it 
attempted to retain support from both mainlander and native-born Taiwanese voters.  As 
a consequence, ideological disputes over the national identity question eroded discipline 
within the ruling party, and it suffered a series of defections and unsanctioned campaigns 
by renegade party members throughout the 1990s, even as its resource advantage 
remained largely unchanged.  In the language of my theory, both partisanship and 
coordination asymmetry declined markedly as a result of the party system’s realignment 
around what I call the “national question.”   
 Second, these defections from the KMT proved much more damaging to the party 
in winner-take-all, plurality rule executive races than in the multi-member legislative 
district races.  In many county and city executive elections in the 1990s, renegade 
candidates siphoned enough support away from the KMT’s official nominees to throw 
many elections to the DPP. By contrast, the DPP performed much worse in Taiwan’s 
multi-member legislative races, never coming close at the national level to capturing a 
majority in either the Legislative Yuan or the National Assembly. The 2000 presidential 
election followed this pattern: a unified DPP faced off against a divided KMT and 
triumphed despite winning less than 40 percent of the vote.  Put simply, the combination 
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of a highly salient national identity cleavage with a presidential rather than parliamentary 
regime led most directly to KMT defeat, not a decline in party resources.  
 
 6.2. The Primacy of the National Identity Question in Taiwan’s Party System 
 The Changing Nature of Identity Categories in Taiwanese Politics 
 Since shortly after the transition to a multi-party regime in the late 1980s, the 
fundamental cleavage in Taiwan’s party system has been one of identity (Cheng and Hsu 
1996). The politics of identity in Taiwan is complex, involving at least three distinct 
categories of divisions.   
 The first concerns an ethnic consciousness (zuqun yishi <=>? ) based on 
spoken language (Wang Fu-chang 1998).  Categorized on this dimension, Taiwan’s 
inhabitants fall into two groups based on pre-1949 provincial origin.   About 13 percent 
are Mainlanders (waishengren @AB) who came to Taiwan with the Nationalist 
government on the heels of its defeat on the mainland in 1949, or whose parents did, and 
who hailed from every other Chinese province.  The rest are “native” Taiwanese 
(benshengren CAB+), whose parents were born and raised on Taiwan.  Benshengren 
can be further divided into three separate ethnicities based on spoken language, with 
Hoklo speakers (fulaoren DEB) the single largest group at about 70 percent of the 
population; Hakka speakers (kejiaren FGB) at about 15 percent; and various tribes  of 
Aborigines (yuanzhumin HI-) together making up about two percent of the island’s 
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population.52  The Hoklo-Hakka division extends back to the earliest days of Han 
Chinese settlement on the island, as does Han Chinese conflict with Aborigines, the 
original inhabitants of Taiwan.  After 1949, differences between the mainlander émigrés 
and the “native” population partially superseded these older ethnic cleavages.  Thus, at 
the time martial law was lifted in July 1987, provincial origin (shengji AJ ) was the 
most salient identity marker in Taiwanese social and political life.53   
 The second division concerns a national identity (guojia rentong ,GKL ) 
based on whether the inhabitants of the island see themselves as part of a larger, 
“Chinese” nation that also encompasses the People’s Republic of China; as members of 
“Taiwan,” a country and people distinct from “China”; or as “both Taiwanese and 
Chinese” (Chu and Lin 1996).  We can get a sense of the breakdown among the 
population on this dimension by looking at public opinion polls.  A version of this 
question has regularly been asked in surveys since 1992 by the Election Study Center at 
National Cheng Chi University in Taipei, providing us with a time series of nearly two 
decades.54  As Figure 6.3 shows, there has been a gradual but significant shift in identity 
defined this way: the percentage of respondents identifying as exclusively “Chinese” 
dropped from a high of 26.2 percent in 1994 to 12.1 percent 1999, three months before 
the election that ended the KMT’s reign; by 2010 it had fallen to a negligible 3.8 percent.  
Those identifying simply as “Taiwanese” rose from 17.6 percent to 52.7 percent over the 
same period. As these data show, the 1990s were a period of gradual but steady 
                                                
52 The population of the small islands of Jinmen and Matsu, under ROC control but lying just offshore the 
mainland, are counted as “mainlanders” in these figures.  
53 For a good introduction to ethnicity in Taiwan and a guide to further sources, see Rigger (2006). 
54 The Chinese-language version of the survey question and available responses are listed in the appendix. 
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strengthening of a Taiwanese national identity at the expense of a Chinese one.  Today, 
more than half the Taiwanese population identifies simply as “Taiwanese,” while most of 
the rest identify as “both Taiwanese and Chinese.”   
  
 
FIGURE 6.3.  CHANGES IN TAIWANESE/CHINESE IDENTITY, 1992 – 2011   
(SOURCE: NATIONAL CHENG CHI UNIVERSITY, ELECTION STUDY CENTER) 
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Support for the “status quo,” either “forever” or until an indefinite point in the future, has 
always been the most popular position on this “independence-unification” question.  
Nevertheless, support for independence, either “immediately” or at some point in the 
future remained significant in the 1990s, drawing between about 11 and 18 percent of all 
respondents.  Similarly, support for unification, either “immediately” or at some point in 
the future, drew a consistent 18-20 percent of all respondents.  The main shift that 
appears to have occurred in these views is after the 2000 election: the proportions have 
flipped, so that support for independence has risen to between 20-23 percent, while 
support for unification has fallen to about 10 percent.   
 
 
FIGURE 6.4.  CHANGING VIEWS ON THE INDEPENDENCE-UNIFICATION ISSUE, 1992-2011 
 (SOURCE: NATIONAL CHENG CHI UNIVERSITY, ELECTION STUDY CENTER) 
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 Taken together, these three categories of identity make up what I will call the 
“national question” in Taiwan.  The national question has been the subject of a great deal 
of interest and debate by Taiwanese social scientists over the last 20 years (e.g. Hu and 
Chu 1992; Chu and Lin 1996; Yu Ching-hsin 1996; Liu I-chou 1998; Hsu Yung-ming 
1999; Wu Yu-shan 2001; Wang Fu-chang 2004; Chang and Wang 2005; Wu Nai-teh 
2005; Wu Rwei-Ren 2007).  Although there are some continuing points of disagreement 
about concepts and methods, the bulk of quantitative research on this topic supports two 
general conclusions about the salience and change in meaning of the national question.  
First, the categories of ethnic consciousness, national identity, and preference for 
independence or unification are actually quite distinct: answers to one are only weakly 
correlated with answers to others (Liu I-chou 1998).  Second, these correlations have 
weakened significantly over time: directly following the end of martial law, the 
associations between ethnicity, national identity and opinions about Taiwan’s political 
future were strong; by the late 1990s, however, they were much less strong (Wu Yu-shan 
2001), in part because of generational change in the electorate (Wu Nai-teh 1999).  Thus, 
over the last 25 years, the meaning of the “national question” has shifted from the first 
and second kinds of divisions to, increasingly, divisions over the third.  Hence, the 
“identity” question that drives politics today is mainly about Taiwan’s relations with the 
PRC (cf. Rigger 2006). 
  
 The Origins and Evolution of the “National Question” 
 Regardless of whether it is framed in ethnic, national, or policy terms, the national 
question has been so central to the past 30 years of Taiwanese politics that it is worth 
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considering in more detail how this cleavage came to dominate all others.  The issue of 
what constitutes the “nation” to which the inhabitants of Taiwan belong remains 
contentious today, but during the martial law era (1949-1987), in which the KMT was the 
sole legal political party on the island, the official answer was simple: everyone in 
Taiwan was unambiguously “Chinese.”  The Republic of China (ROC), as the official 
name of the regime on the island implies, also claimed to be the rightful government of 
all of China, not just Taiwan and the handful of offshore islands that it actually 
controlled; suggesting otherwise was considered tantamount to treason.  Messages to that 
effect were delivered through the state media, public education, and during mandatory 
military service (Bullard 1997).   
 Nevertheless, the social and political differences between waishengren and 
benshengren, especially in the two decades directly following the 1949 defeat, were 
stark, and reinforced by a wide range of policies that in practice favored mainlanders.  
For instance, the Nationalist government required teachers and civil servants to speak 
good Mandarin as a condition of their employment.  But educated native Taiwanese who 
might have been expected to fill those positions had come of age when the island was still 
a Japanese colony55; most spoke Taiwanese (taiyu MN/+also know as minnanhua  OP
Q+) or Hakka (kejiahua FGQ ) as their native tongue and had learned to read, write, 
and speak Japanese rather than Mandarin in school (Roy 2003: 94-96; Sandel 2003).  As 
                                                
55 Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the first Sino-
Japanese War.  It remained a Japanese possession until the end of World War II, when, following the terms 
of the Cairo Declaration, representatives of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek formally 
accepted the surrender of the senior Japanese commander in Taiwan and assumed control of the island. 
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a result, the Nationalist language policy ensured that positions on the public payroll 
initially went overwhelmingly to mainlanders (Jao and McKeever 2006).   
 In addition, a huge slice of the government budget (80 percent or more in some 
estimates) was allocated to the military, a sizeable share of which was directed toward 
social welfare programs—housing, health care, and old-age pensions—for military 
families and their dependents, most of whom, again, were mainlanders who had fled to 
Taiwan at the end of the civil war (Chan 1988; Ward et al. 1993; Wang Fang 1994). 
Admission to universities on the island included special quotas for students from each 
Chinese province, which led again to an anti-Taiwanese bias: because students from the 
Province of Taiwan far outnumbered those whose official registration was from all other 
provinces combined, admissions standards were significantly lower for children of 
mainlanders (Roy 2003: 96).  Moreover, the regime’s ostensibly popularly-elected 
representatives in the Legislative Yuan, which functioned as the national legislature, and 
the National Assembly56, which elected the president, were drawn from constituencies all 
over China, rather than chosen by the Taiwanese electorate.  Because the regime only 
effectively controlled Taiwan and a few offshore islands, elections for the vast majority 
of seats in both bodies were suspended until the party-state could “retake the 
mainland”—a possibility so unlikely by the 1960s that it effectively granted their 
members life-long tenure.57  Native Taiwanese were also barely represented in the 
                                                
56 An unusual body by comparative standards, the National Assembly combined the roles of an electoral 
college (to elect the president) and a constitutional assembly (to pass constitutional amendments).  It had no 
role in the review or passage of ordinary legislation, however, and so should not be mistaken for an upper 
house of the legislature.  
57 These “10,000 year legislators,” as they were derisively called by opposition politicians, eventually 
became the focus of much criticism at the end of the 1980s, and were forced to retire by the end of 1991 as 
part of the transition to fully-contested elections.  
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KMT’s Central Committee, and their numbers only grew slowly at lower levels of the 
party (Tien Hung-mao 1989: 78-80; Huang Teh-fu 1996).  
 Arguably as important to the later salience of the national question was the 
historical legacy of the KMT in the short period after Taiwan returned to Chinese control, 
but before the ROC’s defeat on the mainland at the hands of the Communists.  The KMT 
appointees assigned to take over Taiwan from the Japanese proved to be exceptionally 
corrupt and rapacious even by the dismal standards of the post-war period in Nationalist-
controlled China, and they rapidly ran the island’s economy into the ground.  By 1947, 
economic and political grievances, exacerbated by linguistic and cultural differences, 
sparked an uprising by Taiwanese against the KMT regime.  This rebellion, called the 2-
28 Incident for the day it began, Feb. 28, 1947, lasted several weeks before it was brutally 
suppressed by military force, resulting in an estimated 10,000 - 30,000 deaths, including 
many members of the island’s former political and economic elite.  The legacy of 2-28 
added to the sense of distrust of and hostility toward the KMT by many native Taiwanese 
in later eras, especially the generation old enough to have first-hand experience of the 
event (Edmonson 2002). 
 Strict authoritarian control by the party kept these grievances under wraps in 
Taiwan through the 1970s.  But the death in 1975 of the KMT’s long-time leader Chiang 
Kai-shek and the succession of his son Chiang Ching-kuo to the presidency coincided 
with a gradual loosening of the regime’s security apparatus; the founding of the first 
opposition party, the DPP, in September 1986; and in July 1987 to the lifting of martial 
law, which had been in place since 1949.58  Over the late 1980s the regime loosened 
                                                
58 A succinct review of this gradual transition is provided in Rubinstein (1999). 
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restrictions on freedom of the press and opposition campaigns as well. These changes 
opened the door for the first time to serious discussions about definitions of the national 
territory, symbols, and identity, the KMT’s role in the darker periods of Taiwan’s past, 
and the direction political reform should take. 
 Developments both within and outside Taiwan contributed to the increasing 
salience of the national question during this period.  On the outside, the Republic of 
China had steadily lost official international recognition to the PRC throughout the 1960s 
and 70s, culminating in a vote of the United Nations General Assembly in 1971 to switch 
control of the China seat on the Security Council.  Humiliated by the turn of events, the 
Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations entirely.  Even the United States, 
the regime’s staunchest ally, switched formal diplomatic relations to the PRC in January 
1979, catching the Nationalist government in Taipei off guard and delivering another 
body blow to the regime’s legitimacy.  As a consequence, by the end of the 1980s the 
ROC’s claim to be the rightful government of all of China appeared increasingly 
delusional, not least to many Taiwanese.   
  Domestically, the national question quickly moved to the center of debates over 
political reform.  The institutions of the Republic of China were still structured to 
maintain the fiction that the regime was the rightful government of all of China—not just 
Taiwan.  Thus, forcing the mainland representatives of the National Assembly and 
Legislative Yuan to retire, and replacing them with members elected from Taiwanese 
constituencies, inevitably raised questions about how far to “indigenize” (bentuhua CR
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S ) the constitution, and they dominated debate in the National Affairs Conference, an 
extraordinary body convened by Lee Teng-hui in 1990 to discuss political reform.59   
 In the end, the constitutional changes adopted during the subsequent decade 
downgraded the Taiwan Provincial Government, instituted direct elections for the mayors 
of Taipei and Kaohsiung, shortened the presidential term from six to four years, and 
introduced direct elections for that office as well.  But they did not ultimately resolve the 
question of Taiwan’s national status.  To this day the regime on Taiwan retains the formal 
title of “Republic of China” and continues to operate under a constitution drawn up by 
the Nationalist regime in 1948 to govern all of mainland China, albeit now significantly 
amended.  The ROC functions in practice as a fully independent state but without official 
diplomatic recognition from any but a handful of small, mostly poor countries in the 
developing world.  
 Events in the PRC itself have also led to a shift in the nature of the national 
question away from ethnic and national identity conflicts and toward the independence-
unification issue. The bloody crackdown on student protestors in Tiananmen Square in 
June 1989 swung Taiwanese public opinion sharply against unification with the mainland 
and added to the salience of the issue.  The idea of an independent Taiwanese nation-state 
was not only open for debate but also looked increasingly appealing: while tanks rolled 
through the streets of Beijing, electoral and political reform continued to move forward in 
Taipei (Hsieh and Niou 1996).  Later, in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election, PRC 
leaders attempted to influence the outcome by calling on Taiwanese voters to reject pro-
                                                
59 Reviews of the debates in the conference can be found in Feldman (1991: 22-47) and in Chao and Myers 
(1996: 196-215) 
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independence candidates and by deploying the military to hold war games near the island.  
Since then, Taiwan’s political relations with the PRC have been rocky if not downright 
hostile, with Beijing consistently refusing to recognize the ROC as a separate political 
entity and insisting that Taiwan remains a province of the PRC—positions that have been 
rejected out of hand by all sitting administrations in Taipei.  Most worryingly, Beijing has 
consistently threatened that a Taiwanese declaration of independence would be cause for 
war, and over the last decade the People’s Liberation Army has built up a large military 
presence on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, including over a thousand ballistic 
missiles.  At the same time, however, the cultural and economic exchanges between the 
two sides have steadily increased over the last two decades: Taiwan’s economy has 
become closely intertwined with that of the mainland as its domestic export-oriented 
industries moved much of their production across the Strait, leaving mainly R&D at 
home.  Thus, Taiwan’s political future remains murky and unsettled (Niou 2004).   
 
 The National Question and the Party System 
 As ethnic and national identity cleavages have evolved into a division over the 
independence-unification issue, so has Taiwan’s party system.  To a remarkably 
consistent degree, the sharpest ideological difference between Taiwan’s major political 
parties has been in their positions on the question of the regime’s future (cf. Fell 2005: 
85-128).  Socioeconomic and urban-rural inequality, the proper role of the state in the 
economy, labor versus capital, state corruption, spending on social welfare versus 
defense: all these alternative cleavages have been subsumed under the independence-
unification question: should Taiwan declare formal independence, move towards 
 244 
unification with the PRC, or maintain the ambiguous “status quo?” (Hsieh and Niou 
1996).   
 As a consequence, one can without much difficulty differentiate all significant 
parties in Taiwan’s party system over the last 25 years along this single policy dimension, 
as shown in Figure 6.5.  At one end—let us call it the left, although without the usual, 
western political connotations of that term—are parties that advocate for the complete 
independence of Taiwan as a nation-state separate from China.  Most members of these 
parties have been highly suspicious of any attempts to improve relations with the 
mainland and favor doing away with the “Republic of China” title and other trappings of 
the regime that link it to its mainland Chinese origins.  The most extreme of these to win 
seats in the legislature was the Taiwan Independence Party (Jianguodang  T,. or 
TAIP), founded in 1996, although it proved short-lived as a meaningful political force. 
Since 2001, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng MUVWXY or 
TSU) has been the party furthest to this end of the political spectrum.  At the other end 
fall parties that support a full union with China, even if it means joining the PRC under 
the “one country two systems” formula promoted by Beijing.  In the early post-martial 
law period, only a fringe element in Taiwan supported a full merger with the PRC; the 
New Party subsequently emerged in the 1990s as the most “pro-China” of all the parties 
in Taiwan’s legislature, and it in turn was largely surpassed after 2000 by James Soong’s 
People First Party (Qinmindang  Z-. or PFP).  
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FIGURE 6.5.  SPATIAL POSITIONING OF TAIWANESE POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
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the name or other symbols of the Republic of China.  Rather ironically, given the party’s 
historically bitter antagonism toward the Chinese Communist Party, the KMT is now 
viewed in a much more positive light in Beijing than is the DPP.  For instance, the 
present-day KMT presidential administration of Ma Ying-jeou has been significantly 
more successful at striking cross-Strait agreements than the previous DPP administration 
under Chen Shui-bian, aided in part by the PRC’s eagerness to take steps that weaken the 
more nativist, pro-independence parts of the Taiwanese electorate and to strengthen the 
KMT. 
 
 How the National Question Affected Party System Asymmetry 
 In the following sections, I argue that the emergence of the national question as 
the primary cleavage in Taiwanese politics had profound consequences for electoral 
competition between the parties.  In the language of my theory, this development played 
out through all three mechanisms of party system asymmetry: partisanship, spatial 
positioning, and coordination. Taiwanese nationalism was a potent source of support for 
the DPP in its early days and helped cement the loyalty of a large bloc of voters to the 
party, lowering the asymmetry of partisanship.  The salience of the national question also 
hampered the KMT’s efforts to coordinate in the 1990s, and it played a key role in the 
defection of many mainlanders, previously the strongest supporters of the KMT, to the 
New Party.   
 At the same time, however, the subsequent rise of the independence-unification 
issue as the key cleavage increased the KMT’s spatial positioning advantage. The 
departure of the most dogmatic defenders of the regime’s one-China policy to the New 
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Party gave the KMT leadership more flexibility to craft a set of positions that appealed to 
the broad middle swath of Taiwanese voters.  The DPP and NP, by contrast, were more 
constrained by the strong ideological views of their core membership; neither could as 
easily reposition toward the median voter.  As a consequence, despite the considerable 
deterioration of its partisan and coordination advantages during the 1990s, the KMT 
remained both the largest party and the one at the center of the political spectrum, leaving 
it well-positioned to retain power into the next decade.   
 
 6.3. Partisanship: The Origins and Growth of DPP Support 
 The first mechanism through which the national question reshaped Taiwan’s party 
system is partisanship.  The KMT emerged from the martial law era with a huge partisan 
advantage over the DPP by any measure.  For instance, the number of formal members of 
the party dwarfed that of the nascent DPP: in 1992, it had 2.6 million formal members—
about 17 percent of the total population of Taiwan, while the DPP had only 20,000 (Lu 
Ya-li 1992: 133; Huang Teh-fu 1996: 115).  More crucial to its electoral success, 
however, was its control over and support from factions at the local levels of Taiwanese 
politics—counties and cities, towns and villages, wards and neighborhoods.  By 
managing the flow of state resources, the KMT had built up effective patron-client 
networks that delivered votes for the party’s candidates at election time, and it had the 
organizational capacity to run candidates in all elections and to ensure that its supporters 
turned out to vote.  By contrast, the DPP’s geographic reach was initially limited—it 
fared best in a few anti-KMT strongholds and in cities such as Taipei with a relatively 
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wealthy, educated population, while it had little presence in the more rural, 
underdeveloped jurisdictions of the island.  Nor did the party initially have much access 
to the local networks that were the lifeblood of local politics—it held virtually none of 
the local elected positions that these networks were based upon.  As a result, the DPP 
began its existence at a stark partisan disadvantage to the KMT. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.6.  CHANGES IN TAIWANESE PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION, 1992 – 2011  
(SOURCE: NATIONAL CHENG CHI UNIVERSITY, ELECTION STUDY CENTER) 
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nevertheless still get an idea of the shifting patterns over this time by looking at polling 
data.  Figure 6.6 shows the trends in responses to the standard party ID question from 
1992 through 2004.60  
 For our purposes, two patterns stand out.  First, respondents who identify with the 
KMT were far and away the largest group of partisans in the electorate over this entire 
period.  Second, from the first data point in 1992 on, the leading alternative was the DPP; 
self-identified DPP partisans grew steadily larger as a share of the electorate.  By 
contrast, the KMT’s self-identified partisans did not increase noticeably before 2000, 
instead fluctuating between about 25 and 35 percent of the electorate.  By the 2000 
presidential election, then, the difference between DPP and KMT partisans had shrunk to 
11.6 percent, from a high of 31.1 percent in 1992. 
 To account for declining party system asymmetry, then, we need to explain this 
steady increase in DPP partisanship. The answer I will argue for here is twofold: it is a 
consequence both of the party’s origins in an older anti-KMT electoral coalition and its 
subsequent wholehearted embrace of the “Taiwanese” side of the national question.  I 
address each part in turn. 
 
 Creating Opposition Partisans: Local Elections and the Origins of the DPP 
 Until the 1990s, no part of the central government of the ROC on Taiwan was 
subject to popular election.  During the martial law era (1947-1987), the vast majority of 
Legislative Yuan and National Assembly members who had been elected in the late 
                                                
60 The exact wording of the survey question from which this measure is taken is listed in the appendix. 
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1940s ostensibly represented provinces in mainland China.  Thus, after the KMT’s defeat 
on the mainland and retreat to Taiwan, they did not have to face re-election as long as the 
ROC did not control their respective provinces—in effect giving them life-time tenure in 
office. Only Taiwan Province’s representatives to the national government were directly 
elected from the island.  Since the president of the ROC was formally chosen by the 
National Assembly, this position, too, was effectively removed from contestation.  
Beginning in 1969, the ROC did hold “supplementary” legislative elections every three 
years61 in Taiwanese constituencies to replace the increasing number of mainland 
representatives who were dying.  The number of seats open to direct contestation 
increased each cycle, but even in the last election in 1989 less than a third of the 
legislature was filled through these elections.   
 By contrast, most local offices were subject to direct elections from the regime’s 
earliest days on Taiwan.  And despite the ban on the formation of opposition parties, non-
KMT candidates could run as independents in elections for townships, counties and cities 
and for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly.62  Although KMT candidates won most of these 
elections, many were hotly contested, and independents occasionally scored upsets, 
especially in jurisdictions such as Kaohsiung County and Chiayi City that had been the 
site of large-scale violence during the 2-28 Incident and continued to harbor strong anti-
KMT attitudes (Ting Tin-yu 1989).   
                                                
61 Elections scheduled for the end of 1978 were suspended when the United States announced it was 
switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC; they were held two years later, in 1980.  
62 The provincial governor remained a centrally-appointed (i.e. unelected) position until 1994.  Mayors of 
the centrally-administered municipalities of Taipei (after 1964) and Kaohsiung (after 1978) were also 
appointed until 1994. 
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 In fact, these elections played a central role in the early political development of 
the opposition movement on the island, and ultimately to the growth of DPP partisanship.  
The electoral origins of the opposition can be traced back to 1977, when non-KMT 
candidates for the first time attempted to coordinate their campaigns for local office with 
one another (Lu Ya-li 1992: 123-24).  In order to skirt the ban on opposition parties, they 
referred to themselves collectively as the Dangwai ( .@), literally “outside the Party.” 63  
Dangwai candidates won four of 21 county executive races, the most the KMT had ever 
lost in a single election cycle, and carried 30 percent of the vote island-wide.  These 
victories added political value to the Dangwai label, establishing its candidates as a 
coordinated and viable alternative to the KMT and delivering a sizeable share of votes to 
those who held its endorsement. 
 The Dangwai received another major shot of publicity in December 1979 as a 
result of the Kaohsiung Incident, when a protest in the southern city of Kaohsiung led by 
a number of more radical members of the democracy movement turned violent.  The 
KMT regime used the protests as a pretext to detain many of the leaders of the Dangwai, 
and their arrests and subsequent trials attracted widespread attention both in Taiwan and 
abroad.  Those arrested were eventually all sentenced to prison, some for a decade or 
more, dealing a major short-term blow to the nascent opposition movement.  But in a 
strategic sense, the crackdown backfired: the trials were reported prominently in the 
KMT-controlled press, and as a consequence the accused became household names in 
Taiwan.  The lawyers on the defense team, as well as many of the spouses and relatives 
                                                
63 The history of the Dangwai movement and the early DPP is covered at some length in Huang Teh-fu 
(1992: 40-47); Kuo Jeng-liang (1998); Lin Chia-lung (1998); Rigger (2001: 15-36); and Cheng Ming-teh 
(2004: 61-108), among many other sources. 
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of those convicted, were able to use this fame to win political office in the early 1980s, 
and most ran as part of the Dangwai coalition.  The groundswell of sympathy for those 
convicted in the Kaohsiung Incident thus added to the Dangwai label—anyone running 
under it was likely to attract a sizeable bloc of votes from those who disliked the KMT. 
 Nevertheless, the Dangwai was beset by deep differences among its membership 
that made it difficult to put forth a unified front against the KMT.  It was first and 
foremost an electoral coalition, a loose alliance of candidates held together only by their 
shared antipathy toward the ruling party.  Attempts to coordinate nominations across the 
Dangwai’s diverse and quarrelsome groups broke down completely in 1983, and 
Dangwai candidates performed poorly in the supplementary legislative elections held that 
year.  Within the Dangwai, these disputes were reflected in the development of a number 
of separate factions.  The most serious disagreements in the mid 1980s were between 
members of the Dangwai Editors and Writers Association (DEWA), who were 
sympathetic to Taiwanese independence and favored social movements over 
parliamentary participation to bring about political change, and members of the Dangwai 
Public Policy Research Association (DPPRA), who favored taking a moderate tack in 
negotiations with the KMT and preferred to focus on electoral contestation over mass 
mobilization (Rigger 2001: 24-25).  The tensions between these two groups, as well as 
others, continued right up to the meeting at which the DPP was founded, in September 
1986. 
 The opposition movement in Taiwan may well have ended up permanently 
divided between these moderate and radical camps, with dire consequences for the 
electoral viability of non-KMT candidates, were it not for some clever maneuvering by a 
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few leading figures in the Dangwai.64  Over the spring and summer of 1986, working in 
secret, a handful of key people conceived a plan to found a new party at the upcoming 
Dangwai conference that September, which was organized to choose a set of candidates 
and a policy platform for the supplemental legislative elections scheduled for December 
1986.  With the full Dangwai membership assembled at the Grand Hotel in Taipei on 
September 28, 1986, a motion was made to establish a new political party, catching many 
of those in attendance, as well as the KMT authorities, by surprise.  By the end of the day 
the motion had passed and the various elements in the Dangwai had been formally 
reconstituted as the Democratic Progressive Party—the first new political party to be 
successfully established since the beginning of martial law in 1949.65 
 Founding the new party at this meeting had several advantages that proved crucial 
to its early success.  Because the Dangwai was by this time an established electoral 
coalition and well-known among the electorate as the only island-wide organization of 
anti-KMT candidates, its endorsements were highly valued by most of the opposition 
movement’s factions.  As a result, representatives from all the major components of the 
Dangwai coalition were in attendance, even those from the more radical DEWA.  
Second, the timing maximized the likelihood that all the key components of the Dangwai 
would join the new party, rather than try to found their own—a critical challenge in a 
movement deeply divided along ideological and ethnic lines.66  Once the proposal to 
                                                
64 Much of the following party history is drawn from Lin Chia-lung (1998: 209-253).   
65 There was at least one previous attempt to found a new political party in Taiwan, in 1960, but it was 
quickly snuffed out by the KMT. 
66 Although the DPP eventually developed a reputation as a Taiwanese nationalist party, at its founding its 
ranks included “quite a few” mainlanders, including prominent opposition figures Fei Hsi-ping, Fu Cheng 
and Lin Cheng-chieh (Cheng and Hsu 1996: 144).   
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found the party was announced and passed by delegates, the pressure on all factions in 
attendance to join in the name of opposition unity was intense.  Indeed, as was probably 
anticipated by the conference planners, DEWA members at the founding meeting were 
initially reluctant to join the new party but found it too difficult to resist the calls for 
opposition unity and the face-to-face entreaties of their Dangwai colleagues (Lin Chia-
lung 1998: 240, fn. 50). 
 The party name—Democratic Progressive Party—was also not an accident.  
Originally suggested by Frank Hsieh, one of the Kaohsiung Incident lawyers, it was 
chosen by the planners because it presented the most broadly palatable and ideologically 
neutral title possible.  It deliberately did not contain the words “Taiwan” or “socialism” 
in an attempt to sidestep ethnic and ideological disputes between different Dangwai 
factions, which might have ruined attempts to unify under a single party banner (Lin 
Chia-lung 1998: 242).   
 Finally, the location of the party’s founding conference also aided the new 
party—it was held in the capital, Taipei, at one of the largest and most luxurious hotels in 
the city, with many reporters in attendance because of the Dangwai nomination meeting.  
Founding a new political party was a self-consciously provocative act and was illegal 
under the martial law provisions then still in effect.  The new party was able to generate 
considerable publicity, so that most of the electorate quickly learned of the founding 
conference and of the united front the opposition movement presented there.  It also 
raised the costs to the KMT leadership of a crackdown on the new party, which would 
take place in the capital, involve nearly all of the key figures of the opposition, and be 
widely reported in the international media.  Thus, the founding of the DPP created a 
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major dilemma for the KMT—it could crack down and risk international condemnation 
(especially from the US, where opposition figures living in exile could be expected to put 
considerable pressure on Congress to act) and significant domestic unrest, or it could 
acquiesce to the de facto existence of a full-fledged opposition party.  In the end, the 
ROC president and KMT leader Chiang Ching-kuo decided to tolerate the new party, and 
two weeks later in an interview with the Washington Post, he declared his intention to 
end martial law in the near future.    
 The way in which the DPP was founded gave it several enduring advantages over 
potential challenges to its claim to represent the pro-democratization, anti-KMT position 
in the political arena.  First, it effectively brought over a significant chunk of the 
electorate by absorbing the Dangwai label.  This fact gave the new party instant 
credibility—its candidates would be viable, and its endorsements therefore valuable to 
both voters and aspirants to elected office.  Put differently, the DPP’s founding enabled it 
to lower voter uncertainty about what it stood for and to co-opt voters loyal to the 
Dangwai “brand”—in effect, instantly delivering a significant number of “partisan” 
supporters.  Second, subsuming all major components of the fractious opposition 
movement under the party’s label, getting them all to agree on how the party should be 
governed, and convincing them to abide by party decisions about who to nominate to run 
in elections, all helped ensure that the DPP rather than some alternative became the single 
focal point on which voters sympathetic to the opposition would coordinate.  Third, the 
party provided large economies of scale for the candidates that it endorsed—most of the 
electorate was aware of the new party, making it easier to disseminate information about 
the party’s positions and to rally support.  Finally, the Dangwai had about a decade of 
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experience running coordinated campaigns under the SNTV electoral system, and as a 
result was clearly the only other coalition apart from the KMT able both to contest more 
than one seat in a district and to manage the substantial coordination problems that such 
competition entailed. 
 Thus, the DPP began its existence with a near-monopoly on the anti-KMT vote 
and a strong brand name, and it had unified nearly all the key elites in the opposition 
movement under its party banner.  These initial advantages gave it a lead over 
alternatives in the battle for partisan supporters, a lead which it has retained ever since. 
 
 The Independence Issue Fuels Growth of DPP Partisanship 
 Despite the initial success of its founding, the DPP faced grave challenges in its 
early days.  The party had no access to the resources of state that were the lifeblood of 
local power in Taiwan, and it could not hope to gain control of these resources as long as 
it remained firmly in the minority.  It therefore needed to find some kind of alternative 
strategy to attract voters and mobilize activists.  As the first opposition party, it initially 
emphasized a pro-democratization and pro-political reform platform, so that the post-
martial law era party system began with party competition around a pro-regime versus 
anti-regime cleavage.  Open discussion of Taiwanese independence, relations with the 
mainland, revision of the constitution and changes to the name of the regime and national 
symbols were all still forbidden by the regime itself.  But as some components of the 
opposition pushed against the regime’s limits on speech, with few repercussions, these 
issues gradually came to the fore, and the party’s leaders and activists took on a more 
nativist tone (Cheng and Hsu 1996: 143-150).   
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 Appealing to Taiwanese nationalism for votes came naturally to many members 
of the party, a number of whom had connections with exiles in the overseas Taiwanese 
independence movement.  But it also made good strategic sense in at least two ways.  
First, the national question was a potent but cheap and readily available political weapon 
that enabled the DPP to attract and retain a significant segment of the electorate as core 
partisan supporters.  Second, to the extent the party could polarize the electorate around 
divisions between benshengren and mainlanders, it would put the KMT at a distinct 
disadvantage, given the demographics of the electorate.  The onus would be on the KMT, 
rather than the DPP, to maintain or increase their appeal to benshengren voters while still 
preventing the defection of their core mainlander constituencies.  The DPP, by contrast, 
could potentially win elections without a single mainlander vote, as long as they attracted 
enough support from benshengren (cf. Chu and Lin 1996; Wang Fu-chang 2004).   
 Hence, the DPP’s candidates and leadership increasingly adopted nationalist 
rhetoric in an attempt to brand themselves as the party for “native Taiwanese.”  This shift 
culminated in 1991 in the adoption of a clause in the party platform calling for a national 
referendum on independence—a provocative position to take, since the PRC had long 
held that this would be a casus belli.  The party’s open embrace of Taiwanese 
independence had two long-term consequences.  On the positive side, it cemented the 
support of a core group of 15-20 percent of the electorate for whom formal Taiwanese 
independence was a cherished goal.  The share of DPP partisans grew markedly after this 
period, as Figure 6.6 shows.  On the negative side, however, it also saddled the DPP with 
a position that was not popular among the electorate at large, creating a drag on its 
electoral prospects that it fought for at least the next decade.  In legislative elections in 
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the 1990s, the party’s vote share topped out at about 30 percent, and even in local 
executive races, where it tended to fare better, it never came close to winning a majority 
during the decade.   
 Thus, the shift of the national question from one about national identity to one 
more narrowly focused on the independence-unification question was a double-edged 
sword for the DPP: it solidified a partisan core at the same time that it seriously limited 
its potential to win a majority in the long term. As I discuss in the next section, in contrast 
to the KMT, the DPP’s share of the vote remained significantly lower, and through much 
of the 1990s the party appeared to be constrained by a ceiling on the potential support it 
could attract from the electorate. 
 
 6.4. Spatial Positioning: How the KMT Captured the Center 
 The National Question Splits the KMT 
 In contrast to its partisan advantage, the KMT began the multi-party era in Taiwan 
in a precarious position on the national question.  The ruling party faced a dilemma posed 
by the mathematics of ethnicity on the island: its core mainlander supporters made up less 
than 15 percent of the total electorate, while benshengren were more than 85 percent.  
Even as it enjoyed the support of most Hakkas and Aborigines, giving it another 15 
percent, simple demographics required that it obtain a sizeable share of the Hoklo vote as 
well to win competitive elections in many parts of the island (Huang Teh-fu 1996: 113).      
 Given this unfavorable demographic picture, the KMT leadership under Lee 
Teng-hui began to soften the party’s stance on the national question, moving it closer to 
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the center of the emerging identity cleavage and seeking to improve its appeal to 
benshengren.  Thus, when, for example, the DPP raised the pressure for a more explicit 
acknowledgement of Taiwan’s special historical experience, the KMT responded by 
adopting educational reforms to increase emphasis on Taiwanese rather than mainland 
Chinese history, geography, and culture (Corcuff 2002).  Lee’s background as the first 
native Taiwanese to become head of the KMT and president of the ROC also gave the 
party much-needed credibility on the national question and allowed it to make this shift 
toward the emerging political center.  In addition, the KMT’s “indigenization” policy of 
recruiting and promoting more benshengren in the party, originally set in motion by 
Chiang Ching-kuo, had by the early 1990s substantially transformed the party’s ethnic 
makeup.  Whereas in 1969 only about 40 percent of all KMT members were native 
Taiwanese, by 1992 nearly 70 percent were.  A later but similar shift in ethnic 
composition occurred at higher levels of the party: of the members of the executive 
cabinet, nearly 70 percent were mainlanders in 1978, dropping to 55 percent in 1993; and 
in the KMT’s Central Standing Committee, the percentage dropped from 77 percent in 
1976 to 43 percent in 1993 (Huang Teh-fu 1996: 114-117).  Thus, the rise of native 
Taiwanese to positions of power throughout the KMT party hierarchy substantially 
weakened the link between ethnic identity and party identification by the early 1990s 
(Chu and Lin 1996). 
 Nevertheless, while the “Taiwanization” of the KMT and its moderation on the 
national question improved its electoral prospects, they also generated serious tensions 
within the party.  Many of the remaining older generation of mainlanders in the party 
were fiercely opposed to the democratic reforms pushed by the DPP, and they decried the 
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party’s shifting stances on national symbols and cross-Strait policies.  By 1990, these 
differences had crystallized into two factions within the party elite.  On one side was the 
Mainstream faction (zhuliu paixi [\]^ ) consisting of Lee Teng-hui and his mostly 
benshengren allies.  On the other was the Non-Mainstream faction (feizhuliu paixi _[
\]^ ), led by premier Hau Pei-tsun ( `ab ) and most of the conservative group of 
mainlanders.  Over the next two years, Lee and the Mainstream faction gradually 
outmaneuvered and weakened the conservatives’ influence in the party; a clear sign of 
their declining fortunes was the resignation of Hau in January 1993, who was forced to 
step down, ostensibly to take responsibility for the KMT’s performance in the 1992 
legislative elections.  By mid-1993 several key members of the Non-Mainstream faction, 
increasingly marginalized and unable to prevent greater “Taiwanization” of the party, 
broke away to found the New Party. 67 
 The New Party’s emergence marked a fundamental shift in the party system.  In 
the short run, the defection of the more conservative, predominantly mainlander cadres 
seriously harmed the KMT: many of its former core partisan supporters in the mainland 
community voted for the New Party candidates in 1995, and the KMT’s legislative 
majority shrank considerably.  Coordination in elections became a much bigger problem 
for the KMT as well, as I detail in the next section.   
 But the departure of the KMT renegades to the New Party was not nearly so 
damaging in the big picture: they were among the KMT’s most ideological members, and 
by leaving, they freed the ruling party from having to placate a faction that held views 
                                                
67 A good overview of the events leading to the founding of the New Party can be found in Rigger (2001: 
148-177) 
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significantly to the right of the median voter.  Thus, Lee continued to reshape a number 
of ROC policies toward mainland China, culminating in his statement that cross-Strait 
relations should be considered “special state-to-state relations” rather than merely “two 
political entities” both laying claim to the right to govern all of China (Lin and Tedards 
2003: 38-40; Kuo Su-feng 2000).  This positioned the KMT in the political center, giving 
it a clear electoral advantage over both the more ideologically-driven opposition parties. 
 
 Examples of the KMT’s Spatial Positioning Advantage 
 At the same time that the KMT moved to the center of the independence-
unification issue, the party also took advantage of its ideological flexibility by co-opting 
several other policy initiatives advanced by the DPP.  Of particular interest is the issue of 
social welfare—state-provided health insurance and old-age pensions.  At the beginning 
of the multi-party era, state social welfare provision was highly unequal and distributed 
mainly to households of government employees and military veterans.  Because these 
groups were disproportionately ethnic mainlanders, social welfare had the potential to 
become “ethnicized” in the same way that constitutional reform was.  As Dafydd Fell has 
recorded, the DPP saw social welfare as a major vote-winner and consistently advocated 
for the expansion of state health care and pensions in campaigns in the 1990s (2005: 28-
54).  But the KMT responded to this challenge quite effectively: in 1986 it announced a 
plan to introduce National Health Insurance (NHI) by the year 2000; in 1988 the start 
date was brought forward to 1995; and the bill adopting the final program was drafted by 
the Department of Health, under a KMT-controlled cabinet, and passed in the summer of 
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1994 with little debate and few amendments (ibid. 39).  Thus, the KMT could take just as 
much credit as the DPP for this expansion of the welfare state.    
 Electoral competition generated similar pressure for the expansion of old-age 
pensions.  The DPP promoted this issue with aplomb in electoral campaigns in the 1990s, 
sparking an intra-party battle within the KMT about how to respond.  While mainlanders 
in the party generally opposed any changes to pensions, and then pushed to require 
individual contributions and means-testing for eligibility, many of the native Taiwanese 
in the party advocated the most generous expansion as a way to appeal to rural and less 
educated voters who were largely left out of existing pension programs.  On this issue, 
too, Lee Teng-hui’s mostly native Taiwanese allies ultimately won out, and Lee came out 
publicly in favor of a non-contributory plan in the heat of the 1997 local election 
campaign (Fell 2005: 40-45; cf. Wong 2004). 
 The KMT also took other policy steps to head off issues that might provide votes 
to the DPP.  Most prominently, the central government embarked on a massive increase 
in infrastructure spending during the 1990s, including the construction of metro systems 
for Taipei and Kaohsiung and a major expansion of the island’s highway system.  To pay 
for this new outlay, the government for the first time began to run regular budget deficits, 
while at the same time shifting resources away from the military (Cheng and Haggard 
2001).   As a result, by the mid-1990s there was little to differentiate the KMT from the 
DPP apart from their positions on the independence-unification issue.  At the other end of 
the political spectrum, the New Party was able to draw a clear contrast with the KMT by 
staking out a clear “pro-China” position, but like the DPP’s pro-independence stance, this 
harmed more than helped its electoral performance. The only issue on which the KMT 
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was consistently vulnerable was corruption—or as it was known in the parlance of the 
time, “black gold” politics ( cd ).  Both the DPP and the NP enjoyed an advantage over 
the KMT on this issue, as the ruling party was much more reliant on the use of state and 
party assets and its ties to local factions to win elections (Fell 2005: 54-84).  
Nevertheless, the two opposition parties’ stark ideological differences on most other 
issues precluded any serious attempt to team up against the KMT in elections; the parties 
were much more likely to work with like-mined legislators in the KMT itself than with 
each other.  Thus, in the latter half of the decade, the KMT held a formidable spatial 
positioning advantage over both opposition parties—it was not only still the largest party 
in the system, but also the most pragmatic and centrist.   
 
 The Enduring Weakness of Other Political Cleavages 
 The saliency and subsequent stability of the divisions between Taiwan’s major 
political parties on the independence-unification issue is striking, given the number of 
alternative issues that the parties themselves have raised to appeal to Taiwanese voters.  
For instance, the DPP in the late 1980s was certainly not the only game in town for 
opposition supporters: the political market for anti-KMT voters quickly became crowded 
after the passage in January 1989 of the Law on the Organization of Civil Groups, which 
created a legal basis for multi-party competition in the ROC.  By the end of the year more 
than 50 political parties had registered with the government (Rigger 1999: 132).  Yet at 
election time none of these parties was able to make inroads against the KMT and DPP. 
 An especially revealing example of the primacy of the independence-unification 
issue in Taiwanese politics is that of the labor movement.  Labor’s failure to establish a 
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viable political party was not for lack of a vibrant trade union sector; as Tien Hung-mao 
describes it, when martial law was formally lifted in July 1987, “independent trade 
unions were organized in various industrial regions on the island, mainly among workers 
of larger corporations and state enterprises.  The Brotherhood unions, under the 
leadership of Lou Wei-wen, a militant factory activist, [were] gaining support among 
disenfranchised industrial laborers who refuse[d] to affiliate with the KMT-controlled 
trade union federation.”  Rather than join the DPP, the movement instead attempted in 
December 1987 to throw its weight behind the creation of the Labor Party, whose 
manifesto “proclaim[ed] its hope of becoming the main political instrument for Taiwan’s 
industrial workers” (1992: 49).  Yet the Labor Party’s impact on the political scene was 
short-lived; by June 1988, Lou and other activists had broken away and formed a new, 
more radical Worker’s Party that explicitly advocated unification with the mainland.  
Fatally weakened by divisions over ideology and the independence-unification issue, 
neither party won a single seat in any national election from 1989 through 2001 
(Schafferer 2003: 70).   
 That no party with workers as its main constituent base has ever won a seat in the 
Legislative Yuan or National Assembly seems odd, given that Taiwan’s large-magnitude 
SNTV electoral system appears tailor-made for candidates from small but concentrated 
interest groups.  But the labor movement was not alone in failing to transform its political 
potential into electoral victories.  The number of social movements in Taiwan exploded 
in the late 1980s: Michael Hsiao counted 18 distinct issue groups in 1989, which in 
addition to labor included consumers, antipollution protesters, environmental 
conservationists, women, aborigines, students, religious groups, farmers, teachers, the 
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handicapped, veterans, human rights advocates, mainlanders advocating for the right to 
visit the mainland, anti-nuclear power activists, renters (non-homeowners), and ethnic 
Hakkas.  Hsiao noted that the DPP had by no means locked up the support of these social 
activists and their sympathizers in the electorate; rather, the leaders of most of these 
movements  
 
“adopted an apolitical strategy by avoiding any obvious connection with 
the political opposition…Though DPP politicians appeared to be 
supportive of many of the protests, there is still no clear sign that the DPP 
has formulated a concrete political stand in relating to most of the social 
movements.  Moreover, the social movement leaders have apparently seen 
no advantage in aligning openly with the DPP” (1992: 70).   
 
 Yet when some of these groups eventually did attempt to form new political 
parties and contest national elections, they consistently flopped at the ballot box.  
Schafferer (2003: 70-72) notes 32 different political parties that ran candidates in the 
1990s; of these, only four managed to get even one of their candidates elected to office.  
In 1992, a single candidate from the Chinese Social Democratic Party (efgh-[.) 
won election to the Legislative Yuan (LY); in 1996 a member of the Green Party (i.) 
was elected to the National Assembly; in 1998 a single member of the Taiwan 
Independence Party (TAIP, or T,.) won a seat in the LY, and in 2001 a member of 
the Taiwan No. 1 Party (MUj.) was elected to the legislature.  Of these, only the first 
two were parties clearly competing on issues other than the independence-unification 
question; the impact of even these four parties on Taiwan’s politics has been negligible. 
 In sum, after political liberalization Taiwan’s party system rapidly realigned from 
a pro- versus anti-regime cleavage to a national identity one.  Political activists tried and 
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failed in numerous attempts to align the island’s politics along other latent social 
cleavages—socioeconomic lines, or occupational ones, for example.  Yet in the newly-
emergent party system of the 1990s, the three parties which won significant numbers of 
seats—the DPP, the KMT, and the New Party—were distinguished first and foremost by 
their positions on the independence-unification question rather than on socioeconomic 
issues.  
 
 Conclusion 
 By the time of the 1996 presidential election, the KMT was in an advantageous 
position: it was the leading party in a new three-party system in which it was both the 
largest party and the centrist one.  Thus, the first direct election for the president played 
out on terms highly favorable to the KMT, as both the DPP and NP nominated polarizing, 
ideological candidates who did not have much serious prospect of winning.  With the full 
force of the KMT’s party apparatus behind him, Lee Teng-hui easily won re-election 
despite the turmoil of the previous decade.  The KMT appeared to be well-positioned to 
remain Taiwan’s ruling party for the foreseeable future.  In the end, the ultimate 
weakness of the KMT would prove to be tactical, not ideological: it struggled to 
coordinate in elections.  It is to this factor that I turn next. 
 
 6.5. Coordination: Toward Greater Symmetry 
 Having examined how partisanship and spatial positioning affected Taiwan’s 
evolving party system, now let us consider how the development of the party system 
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affected electoral coordination.  Comparative scholarship often references Taiwan under 
the KMT as an example of a dominant party system sustained by asymmetric 
coordination (e.g. Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 1996; Hsieh 1996; Cox 1997; Lin Jih-wen 
2006).  Yet coordination asymmetry does not appear to have been critical to ruling party 
survival in Taiwan, at least once legislative elections were fully opened to opposition 
contestation.  Instead it was in elections for local executives, rather than national 
legislative races, that coordination problems were most consequential to party 
performance.  In the late 1990s, the KMT consistently struggled to coordinate behind a 
single nominee in these races, frequently splitting the vote and opening the door to DPP 
victories in counties with a solid KMT partisan majority.  These DPP county and city 
executives in turn increased their own national profiles and helped moderate the party’s 
image, leaving it better positioned to compete at the national level.  
  
 Coordination Problems in Taiwan’s SNTV Electoral System 
 From the time the KMT assumed control of the island until 2008, legislative 
elections at all levels of government in Taiwan were held under the Single Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV) electoral system.  Under SNTV, voters cast a ballot for a 
single candidate, but multiple candidates win seats.  Thus, in a five-seat district, even the 
top vote-getter typically wins only 15 to 30 percent of the total vote, and the “last 
winner” might win with less than 10 percent, depending on how dispersed votes are 
across all candidates.  As has been widely noted in the literature on comparative electoral 
systems, SNTV poses two difficult challenges for the leaders of any political party that 
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aims to capture more than one seat in a district.68  First, they must estimate their overall 
expected level of support in the district, and nominate the maximum number of 
candidates that could be elected with that support.  Identifying the optimal number 
requires a delicate balancing act—nominate too many candidates, and most lose by small 
margins; nominate too few, and the party could have won another seat with excess votes 
cast for its candidates.  Second, once the party leaders decide how many candidates to 
nominate, they must find a way to get votes distributed as equally as possible across all 
the party’s nominees—what in the parlance of local campaigns in Taiwan is known as the 
“vote division system” (peipiao zhidu klmn ).  
 By the advent of the first fully contested elections for the legislature in 1992, the 
KMT had become especially adept at distributing votes among multiple candidates in a 
district, as it had been running election campaigns since the 1950s for local county and 
city councils as well as the Taiwan Provincial Legislature.  The KMT’s principal vote 
allocation strategy was to assign each nominee his or her own exclusive “responsibility 
zones” ( zeren qu opq ) within the district—smaller areas, typically demarcated at the 
ward (li r) or village (cun b ) level, in which they were to target their campaign 
appeals.  Once assigned, candidates were forbidden from campaigning in the 
responsibility zones of others.  In effect, this strategy created an informal set of single-
member districts out of the larger multi-member district.  The responsibility zone system 
proved reasonably effective at equalizing the votes won by each member, because the 
                                                
68 See the discussion and literature cited in Section 4.1.  Notably, the median SNTV district in Taiwan had 
twice as many seats as in Japan, the other prominent country to use SNTV: in the 1998 election, for 
instance, the median legislator came from a district with eight seats, while in 1993 in Japan the median was 
four (my calculation).  As a consequence, intra-party coordination problems in Taiwan were significantly 
more complex than in Japan. 
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party could estimate from the previous election how many loyal KMT votes were 
available in a given ward (Liu I-chou 1999).  Voters in turn typically learned about and 
followed the vote distribution strategy of the party through a kind of local “vote 
broker”—called zhuangjiao ( st ) in Mandarin, or in Taiwanese, tiau-a-ka.  These 
influential local figures, often holding official elected administrative positions such as 
chief of the ward (lizhang  ru ), village (cunzhang  bu ) or neighborhood (linzhang 
vu ), cultivated close social ties with most households in their community, often over 
many years, and provided assistance or favors in exchange for support at election time 
(Rigger 1999: 87-94).  Instructions about which KMT candidate to support could then be 
communicated to voters through local-level tiau-a-ka. 
 The whole system was greased by funds delivered from the party through each 
nominee’s campaign office to the ward chief for local campaign rallies, feasts, gifts, and 
other ways to obtain votes from constituents who might need a little extra encouragement 
to turn out to vote (Rigger 1999: 94-99; Wang Chin-shou 2004).  The KMT also 
occasionally held in reserve blocs of core voters known to be especially reliable party 
supporters—the so-called “iron vote” (tiepiao wl).  These were typically the 
households of veterans, civil servants, or employees of state-owned enterprises, and they 
could be directed at the last minute to support the candidate(s) in the district who 
appeared to be at greatest danger of losing (Rigger 1999: 41).  As a consequence of 
decades of refining this system, by the time martial law was lifted the KMT had become 
quite efficient at converting votes into seats.  As Figure 6.7 shows, it won a net seat 
bonus (seat share minus vote share) of nine percent in the partially contested, 
“supplementary” elections of 1986, and 11 percent in 1989. 
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FIGURE 6.7.  SEAT VERSUS VOTE SHARE OF TAIWANESE POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEGISLATIVE YUAN 
ELECTIONS, 1986-2004 
 
 The newly-founded DPP, by contrast, could not in its early days replicate the 
KMT’s sophisticated and highly resource-intensive vote allocation system, putting it at a 
disadvantage.  The vote-division challenge facing new parties under SNTV is especially 
difficult: in order to distribute votes optimally, they need both good estimates of their 
likely level of support across each district and a large base of core partisans who are 
willing to follow whatever allocation strategy the party decides on.  Because of its 
previous Dangwai experience, the DPP was better positioned than other opposition 
parties to compete in legislative elections, but even so, it was much less efficient than 
was the KMT: its seat bonus was actually negative in 1986 and 1989—that is, it won a 
larger share of votes than of seats.  The overall effect of this difference was that the 
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KMT’s majority in these elections, and in the 1991 National Assembly election, was 
padded by its superior ability to coordinate.  
 However, this asymmetry declined in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, the 
first fully contested elections to that body.  In the run-up to the election, the battle 
between the Mainstream and Non-Mainstream groups in the KMT adversely affected the 
party’s vote division system. The Non-Mainstream faction had close ties to many of the 
“iron vote” constituencies in military villages; these supported Non-Mainstream-allied 
KMT candidates rather than following the dictates of the party center.  The campaign 
soon devolved into a free-for-all within the KMT as individual nominees, worried about 
the defection of these core constituents from the allocation system and facing competition 
from renegade KMT candidates as well, started invading each other’s zones (Rigger 
1999: 164).  As a consequence, a number of the Non-Mainstream candidates won with 
tens of thousands of votes to spare, while many Mainstream candidates were defeated; 
the KMT’s seat bonus declined noticeably, from about 11 percent in 1989 to only six 
percent in 1992. By contrast, the DPP significantly improved its conversion of votes to 
seats, managing for the first time to exceed parity.  Learning from its previous mistakes, 
the party followed a more conservative nomination strategy in 1992, limiting the number 
of candidates it ran.  Thus, the difference in the two parties’ votes-to-seats conversion 
bonus was cut by two-thirds, from a difference of 17.5 percent in 1989 to only 5.7 
percent in 1992.  The results of the 1995 and 1998 legislative elections show a similar 
pattern, despite the emergence of the New Party: the KMT enjoyed a reduced but still 
significant seat bonus, while both the main opposition parties remained near parity (Hsu 
and Chen 2004).   
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 Part of the reason for the improved conversion rates of the two opposition parties 
was their use of a “forced-distribution” ( xykl ) vote-division system that relied on 
core supporters to follow party guidelines so as to equalize their votes across all the 
party’s nominees (Sheng Shing-yuan 1998).  After deciding on its nominees in a district, 
the party would assign candidates to voters sharing the same birth month or the last digit 
of their national ID card.  For instance, in Taipei City’s South District, the New Party 
nominated three candidates.  Voters whose birthdays fell between January and April were 
instructed to vote for Chu Hui-liang ( z{|+); between May and August, Chou Yang-
shan ( }~+); and between September and December, Lee Ching-hua ( 9f ).  
Because the New Party’s core supporters were generally well-informed about politics and 
highly motivated to support the party’s candidates, most followed the allocation 
guidelines; the votes for all three were remarkably evenly distributed across the district, 
and all three were elected (Pao Cheng-hao 1998).   
 This randomization system was frequently used by the DPP as well in SNTV 
elections (cf. Chen and Huang 2004).  Figure 6.8 shows an example of how parties in 
Taiwan communicated this scheme to voters—through large billboards or banners hung 
throughout the district.  The banner shows all the party’s candidates in the 2004 Tainan 
County race posing with President Chen.  Contained in the rings are the name of a 
candidate and numbers corresponding to the last digit of the voter’s national ID number: 
a supporter whose ID number ends in a 1 or 2 should vote for the first candidate; a 3 or 4, 
the second; and so forth. This randomization strategy is one of the chief reasons the 
DPP’s votes-to-seats ratio improved in the 1990s, despite not having the KMT’s 
resources or strong ties to informal local networks (Sheng Shing-yuan 1998).   
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FIGURE 6.8.  DPP VOTE-RANDOMIZATION BANNER, 2004 LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTION  
(© ANFREL 2004) 
 
 Nevertheless, despite the weakening of its local vote-broker system and the 
decline in its coordination advantage over the opposition parties, the KMT remained by 
far the largest party in the legislature on the eve of the 2000 presidential election.  Given 
this fact, the emphasis in the literature on the role of the SNTV electoral system in the 
KMT’s persistence and eventual defeat seems rather misplaced.69  To the extent the 
electoral system itself significantly altered the KMT’s survival prospects, its primary 
                                                
69 For instance, see Cox (1996); Hsieh (1996); Wang Yeh-li (1996); Lin Jih-wen (2006), (2011).   
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effect was early on: the low threshold of exclusion made opposition nominations more 
valuable, and helped shift the focus of Dangwai efforts from social protest and mass 
mobilization to winning seats in electoral competition.  Coordination asymmetry may 
have helped the KMT during this period as well, but it was far from decisive.  
 
 The Importance of Local Elections to the DPP’s Development 
 In contrast to the large literature on SNTV, much less attention has been paid to 
the effect of local elections on the development of a competitive party system in Taiwan.  
Yet it is my contention that the existence of direct elections for local executives 
contributed much more to the development of a credible opposition, and ultimately to the 
defeat of the KMT.  Consistent with the institutional argument I made in Chapter 4, the 
opposition fared much better in local executive races than in legislative ones.  Victories 
in these elections in turn helped the DPP’s leaders develop practical experience at 
governing, gave them access to state resources, and helped them moderate the party’s 
image—all of which subsequently made the party a more formidable challenger to the 
KMT at the national level.     
 Taiwan has a long history of elections for local offices.  Since the earliest days of 
KMT rule, county executives and city mayors have been directly elected and held 
significant authority independent of the central government, exerting influence over local 
budgets, land use, and employment.  During the martial law era, the ban on opposition 
parties prevented non-KMT candidates from coordinating campaigns across the island’s 
local jurisdictions, but independent candidates were common, and occasionally even 
managed to run competitive races against the party’s chosen nominees. 
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 Initially, contested elections were held even for the two largest municipalities, 
Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities.  But when the KMT leadership’s favored candidate was 
defeated by an independent in the 1964 mayoral election in Taipei, the party decided to 
elevate the city to the status of a special municipality, which had the effect of changing 
the mayor’s office from an elected position to one appointed directly by the premier.  A 
similar challenge in Kaohsiung City in 1977 led the KMT to elevate it, too, the status of 
special municipality, so that its mayor could be more easily controlled by the central 
government and party.  
 Despite these institutional manipulations, the KMT refrained from suspending 
elections in other jurisdictions, and by the late 1970s these races had become a central 
battleground between the KMT and the nascent opposition movement in Taiwan.  Many 
of the DPP’s founding members got their start in politics in these local races, either as 
candidates or as volunteer campaign workers.  And the fact that local races were held at 
the same time across the island provided the often-fractious opposition movement a focus 
on a common objective that it lacked at other times (Lin Chia-lung 1998: 223-232).   
 It is in the 1990s, however, that the opposition most clearly benefited from local 
executive elections. Among the most prominent DPP victories was in the 1994 Taipei 
mayor’s election, the first since elections were reinstated for that office.  That election 
played out in what became a familiar pattern: Chen Shui-bian won an upset victory with 
43.7 percent of the vote when a New Party and KMT candidate split the rest.  But the 
party benefitted in the same way from poor KMT coordination to win a plurality of the 
next round of local executive contests in November 1997, as Table 6.1 shows. Of the 
dozen executive positions the DPP captured in 1997, half were won with less than 50 
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percent of the vote.  As in the legislative elections in 1995 and 1998, the KMT 
consistently failed to clear the field for its official nominees; instead, New Party 
candidates or KMT members denied the party’s nomination ran as independents in 
several races, badly splitting the pro-KMT vote. As a consequence, the DPP for the first 
time took a majority of the county and city executive seats and subsequently ran 
jurisdictions in which over 70 percent of the Taiwanese population lived (Rigger 1999: 
186). 
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Table 6.1.  1997 County and City Executive Elections Summary 
Locality KMT % DPP % NP % TAIP % SRP % Ind. % Seat won by 
Taipei County 38.7 40.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 18.3 DPP 
Yilan County 46.2 53.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DPP 
Taoyuan County 43.0 56.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 DPP 
Hsinchu County 32.9 36.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.0 DPP 
Miaoli County 35.3 4.2 5.7 0.0 0.0 54.8 Ind. 
Taichung County 53.6* 37.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 7.8 DPP 
Changhua County 49.6 48.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 KMT 
Nantou County 30.1 30.8 7.3 0.0 0.0 31.8 Ind. 
Yunlin County 34.9 29.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.0* KMT 
Chiayi County 53.3 46.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KMT 
Tainan County 34.3 65.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DPP 
Kaohsiung County 44.7 51.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 DPP 
Pingtung County 41.5 55.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 DPP 
Taitung County 47.6 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.6 KMT 
Hualien County 56.8 43.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KMT 
Penghu County 57.5 42.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KMT 
Keelung City 38.0 42.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.3 DPP 
Hsinchu City 42.8 56.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 DPP 
Taichung City 41.3 49.6 7.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 DPP 
Chiayi City 42.5 5.5 0.0 1.8 0.0 50.2 Ind. 
Tainan City 38.8* 35.8 1.5 0.0 0.0 24.0 DPP 
Kinmen County 58.6 0.0 41.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 KMT 
Lienchiang County 61.0 0.0 39.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KMT 
Grand Total 42.1 43.3 1.4 0.2 0.1 12.9  
        
Seats won 8 12 0 0 0 3  
        
*Vote split between two or more candidates; DPP plurality winners are highlighted. 
 
KMT = Kuomintang; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party; NP = New Party; TAIP = Taiwan 
Independence Party; SRP = Social Reform Party; Ind = Independents 
 
 
 The DPP’s victories in local executive races helped the party’s development in at 
least three ways.  First, control of local executive positions allowed the party to build a 
reputation for pragmatism and competence that it had previously lacked.  Whereas much 
of the party’s older generation remained focused on ideological concerns, especially the 
national question, the local elected officials had to dirty their hands with the business of 
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day-to-day governing.  Many of these local officials proved popular—Chen Shui-bian, 
for instance, racked up approval ratings of over 70 percent as mayor of Taipei (Rigger 
2001: 101)—and were thus an asset to the national party.  Second, by winning control of 
local governments, the DPP also was able to develop a strong political “farm team” that it 
could draw on in subsequent elections: a number of these county executives continued on 
to be major figures in national politics in the 2000s.  Chen Shui-bian was only the most 
prominent and successful of a cohort of local executives that included the future vice 
president Annette Lu (Taoyuan County executive), premier Su Tseng-chang (Taipei 
County executive), premier and future presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Kaohsiung 
City mayor) and premier and DPP party chairman Yu Shyi-kun (Yilan County 
executive).  Third, by controlling local administrations in which more than two-thirds of 
Taiwanese lived, the party also gained valuable access to resources and was able to 
further weaken the KMT’s local patronage networks.  
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Table 6.2.  1998 County Assembly and City Council Elections Summary 
Locality KMT % DPP % NP % TAIP % SRP % Ind % Winner 
Taipei County 46.8 21.4 8.6 0.6 0 22.2 KMT 
Yilan County 50.9 27.3 0.9 0 0 20.9 KMT 
Taoyuan County 43.4 19.8 4.5 0.1 0.1 25.0 KMT 
Hsinchu County 48.5 15.2 2.5 0.2 0 33.7 KMT 
Miaoli County 55.4 5.4 2.2 0.7 0.1 36.2 KMT 
Taichung County 53.1 15.5 3.8 0.4 0 27.1 KMT 
Changhua County 55.6 13.2 0.4 0 0 30.8 KMT 
Nantou County 45.7 10.7 1.8 0 0 39.8 KMT 
Yunlin County 51.9 7.5 0.7 0.2 0 39.8 KMT 
Chiayi County 61.1 9.6 0.1 0 0 29.1 KMT 
Tainan County 36.7 14.8 0.6 0 0 47.9 Ind 
Kaohsiung County 37.3 19.3 1.8 1.3 0 40.4 Ind 
Pingtung County 43.9 13.1 0.7 0.7 0 41.6 KMT 
Taitung County 62.0 2.9 1.0 0 0 33.0 KMT 
Hualien County 63.2 13.1 2.3 0 0 20.7 KMT 
Penghu County 53.3 6.5 0.5 0 0 39.7 KMT 
Keelung City 61.0 17.5 6.7 0 0 14.8 KMT 
Hsinchu City 51.5 14.5 5.1 0 0 28.9 KMT 
Taichung City 60.5 17.8 5.5 0 0 15.3 KMT 
Chiayi City 42.7 11.1 1.4 3.0 0 41.8 KMT 
Tainan City 42.8 24.7 1.5 1.4 0 29.6 KMT 
Kinmen County 73.9 1.7 6.9 0 0 17.4 KMT 
Lienchiang County 78.4 0 21.0 0 0 0.6 KMT 
Grand Total 48.8 15.8 3.1 0.5 0.1 31.1  
        
Seats won 522 114 10 1 0 239 (886) 
        
 
KMT = Kuomintang; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party; NP = New Party; TAIP = Taiwan 
Independence Party; SRP = Social Reform Party; IND = Independents 
 
 
 Thus, direct election of the executive at the local level was a key factor in the 
defeat of the KMT.  One can get a sense of its importance by looking at the career arc of 
Chen Shui-bian.  Chen initially gained notoriety as one of the lawyers defending 
members of the Dangwai on trial for the Kaohsiung Incident in 1980, then parlayed that 
fame into a seat on the Taipei City Council in 1981 and later won a seat in the Legislative 
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Yuan in 1989.  He then won the 1994 Taipei mayor’s election with 45 percent of the vote 
when the KMT and NP candidates split the rest. Chen’s victory provided the DPP with its 
most important victory to that point in its history, and immediately gave him both a high 
national profile and a resource-rich office with which to build a concrete record of 
achievement.  Chen’s time as Taipei mayor served to make him the clear front-runner for 
the DPP presidential nomination, and when he was defeated in the 1998 mayor’s race 
despite improving his vote share, he used his concession speech to launch his presidential 
campaign (Rigger 2001: 177).   
 Had these local executive offices been centrally appointed, or had they been filled 
with someone from the local assembly, the rise of Chen Shui-bian into a candidate 
capable of winning the presidency would not have been possible.  It required both 
directly elected local and national executives—that is, a presidential regime—for the DPP 
to win.  That both were present points to a final puzzle in the Taiwan case: why was 
direct election of the president adopted in the first place?  
 
 6.6.  The Origins and Consequences of Presidentialism 
 If presidentialism is so much worse for advantaged ruling parties, as I have 
argued, why did the KMT see fit to adopt it?   The answer I will argue for in this section 
is simple: at the time direct election of the president was adopted, a presidential system 
was in the KMT leader Lee Teng-hui’s best interest.  Taiwan’s political reforms could 
easily have delivered a purely parliamentary system if Lee had supported it: the KMT had 
more than enough votes in the National Assembly to unilaterally change the system 
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however it preferred.  But because presidentialism would weaken his chief rivals within 
the party and reduce the intra-party constraints he faced, Lee ultimately came down 
decisively in favor of direct election of the president, undercutting his own party in the 
long run. 
 
 How Presidentialism was Adopted: Constitutional Reform in Taiwan 
 Under the provisions of the constitution prior to reform, the Republic of China 
was set up as a kind of semi-presidential system, albeit one with five formal branches of 
government and several other unusual features.  The president was chosen indirectly for a 
six-year term by the National Assembly, which itself was to be elected in a nation-wide 
vote.70  The president in turn appointed the premier, who selected and headed the 
Executive Yuan, the government cabinet.  The legislature consisted of a unicameral body, 
the Legislative Yuan, which was elected separately at different times and for different 
terms than the National Assembly.  Legislative confirmation was required for the premier 
to take office, but once seated he was not subject to a no-confidence vote; only the 
president could remove him (Wu Jau-shieh 1995: 126-7).  On the other hand, neither the 
premier nor the president had the ability to dismiss the legislature (Cheng and Haggard 
2001: 192-193).  Thus, the executive and legislative branches possessed both separate 
origin and separate survival.   
                                                
70 In practice, this occurred exactly once, in 1947.  The members of the first National Assembly held their 
seats until 1991, when they were replaced by representatives elected solely from Taiwanese constituencies.  
Their potentially crucial role in selecting the president was removed in 1994, well before the president’s 
term expired. 
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 During the martial law era, the president’s power in practice was greatly enhanced 
in two ways.  First, he was head of a hierarchical KMT organized along Leninist lines, 
giving him control over the party machinery that controlled all other branches of 
government.  Second, the president had been granted extraordinary powers by the 
“Temporary Provisions,” an amendment passed by the National Assembly before the 
regime fled to Taiwan as part of its fight against the Communists.  These powers included 
the suspension of civil rights delineated in the constitution, executive degree authority, 
and direct supervision of the military and security apparatus through the National 
Security Council and Taiwan Garrison Command (Feldman 1992: 3-6).  
 Thus, when Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency in January 1988, he inherited 
an extraordinarily powerful office.  But his hold on the position was precarious; he had 
succeeded to the top office only because Chiang Ching-kuo himself had tapped Lee to be 
vice-president, not because of his standing within the KMT.  And in fact, the parallel 
position of KMT party chairman initially went unfilled in the days after Chiang’s death, 
as the party’s Central Standing Committee was divided between “hardliners,” including 
Chiang Kai-shek’s widow Soong Mei-ling, who favored collective government for the 
rest of Chiang’s unfinished term, and “softliners” who favored Lee. After rallying support 
from components of the party grassroots, the softliners’ position won out, and Lee was 
named acting chairman two weeks later. 71   
 Nevertheless, Lee continued to be challenged by conservatives in the Non-
Mainstream faction within the party for the next two years, culminating in a battle over 
the party’s nomination for the presidential election in March 1990.  The KMT’s control 
                                                
71 Much of this section draws from Lin Chia-lung (1998: 303-340). 
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of 86 percent of the National Assembly seats ensured that its nominee would be selected 
as president, but in February Non-Mainstream members mounted an intra-party challenge 
to Lee and put forth an alternative candidate, Lin Yang-kang.  Lee managed through 
some savvy back-room maneuvering to secure the party’s nomination, and in the end, Lin 
withdrew and Lee won reelection with 641 of 688 votes in the National Assembly 
(Rigger 1999: 150-151).   
 The Non-Mainstream faction remained a powerful threat to Lee, however—
enough so that after his reelection, Lee appointed a conservative mainlander and high-
ranking military general, Hau Pei-tsun, as premier.  The appointment of Hau as head of 
the Executive Yuan moved the ongoing division between the two alliances in the KMT 
into the realm of constitutional reform.  Under pressure from the opposition and members 
of his own party, Lee announced shortly after his reelection the formation of a “National 
Affairs Conference” (guoshihui ,h) to seek a consensus on political reforms.  The 
conference resulted in a number of points of agreement, including the introduction of 
direct election of the Taiwan Provincial Governor and the mayors of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung, the retirement of all senior members of the Legislative Yuan and National 
Assembly, and the abolition of the Temporary Provisions (Rigger 1999: 152).  But the 
issue of the selection of the president and premier remained controversial.  The Non-
Mainstream faction members tended to support retaining the indirect selection of the 
presidency and reducing it to a symbolic role in government.  Lee Teng-hui, by contrast, 
favored direct election (Lin Chia-lung 1998: 363-4).   
 The most interesting about-face on the executive selection issue came from the 
DPP.  In the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the party had consistently advocated for 
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parliamentarism, viewing it as the best way to check Chiang’s authority.  But in the run-
up to the NAC, the party endorsed direct election of the president.  The primary reason 
for this change in position appears to be a reevaluation of the party’s prospects of 
winning power under both systems.  Party leaders were perceptive enough to realize that 
by the early 1990s, the DPP “had a better chance [of] getting the governing power 
through winning the presidential election than winning a majority in the Legislative 
Yuan” (ibid.: 333).   
 Ultimately, all the constitutional reforms proposed by the NAC had to be adopted 
by a three-fourths vote of the National Assembly to take effect.  The retirement of all 
senior parliamentarians and the election of a new National Assembly composed mostly of 
native Taiwanese strengthened Lee’s hand vis-à-vis the Non-Mainstream faction, but 
even so, opposition to direct election from conservatives remained strong enough that the 
issue was postponed several times, as was any change in the powers of the president and 
premier. 72  Finally, in mid-1994, with many conservatives having joined the New Party, 
public opinion clearly in favor of direct election of the president, and the DPP threatening 
to campaign on the issue, the reform passed the National Assembly (ibid.: 364-66).  
Taiwan was set to directly elect its chief executive for the first time in history.   
 
 The 1996 Presidential Election 
 The 1996 election actually worked out quite favorably for the KMT.  Lee Teng-
hui remained relatively popular and well-placed to win the election.  The DPP entered the 
                                                
72 A detailed if rather facile discussion of the debate over adopting direct election of the president can be 
found as well in Chao and Myers (1998: 242-264). 
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1996 race unusually divided over the issue of Taiwanese independence, and it 
experienced considerable intra-party turmoil before nominating Peng Ming-min, a 
fervently pro-independence candidate with a reputation as a radical.  On the right, 
conservative former KMT member Lin Yang-kang chose former premier Hau Pei-tsun as 
his running mate and ran on a strong pro-China platform.  Thus, neither of the two major 
party alternatives to the KMT put forth centrist tickets.  Lee’s campaign was aided further 
by the actions of the PRC, which conducted war games off the coast of Taiwan and 
warned Taiwanese voters to make “the right choice” by supporting the Lin-Hau ticket.  In 
the end, this belligerence backfired, and Lee ended up winning about 54 percent of the 
popular vote, an improvement over the KMT’s vote share in the 1995 legislative election.  
His nearest opponent, Peng, won only 21.1 percent, the DPP’s worst performance in the 
post-martial-law era (Copper 1998: 93-134).      
 
 The 2000 Presidential Election  
 Consistent with my argument that presidential contests are higher variance, the 
second direct presidential election in Taiwan played out much differently than the first.  It 
is instructive to examine more closely why the KMT ticket did so much more poorly this 
time around for what it can tell us about the problematic nature of presidential races for 
advantaged parties.73  Four factors common to presidential regimes hurt the KMT in this 
election. 
                                                
73 Thorough overviews of this election can be found in Diamond (2001) and Copper (2005). 
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 First, Lee Teng-hui was term-limited out of office and agreed to respect that limit.  
His retirement opened up a battle within the KMT over succession at a time when it was 
especially vulnerable: during the run-up to the presidential election.  If there had been no 
term limits and Lee had stayed on, or if Lee had resigned midway through his term and 
handed over to the vice president Lien Chan, then the issue of succession would not have 
become linked to the election, and the KMT would have been less likely to split.     
 Second, the KMT’s nomination procedure for the presidency effectively gave Lee 
the authority to choose his own successor.  As a consequence, Lee’s preference for Lien 
Chan over James Soon effectively won out.  Soong appeared to be the stronger general 
election candidate, judging by public opinion polls at the time; he had also won the 
Taiwan Provincial Governor’s race in 1994 and had proved to be popular in that office.  
The political base that position gave Soong, however, made him a more formidable 
threat, and Lee eventually forced through a constitutional reform in 1997 that 
downgraded the Taiwan Provincial government over Soong’s objections.  Thus, in the 
run-up to the 2000 election, Lee was strongly opposed to Soong’s nomination and used 
his influence to place vice president Lien Chan at the top of the ticket instead.  As a 
consequence, the KMT entered the 2000 election cycle with a major internal feud 
brewing between Soong’s and Lee’s supporters.   
 Third, because Soong was well-known in Taiwanese politics and had a long track 
record of running in and winning elections on the island, his prospects as an independent 
candidate appeared quite good.  Thus, the presidential election provided Soong with an 
excellent opportunity to convert his personal popularity into control of the executive, 
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despite being denied the KMT’s official nomination.  Thus, in November 1999, four 
months before the election, he announced his candidacy.   
 Finally, for its part, the DPP nominated arguably the strongest candidate it could 
have in Chen Shui-bian (cf. Solinger 2001).  Chen was well-known on the island for his 
stint as Taipei mayor.  During his time in that position he had managed to dispel some of 
the DPP’s reputation for radicalism on the independence-unification issue by focusing on 
the more mundane task of governing a city; when he left office, his approval rating was 
over 70 percent.  Chen also had the advantage of a wide geographic appeal; although he 
had served as Taipei mayor, he had previously run in Chiayi City in southern Taiwan, 
and he was originally from Tainan County.  Chen’s long history as part of the Dangwai 
and as a key member of the DPP also helped him to tamp down ideological divisions 
within the party, and he entered the campaign at the head of an enthusiastic and unified 
DPP; the contrast with the party’s previous presidential campaign in 1996 was stark.   
 Taken together, these outcomes drastically reduced the importance of all of the 
KMT’s structural advantages in the party system.  Its lead in partisanship was blunted by 
the presence of two KMT candidates running against one another, and by a DPP 
candidate able to appeal to the broad middle of the electorate on the strength of his 
personal qualities.  The KMT’s superior spatial position was undercut by the increasingly 
personalized nature of the race, with both Soong and Lien taking similar positions on the 
national question and Chen also moving toward the center.  And the party’s coordination 
advantage was all-but-destroyed by the winner-take-all nature of the presidential contest, 
much as it had been in the local executive races in 1997.  As a consequence, the KMT 
lost the presidency to the DPP despite retaining a formidable electoral machine, a strong 
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record of economic management, and a centrist position on the most salient issue in 
Taiwanese politics.   
 
 The Counterfactual: Taiwan as a Parliamentary Regime? 
 I have argued that Taiwan’s presidential system played a key role in the KMT’s 
defeat in the 2000 election, which sets up a counterfactual: that it would not have lost had 
Taiwan been parliamentary.  Obviously, we cannot rerun history to see whether this is 
true.  But as a second-best strategy, we can look at which parties won the legislative 
elections held before and after the 2000 race to gain some sense of how the KMT would 
have fared if the legislature had selected the chief executive. 
 In the 1998 legislative election, the last held before the KMT’s defeat, the voters 
returned a solid KMT majority of 54.7 percent of the seats.  Thus, under a parliamentary 
system the prime minister would undoubtedly have been a KMT member.  More 
revealing is the result of the 2001 legislative election, held 18 months after Chen Shui-
bian took office.  This election was the first held under a non-KMT president, denying 
that party for the first time the access to much of the largess of the state that it had 
previously relied to on win legislative races.  Moreover, shortly after the 2000 election, 
the KMT went through a leadership crisis and fractured into three pieces.  James Soong 
built on his strong showing by founding the PFP and taking roughly 20 percent of the 
KMT’s sitting legislators with him.  Lee Teng-hui was confronted with hostile 
demonstrations by KMT partisans the day after the election, and forced to give up his 
party chairmanship.  After his term as president ended, he, too, founded a new political 
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party, the TSU, taking with him another handful of KMT legislators.  Rather than two 
major parties in the legislature, Taiwan now had four.   
 By the time the 2001 election rolled around, this new constellation of parties had 
formed into two loose alliances.  In the local parlance, the DPP and TSU made up the 
“pan-Green” (fanlu i) camp, while the KMT and PFP along with the now marginal 
NP made up the “pan-Blue” (fanlan ) camp.  As a consequence, the 2001 race took 
on the form of a straight-up ideological clash between the main parties on either side of 
the independence-unification divide.   
 Expectations for the DPP were especially high: it had broken the KMT’s hold on 
the central government and had greatly weakened its patronage machine.  Many in the 
party elite thought that, with the KMT seriously damaged and with Chen Shui-bian 
reasonably popular, they could win an outright majority, or at least enough for the pan-
Green camp together to control the legislature.  Yet the KMT and PFP together retained a 
majority.  Had Taiwan been a parliamentary system in 2001, the most likely outcome is 
that the KMT would have retained control of the prime minister’s office as the largest 
party in the majority coalition, and the DPP-TSU alliance would have remained shut out 
of the cabinet.   
 Thus, these two election outcomes provide further support for the argument that 
the adoption of direct election of the president was a crucial factor in the KMT’s defeat.   
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 6.7. Conclusion 
 I had two objectives in this chapter.  The first was to show my theory in action.  I 
focused on a specific case of advantaged ruling party defeat, showing how changes in 
party system asymmetry interacted with a presidential regime type to reduce the survival 
prospects of the KMT.  The second was to account for an apparent paradox in Taiwan’s 
transition to democracy: the party that initiated the multi-party era and maintained a clear 
electoral advantage over its opponents was not able to convert that advantage into long-
term rule.  By describing how the KMT’s advantages were less relevant in the direct 
election of the president than in legislative races, I have shown that the ruling party’s 
defeat was more likely than existing theories of dominant party systems would have us 
believe. 
 This case study has relevance for at least two audiences: those interested in 
Taiwan’s transition to a competitive, multi-party democracy, and those concerned more 
generally with the persistence and breakdown of dominant party systems.  For the first 
audience, the argument I have presented in this chapter indicates that Taiwan’s political 
transformation can be understood in much broader, more comparative terms than it often 
is.  The main feature that sets Taiwan apart is the rapid emergence of an identity cleavage 
that provided a potent source of fuel for the main opposition party’s development.  Most 
other new ECRs with an advantaged incumbent do not have an issue lying dormant, 
waiting to be exploited by the opposition.  Nevertheless, despite the KMT’s initial 
struggles to adapt to a party system realigned around the national question, it emerged 
exceptionally well-positioned to retain the executive.  
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 Of the post-mortems written on the KMT’s electoral defeat in 2000, then, most 
discount the fundamental strengths that the party retained over its competitors, including 
its larger number of partisan supporters, its centrist position, and its structural advantage 
in legislative elections  (e.g. Diamond 2001; Solinger 2001; Greene 2007: 261-268).  In 
my view, this has led most observers to overlook the single biggest factor in the party’s 
defeat: presidentialism.  Instead, Taiwanese scholars looking for institutional 
explanations have paid a great deal of attention to the legislative electoral system—an 
institution that had no direct relevance to the 2000 election!  If I can hammer home only 
one point to this audience, it is that direct election of the president, not the SNTV 
electoral system, was the institutional feature that made the KMT’s defeat probable—if 
not in 2000, then in the subsequent electoral cycle or two.   
 This case study of Taiwan has relevance as well for the second audience of 
comparative scholars interested in dominant party persistence and breakdown.  If nothing 
else, the Taiwan case demonstrates that resource advantages are not the end-all be-all 
source of ruling party survival.  Those advantages are meaningful—indeed, quite 
important—to dominant party persistence in elected office.  But they are highly 
conditional on the institutional environment of the regime: presidentialism makes long-
lived one party rule less likely.  Thus, we risk badly misinterpreting what led to defeat in 
the many presidential regimes that have featured advantaged ruling parties.  This set 
includes not only Taiwan, but Mexico, South Korea, and Paraguay as well, to name three 
among many others.  And it suggests that advantaged first incumbents in ECRs such as 
Namibia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Russia are much more susceptible to defeat than 
they appear because they hold regular, direct presidential elections.  The converse is also 
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true: the ruling parties in Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana, South Africa, and Cambodia 
are better positioned to convert their advantages in the party system into continued 
executive control, because they hold power in parliamentary regimes.  
 Finally, the Taiwan case study illustrates how party system asymmetry can evolve 
in rather complicated ways, as declines in one kind of asymmetry—typically coordination 
or partisanship—may be offset by increases in another—typically spatial positioning.  
Thus, the link between causes of asymmetry and ruling party survival is not 
straightforward even when we take institutional effects into account.  Future comparative 
work on this topic would be well-served to consider how the different mechanisms of 
asymmetry interact with one another to drive party system change. 
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CHAPTER 7      
CONCLUSION: WHITHER DOMINANCE? 
 
 
 7.1. Contributions of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation makes three broad contributions to the study of dominant party 
systems.  The first is conceptual.  As I reviewed at length in the first chapter, the concept 
of “dominance” in political science has been used in a variety of competing and often 
contradictory ways.  Such conceptual incoherence has hampered our understanding of the 
underlying political processes of interest and made more difficult the evaluation of 
existing theories of dominant party systems with empirical evidence.  In this study I 
focused on two of the most common ways dominant parties are characterized—as parties 
that last in power a long time, and as parties that win elections by “a lot”—and showed 
how one is linked to the other.  The central organizing concept of party system asymmetry 
is, I hope, a useful extension and refinement of one key feature of dominance.       
 The second contribution is explanatory.  I argued for the importance of executive 
type—presidential versus parliamentary—to our understanding of long-lived ruling 
parties.  Most previous work has ignored this distinction; yet I demonstrated that the way 
the executive is selected has potentially very large consequences for the survival of 
incumbent parties, regardless of the other electoral advantages they might possess.  Thus, 
my institutional theory of ruling party survival provides a corrective to existing work by 
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Greene, Magaloni, Scheiner, and others, and it helps us better understand cases like the 
KMT in Taiwan that are inconsistent with resource-based theories of dominance.    
 The third contribution is empirical.  Most previous work on dominant party 
systems has suffered from a serious selection bias problem, as I detailed in Chapter 2.  In 
particular, if we want to understand ruling party longevity, then we need to employ a 
survival analysis framework.  That in turn requires defining an appropriate universe of 
cases—short-lived as well as long-lived parties—that permits us to make valid inferences 
about the determinants of ruling party persistence and defeat.  My work to identify this 
set of cases, along with my preliminary investigation of the determinants of ruling party 
longevity, I hope will point the way toward a more fruitful study of this aspect of 
“dominance.”    
 
 7.2. Remaining Questions and Directions for Future Research 
 As with most dissertations, this one ends with as many questions as it resolved.  
There were several hypotheses I was unable to test systematically because of a paucity of 
suitable data.  My investigation of the sources of what I termed “first-mover advantage,” 
for instance, was based on a rather cursory qualitative review of many cases, rather than a 
set of firm measures of the variables of interest.  I also was unable to locate or gather data 
that would allow me to test whether direct elections to local offices played a role in ruling 
party defeat, or to evaluate more directly whether resource advantages contribute to 
survival.  The collection of additional data to test these implications of the theory remains 
for future work. 
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 In addition, there remains a great deal of refinement and improvement that could 
be done to the measures of party system asymmetry I employed in the analysis.  I began 
this project focused primarily on duration in office as the key outcome of interest; but as 
the study developed, the usefulness of party system asymmetry as an organizing concept 
gradually became apparent.  The multiple ways I have attempted to measure variation in 
asymmetry—control of all branches of government, vote margin, and seat margin—are a 
reflection of this.  Future iterations of this project will need to tackle head-on the 
challenge of measuring systematic differences in parties’ likelihood of winning the 
executive.    
 Finally, there are a number of outgrowths of this project that could potentially 
bear intellectual fruit.   In particular, one topic that remained deliberately walled off from 
consideration is regime change itself: why, for instance, do some autocrats adopt 
elections?  And with what consequences for the patterns of contestation that follow?  The 
finding in Chapter 2 that the starting conditions of electorally-contested regimes have 
potentially long-lasting consequences points to the importance of understanding these 
transitions in the first place.  The work in this dissertation has barely scratched the 
surface of that question.  
 I leave these issues for future work. 
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 APPENDICES      
 
Appendix A.  Sample Selection Coding Rules 
 
Sample Selection Criteria, w/ Coding Rules and Examples:  Country-regimes 
included in the dataset must meet the following criteria. 
 
Criterion 1 - Elections: Elections consistently determine who wields executive power. 
   
1. The following types of cases are ruled out in toto by this criterion: 
a. Military regimes, e.g. Myanmar at present, Argentina under the military 
junta of 1976-1983 
b. Theocracies or absolute monarchies, e.g. the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Bhutan; Saudi Arabia 
c. Other regimes where executive power is awarded based on a non-elective 
process, e.g. Communist regimes such as Vietnam, China, Eastern Europe 
pre-1989; regimes installed by foreign intervention such as Iraq 2003-
2009.  
2. The election outcome determines control of central government executive power, 
not legislative.   
a. In presidential regimes, the party of the president is coded as the single 
executive party 
b. In parliamentary regimes, the party of the prime minister is coded as the 
single executive party 
c. In semi-presidential regimes, executive power is determined by the 
following: 
i. If the prime minister is appointed and can be removed by the 
president without parliamentary approval, then the key executive 
is the president.  The incumbent party is the president’s party. 
ii. If the prime minister’s appointment and removal requires 
parliamentary approval, then cannot be removed by the president), 
then the key executive is the prime minister.  The incumbent party 
is the prime minister’s party. 
iii. Divided government rule: when they occur, periods when the 
presidency and parliament are controlled by different parties 
(“cohabitation”) are used to determine whether the parliament or 
the president is the ultimate principal to whom the prime minister 
is responsible.  
3. Indirect elections for executive power count if the following hold; otherwise, the 
regime is excluded: 
a. For parliamentary regimes, if the members of the parliament are directly 
elected 
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b. For presidential regimes, if the members of the electoral college are 
directly elected 
 
 
Criterion 2 - Contestation: Elections must be contested. 
1. Opposition (i.e. non-incumbent or incumbent-friendly) parties must be allowed to 
field candidates, and these candidates must gain a “meaningful” percentage of the 
vote.   
2. A contest was treated as uncontested if the incumbent party or candidate received 
>90% of the vote.   
a. Coded using descriptions of elections and election results from elections 
handbooks edited by Dieter Nohlen.  These were: 
i.  Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (ed. Nohlen et al. 1999),  
ii. Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook (ed. Nohlen et 
al. 2001), 
iii. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook (ed. Nohlen 2005), 
and 
iv. Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook (ed. Nohlen et al. 2010). 
b. Cross-checked against the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC) variable (1975-
2006):  
i. EIEC scores the vote share of the winning candidate, with the 
following ranking: 
1. 5 = multiple parties, only one party wins seats (parl.) or 
votes (pres.) 
2. 6 = multiple parties win seats (votes) but one wins at least 
75% 
3. 7 = multiple parties win seats (votes) and largest party wins 
less than 75%  
ii. Contestation requires a score of 6 or 7. 
c. Cross-checked against the POLITY IV PARCOMP variable:   
i. PARCOMP gives the competitiveness of political participation, 
with the following ranking: 
1. 1=repressed, no opposition activity allowed outside ruling 
party 
2. 2=suppressed, some opposition but sharply limited by 
government 
3. 3=factional, parochial or ethnic-based factions 
4. 4=transitional, any transitional arrangements from 1,2,3 to 
5 or vise versa 
5. 5=competitive, regular, institutionalized competition with 
alternative of power 
ii. Contestation requires a score of 2 or greater. 
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3. In country-regimes in which descriptions were inconsistent with DPI and 
POLITY IV scores, decisions about contestation were made based on country-
specific sources.  In several instances, these sources led me to adjust the period of 
contestation or to exclude the regime altogether.   
 
 
Criterion 3 – Institutionalization: Elections not only determine who controls power but 
also are held regularly and are uninterrupted by non-institutionalized changes of power 
 
1. Two-election rule: at least two consecutive, contested executive elections must 
be held, and the term between them uninterrupted by successful non-
institutionalized leadership turnover, for the country-regime to be included in the 
sample.  These elections must occur after 1950. 
2. Independence rule: the two consecutive elections must occur after the country 
has gained independence or reacquired full sovereignty.   
a. Regimes which ban opposition parties after holding the first post-
independence elections are excluded, e.g. Chad, Ivory Coast, Senegal, 
Tanzania 
b. States which are in “free association” with another state are treated as 
independent from the month they assume that status, e.g. Cook Islands, 
Marshall Islands.   
c. Colonies which are highly autonomous but not formally independent are 
not included until they achieve full independence, e.g. Bahamas internal 
self-government granted in 1969, independence granted July 1973, regime 
coded as beginning July 1973. 
d. Ruling parties in states which have been occupied by foreign powers are 
not included until full sovereignty is restored through formal treaty, or the 
occupying power is defeated and a new election is held, e.g. Austria 
beginning July 1955; Japan beginning April 1952; Norway beginning 
October 1945; Luxembourg beginning October 1945. 
e. Ruling parties in states which were officially neutral during WWII are 
included, e.g. SAP in Sweden 1936-1976, FBP in Liechtenstein 1928-
1970. 
f. Ruling parties in the former Soviet republics are counted beginning with 
formal recognition of independence—the Baltic states: September 1991; 
others: December 1991. 
3. Five year rule: the period of consecutive, contested elections must span at least 
five full years for the country-regime to be included in the sample, e.g. Somalia 
1960-1969 is included, Nigeria 1979-1983 is excluded 
4. Coup d’Etat rule: coups are an indication that elections are not the main route to 
power.   
a. The period prior to the coup is included in the sample only if the case 
satisfies the two-election rule, the independence rule, and the five year 
rule 
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b. A coup that occurs after at least two consecutive contested elections is 
treated as the end of the regime; the observation is censored in the month 
of the coup, not recorded as a ruling party “death”. 
c. Unsuccessful coups are not coded.  An “unsuccessful” coup is one in 
which the incumbent executive returns to power within a month of the 
coup attempt, e.g. Chavez in Venezuela April 2002 
d. A non-military suspension of multi-party contestation that occurs after two 
consecutive elections, such as a declaration of martial law or proclamation 
of a one-party state, is treated like a coup, i.e. the observation is censored. 
e. A declaration of martial law or suspension of constitutional procedures is 
not coded as a coup if followed within five years by a contested election.  
Examples: 
i. India 1975-1977: Indira Gandhi declares State of Emergency in 
June 1975, suspends civil liberties, eventually calls elections for 
March 1977; coded as no regime change. 
ii. Malaysia 1969-1972: election held May 1969, leads to ethnic 
rioting, UMNO declares national emergency and suspends 
parliament, National Operations Council governs country until 
September 1970, contested parliamentary elections held September 
1974; coded as no regime change. 
iii. Mauritius 1971-1976: state of emergency declared December 1971 
in response to MMM-led strikes, 1972 elections unilaterally 
postponed, parliamentary elections finally held December 1976, 
MMM allowed to contest; coded as no regime change.  
f. Coded based on data from Nohlen handbooks, cross-checked against the 
CSP Coup d’Etat Database. 
5. Popular protest rule: popular protests that lead to a change in ruling party are 
treated differently depending on whether they occurred in response to an election. 
a. If an election campaign or result, such as oppression of the opposition or 
ruling party attempts at electoral fraud, was the main immediate cause of a 
popular uprising, the result is coded as follows: 
i. An incumbent’s loss of power due to a popular, election-related 
uprising is coded as ruling party “death” in the month the ruler 
leaves office. 
ii. Popular protests that do not result in the incumbent leaving office 
are coded as no turnover. 
b. If an election was not the main cause of a popular protest that led to a 
change of the ruling party, the event is coded as follows: 
i. If the change in ruling party occurred through constitutionally-
prescribed means, such as resignation and replacement by a 
constitutionally-designated successor, then the event is a ruling 
party “death.” 
ii. If the change did not occur through constitutionally-prescribed 
means (e.g. military intervention to install a new civilian leader, 
popular rebellion, rebel victory, etc.), then the event is treated like 
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a coup—the observation is censored rather than a ruling party 
“death”.   
 
 
Coding for the Dependent Variable - Ruling Party Duration in Power: The sample 
includes all ruling parties in electorally-contested country-regimes over the time period 
January 1950 to December 2006.  Duration in power is measured in months.   
 
1. Birth observation: The ruling party “birth”—the first period in the duration 
count—occurs in the month the party takes office, not the month the party is 
elected to office. 
2. Death observation: The ruling party “death”—the last period in the duration 
count—occurs in the month the party leaves office 
3. Right-censored observations rule: Duration counts that end with either a coup 
or the end of the observation period are treated as right-censored.  That is, the 
ruling party remained in power during the last observed period, and subsequent 
periods are unobserved.  A coup is not counted as a ruling party “death.” 
4. Left-censored observations rules: Duration counts for incumbent party rule that 
begins before the first observation in the dataset (i.e. truncated observations) are 
treated as follows: 
a. Competitive regimes rule (Democracies and electoral autocracies only): 
If the ruling party took office before January 1950, observations on all 
variables for the month the party took office are recorded and included in 
the dataset, and the duration count and regime period is adjusted 
accordingly. 
i. E.g. in the U.S., the Democratic Party is the ruling party in January 
1950, enters office March 1933, so the duration count is adjusted 
so that March 1933 is month 1, January 1950 is month 301 of 
ruling party duration. 
ii. Note that regime periods are also adjusted: the U.S. regime is 
included in the sample from March 1933 to December 2006, not 
January 1950.   
b. Non-competitive regimes (“at risk”) rule: If the ruling party took office 
before the first contested election, as determined above by the 
Contestation Criterion, then ruling party duration in power is counted two 
ways:  
i. duration: This variable records when the incumbent party becomes 
at risk for “death,” beginning with the month the first contested 
elections for the executive are held.   
ii. duration2: This variable records total duration from the month the 
party took office. 
iii. If the party was founded by a non-elected incumbent, such as a 
military leader, the duration2 count begins the month that leader 
took office, not the month the party was officially founded.  As 
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before, the incumbent is at risk of defeat beginning in the month 
the first contested elections are held. 
c. Independence rule: If the party was in power before the country achieved 
independence, ruling party duration in power is counted from the month of 
independence. 
i. E.g. in the Bahamas, the PLP took power in 1967, won reelection 
in 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987, was defeated in August 1992.  PLP 
ruling party duration count begins with Bahamas’s independence, 
July 1973, ends August 1992. 
5. Name rule: Incumbent parties frequently are renamed.  Name changes are not 
coded as a change of ruling party if the following are true: 
a. The leaders, organization, and supporters of the new party are 
substantially the same as the old 
b. If the name change is due to a merger or split, the incumbent leader 
remains the same 
c. Coded using the Nohlen handbooks, supplemented by handbooks of 
political parties: 
i. World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties (ed. George 
Delury and Deborah Kaple, 1999). 
6. Caretaker government (“six month”) rule: In some regimes, caretaker (non-
partisan) governments often assume power between a government’s resignation 
and the next election.  These are treated as follows: 
a. If the caretaker government lasts less than six full months, then it is 
considered an extension of the previous government, regardless of what 
party replaces it.  No turnover of power is recorded until a new PM from a 
different party assumes office.  If the same party wins the subsequent 
elections, no turnover occurs despite the interim caretaker period. 
i. E.g. In Bangladesh after 1996, all elections held only after the 
(partisan) government resigns and hands over power to a non-
partisan cabinet led by the chief justice.  So the ruling BNP’s 
duration is coded as ending in June 1996, when the election winner 
BAL replaced the non-partisan caretaker government, rather than 
in March 1996, when the BNP resigned and handed over power. 
b. If the caretaker government lasts more than six full months, then it is 
considered an independent government in its own right, and a turnover of 
power is recorded for the month the “caretaker” PM takes office, and 
again when a new partisan PM replaces the caretaker government. 
i. E.g. in Finland the partisan PM resigned and handed power to a 
non-partisan PM in Dec. 1963; new elections not held and n/p PM 
not replaced until Sept. 1964, so both Dec. 1963 and Sept. 1964 are 
coded as a change of party. 
c. “Caretaker” and non-partisan presidents in presidential regimes are coded 
using the same rule 
 
 
 302 
Definition of a Dominant Party: For a ruling party to be included in the set of dominant 
parties, the following conditions must hold: 
 
1. 20-Year Rule: The ruling party has controlled the executive for an unbroken 
period of at least 20 years 
a. In a parliamentary regime, the PM has come from the same party 
b. In a presidential regime, the president has come from the same party 
2. Contested Election Rule: The ruling party has been at risk of electoral defeat for 
at least 20 consecutive years  
a. If the ruling party has not yet been defeated, it has been at risk of defeat in 
regularly scheduled elections for at least the previous 20 years  
b. If the ruling party has lost power due to an electoral defeat, it held power 
at risk of defeat for at least the preceding 20 years 
3. Party Rule: The chief executive must have turned over at least once during the 
ruling party’s duration in power.  Otherwise, the ruler is coded as a “personalist 
incumbent” 
 
 
Definition of a First Mover: An incumbent executive is a first mover if it is the first to 
hold office in a newly-established electorally contested regime: 
 
1. Independence rule: in formerly non-sovereign states, the first mover is the party 
that holds the chief executive office in the month the state becomes independent 
a. E.g. Russia, independence from USSR finalized Dec. 1991, Yeltsin is 
incumbent president, so Yeltsin is first mover.  
2. First contested election rule: in formerly closed or unstable autocracies, the 
party that wins the first fully-contested election for the executive is coded as the 
first mover  
a. If the incumbent contests and wins the first election, the previous 
incumbent is the first mover.  The duration count begins with the month of 
the election 
i. E.g. Taiwan, first direct election of president occurs March 1996, 
KMT president Lee Teng-hui re-elected, KMT is the first mover, 
duration count begins March 1996  
b. If the incumbent contests but loses the first election, the opposition winner 
is the first mover.  The duration count begins with the month the 
opposition winner is seated. 
i. E.g. Zambia, first direct election of president occurs October 1991, 
incumbent president Kaunda of UNIP loses election, opposition 
winner Chiluba of MMD seated Nov. 1991, MMD is the first 
mover, duration count begins then 
c. If the incumbent does not run, the first election is an open-seat contest.  
The winner of the first election is the first mover.  The duration count 
begins with the month the winner is seated. 
i. E.g. Argentina, direct election of president occurs October 1983, 
military does not contest, winner Alfonsin of UCR seated 
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December 1983, UCR is the first mover, duration count begins 
then 
 
 
Definition of an Advantaged First-Mover Party: A first-mover party is “advantaged” 
if it has full control of the institutions of the central government when the regime begins.   
 
A party has “full control” if the following conditions hold: 
1. Chief executive rule: A member of the party holds the chief executive office. 
a. In presidential regimes, the president is a member of the party 
i. The candidate’s vote share in the presidential election does not 
matter, only that he/she was seated in the office 
b. In parliamentary regimes, the prime minister is a member of the party 
c. In semi-presidential regimes, both the prime minister and the (directly-
elected) president are members of the same party 
2. Legislature rule: The party that controls the chief executive office must also 
have a majority of seats in the legislature. 
a. In unicameral or weak bicameral legislatures, the party controls at least 
50% of the seats in the lower house 
b. In strong bicameral legislatures, the party controls at least 50% of the 
seats in both houses 
c. Multi-party coalitions are coded as single-party majorities only if there is 
a pre-electoral pact between parties and this coalition wins a majority of 
seats 
3. First election rule: The party must secure or retain control of the chief executive 
and legislature in the first election of the regime. 
a. Parties that preside over independence but lose the first election are not 
advantaged, e.g. PUP incumbent party in Belize at independence, 
September 1981, loses first post-independence election in December 1984, 
replaced by opposition UDP.  PUP coded as non-advantaged first mover. 
b. See First Mover definition for first election coding rule. 
 
 
Miscellaneous Notes:  
1. Four regimes were excluded because of power-sharing or party-rotation 
requirements in the executive: Lebanon, Switzerland, Uruguay (1952-1967), 
Colombia (1958-1974). 
2. Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, and Gambia all changed executive selection from 
parliamentary to presidential.  Because this is a critical distinction in the analysis, 
these are treated as changes of regime, i.e. Zimbabwe is coded as two separate 
regimes, one from April 1980-December 1987, and one from December 1987-
present. 
3. The start month in electorally-contested regime is coded differently depending on 
whether the incumbent wins or loses the first election.  Ideally, the official 
beginning of the new executive term would be counted as the first month in office 
for both new and continuing incumbents.  However, because data on the 
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beginning of new incumbent terms were lacking for most continuing incumbents, 
the month the first election is held is coded as the start month of the electorally-
contested regime when the incumbent wins the first election.   
 
An Example: The Philippines. 
• Gained independence July 4, 1946.   
• Roxas of the Liberal Party elected first president in April 1946, prior to 
independence 
• Roxas dies in office, April 15, 1948, succeeded by vice president Quirino, of the 
Liberal Party.   
• Quirino re-elected 1949, in office until 1953, defeated by Magsaysay of the 
Nacionalista Party, left office in December.   
o Enters dataset July 1946, because incumbent party as of January 1950 
took office then 
o Coded as change in ruling party, December 1953 
o Regime satisfies two election rule, December 1953 
o Regime satisfies independence rule, December 1953 
o Roxas holds presidency at independence, so Liberal Party is a First 
Mover 
o In 1946, Liberal Party holds 49 of 98 seats in House, or 50%, and 9 of 
16 seats in the Senate, or 56.25%.  So Liberal Party is an Advantaged 
First-Mover Party. 
o Total Liberal Party duration: July 1946 to December 1953 = 89 
months 
• Magsaysay in office until March 1957, killed in plane crash.  Succeeded by 
Garcia, also of the Nacionalista Party.   
o Coded as no change in ruling party 
o Regime satisfies five year rule, January 1955 
• Garcia re-elected in 1957, serves until defeated in Nov. 1961, leaves office in 
December 1961, succeeded by Macapagal of the Liberal Party. 
o Coded as change in ruling party, December 1961 
• Macapagal defeated for reelection in Nov. 1965, leaves office in December.  
Succeeded by Marcos of the Nacionalista Party. 
o Coded as change in ruling party, December 1965 
• Marcos reelected in 1969. 
• Marcos declares martial law in September 1972.  No direct election of the 
presidency until 1981. 
o Coded as regime change; observation of incumbent duration censored 
o September 1972 - January 1986 coded as non-competitive; 
observations not included in sample 
• Martial law lifted January 1981. 
• June 1981, Marcos re-elected president, inaugurated for another term.  Opposition 
boycotts. 
 305 
o Coded as non-competitive election; observations not included in 
sample 
• Nov. 1985, Marcos calls for early presidential election in Feb. 1986 
• Presidential election held in Feb. 1986, contested by opposition, highly 
competitive, results disputed 
• Feb. 15, Marcos declared winner, EDSA protests begin 
• Feb. 25, Marcos leaves country, Aquino of the UNIDO inaugurated as president 
o Coded as regime change, competitive regime beginning February 
1986 
o Aquino of UNIDO coded as First Mover in 2
nd
 Philippine electorally-
contested regime; duration count begins February 1986 
o Supporters of Aquino in legislative elections did not run under single 
party label, so seat totals unclear.  No obvious majority for president 
in House; coded as no first-mover advantage. 
• Aquino not eligible for re-election.  Ramos of the LE-NUCD elected in May 
1992, takes office in June 1992 
o Coded as change in ruling party, June 1992 
• Ramos not eligible for re-election.  Estrada of the LMP elected in May 1998, 
takes office in June 1998. 
o Coded as change in ruling party, June 1998 
• Estrada impeached, removed from office by ruling of the Supreme Court, January 
2001.  Succeeded by Arroyo of the LE-NUCD-UMDP. 
o Coded as a constitutionally-prescribed change in incumbent, January 
2001 
o Coded as change in ruling party, January 2001 
• Arroyo re-elected in competitive elections in May 2004, inaugurated for full term 
in June 2004.  Current incumbent. 
o Data series ends December 2006; coded as censored observation 
 
The entry for the Philippines in the dataset then appears as follows: 
 
Country Party # Start Month  End Month 
Duration 
at risk 
(m) 
Censored? 
(y=1) 
Philippines 
(I) 1 Jul-46 Dec-53 89 0 
 2 Dec-53 Dec-61 96 0 
 3 Dec-61 Dec-65 48 0 
 4 Dec-62 Sep-72 117 1 
Philippines 
(II) 1 Feb-86 Jun-92 76 
 
0 
 2 Jun-92 Jun-98 72 0 
 3 Jun-98 Jan-01 31 0 
 4 Jan-01 Dec-06 71 1 
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Appendix B.  Electorally Contested Regimes in the Sample 
Regime Regime Months  Regime Regime Months 
     
Albania Mar-91 to Dec-06  El Salvador Jun-84 to Dec-06 
Andorra  Dec-93 to Dec-06  Estonia Sep-91 to Dec-06 
Antigua and Barbuda  Nov-81 to Dec-06  Ethiopia May-95 to Dec-06 
Argentina  Dec-83 to Dec-06  Fiji Oct-70 to May-87 
Armenia  Dec-91 to Dec-06  Finland Mar-48 to Dec-06 
Australia Dec-49 to Dec-07  France (I) Oct-49 to Jan-59 
Austria Jul-55 to Dec-06  France (II) Jan-59 to Dec-06 
Azerbaijan Oct-98 to Dec-06  Gabon Dec-93 to Dec-06 
Bahamas Jul-73 to Dec-06  Gambia (I) Feb-65 to May-82 
Bangladesh Mar-91 to Dec-06  Gambia (II) May-82 to Jul-94 
Barbados Nov-66 to Dec-06  Gambia (II) Sep-96 to Dec-06 
Belarus Jul-94 to Dec-06  Georgia Oct-92 to Dec-06 
Belgium Aug-49 to Dec-06  Germany Sep-49 to Dec-06 
Belize Sep-81 to Dec-06  Ghana Nov-92 to Dec-06 
Benin Apr-91 to Dec-06  Greece (I) Jan-50 to Apr-67 
Bolivia (I)  Jun-56 to Nov-64  Greece (II) Nov-74 to Dec-06 
Bolivia (II) Aug-85 to Dec-06  Grenada  Dec-84 to Dec-06 
Botswana Sep-66 to Dec-06  Guatemala Jan-86 to Dec-06 
Brazil (I) Jan-51 to Mar-64  Guinea Dec-93 to Dec-06 
Brazil (II) Mar-85 to Dec-06  Guyana (I) May-66 to Oct-80 
Bulgaria Jun-90 to Dec-06  Guyana (II) Oct-92 to Dec-06 
Burkina Faso Nov-98 to Dec-06  Honduras Jan-82 to Dec-06 
Cambodia Jul-98 to Dec-06  Hungary May-90 to Dec-06 
Cameroon Oct-92 to Dec-06  Iceland Dec-49 to Dec-06 
Canada Oct-35 to Dec-06  India Aug-47 to Dec-06 
Cape Verde Jan-91 to Dec-06  Indonesia Oct-99 to Dec-06 
Chad  Jun-96 to Dec-06  Ireland Feb-48 to Dec-06 
Chile (I) Nov-46 to Sep-73  Israel May-48 to Dec-06 
Chile (II) Mar-90 to Dec-06  Italy Dec-45 to Dec-06 
Colombia Aug-74 to Dec-06  Ivory Coast Oct-90 to Dec-99 
Comoros Apr-02 to Dec-06  Jamaica Aug-62 to Dec-06 
Cook Islands Aug-65 to Dec-06  Japan Apr-52 to Dec-06 
Costa Rica Jul-53 to Dec-06  Kenya Dec-92 to Dec-06 
Croatia Jun-91 to Dec-06  Kiribati Jul-79 to Dec-06 
Cyprus (I) Aug-60 to Jul-74  Korea, S. (I) Aug-48 to May-61 
Cyprus (II) Dec-74 to Dec-06  Korea, S. (II) Oct-63 to Oct-72 
Czech Republic Jan-93 to Dec-06  Korea, S. (III) Feb-88 to Dec-06 
Denmark Nov-47 to Dec-06  Kyrgyzstan Aug-91 to Dec-06 
Djibouti May-93 to Dec-06  Latvia Sep-91 to Dec-06 
Dominica Nov-78 to Dec-06  Lesotho Apr-93 to Dec-06 
Dominican Republic Jul-66 to Dec-06  Liechtenstein Jul-28 to Dec-06 
Ecuador (I) Sep-48 to Nov-61  Lithuania Sep-91 to Dec-06 
Ecuador (II) Aug-79 to Feb-97  Luxembourg Oct-45 to Dec-06 
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Macedonia Sep-91 to Dec-06  Spain  Jun-77 to Dec-06 
Madagascar Mar-93 to Feb-02  Sri Lanka (I) Feb-48 to Feb-78 
Malawi May-94 to Dec-06  Sri Lanka (II) Feb-78 to Dec-06 
Malaysia Aug-65 to Dec-06  Suriname Sep-91 to Dec-06 
Mali Jun-92 to Dec-06  Sweden Sep-36 to Dec-06 
Malta Sep-64 to Dec-06  Taiwan Mar-96 to Dec-06 
Marshall Islands Oct-86 to Dec-06  Tanzania Oct-95 to Dec-06 
Mauritius Mar-68 to Dec-06  Thailand Sep-92 to Sep-06 
Mexico Jul-46 to Dec-06  Trinidad and Tobago Aug-62 to Dec-06 
Micronesia Nov-86 to Dec-06  Turkey (I) Jul-46 to May-60 
Moldova Aug-91 to Dec-06  Turkey (II) Oct-87 to Dec-06 
Mongolia Jul-90 to Dec-06  Tuvalu Oct-78 to Dec-06 
Mozambique Oct-94 to Dec-06  Ukraine Dec-91 to Dec-06 
Myanmar Jan-48 to Mar-62  United Kingdom Jul-45 to Dec-06 
Namibia Mar-90 to Dec-06  United States Mar-33 to Dec-06 
Nauru Jan-68 to Dec-06  Uruguay Mar-85 to Dec-06 
Nepal May-91 to Oct-02  Vanuatu Jul-80 to Dec-06 
Netherlands Aug-48 to Dec-06  Venezuela Feb-59 to Dec-06 
New Zealand Dec-49 to Dec-06  Zambia Nov-91 to Dec-06 
Nicaragua Apr-90 to Dec-06  Zimbabwe (I) Apr-80 to Dec-87 
Niger Dec-99 to Dec-06  Zimbabwe (II) Dec-87 to Dec-06 
Nigeria May-99 to Dec-06    
Norway May-45 to Dec-06    
Pakistan Dec-88 to Oct-99    
Palau Oct-94 to Dec-06    
Panama Sep-94 to Dec-06    
Papua New Guinea Sep-75 to Dec-06    
Paraguay May-93 to Dec-06    
Peru Jul-80 to Dec-06    
Philippines (I) Jul-46 to Sep-72    
Philippines (II) Feb-86 to Dec-06    
Poland Dec-91 to Dec-06    
Portugal Jul-76 to Dec-06    
Romania May-90 to Dec-08    
Russia Dec-91 to Dec-06    
St Kitts and Nevis Sep-83 to Dec-06     
St Lucia Feb-79 to Dec-06    
St Vincent Oct-79 to Dec-06    
Samoa Jan-62 to Dec-06    
Sao Tome & Principe Feb-91 to Dec-06    
Senegal Feb-78 to Dec-06    
Seychelles Jul-93 to Dec-06    
Singapore Aug-65 to Dec-06    
Slovakia Jan-93 to Dec-06    
Slovenia Jun-91 to Dec-06    
Solomon Islands Jul-78 to Jun-00    
Somalia Jul-60 to Oct-69    
South Africa (I) Jun-48 to May-94    
South Africa (II) May-94 to Dec-06    
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Appendix C.  Survey Questions for Figures in Chapter 6 
 
 Many thanks to the Election Study Center at National Cheng Chi University for 
access to these survey questions and time series.  Data are from various years of the 
Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS).  More information can be found at 
the TEDS archive, at: http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/home.phtml 
 
 
Figure 6.3 
 The survey instrument for this measure reads: “In our society, some people 
consider themselves to be “Taiwanese.”  Others consider themselves to be “Chinese,” 
while still others consider themselves to be “both Taiwanese and Chinese.”  Do you 
consider yourself to be “Taiwanese,” “Chinese,” or “both”? 
 
The original Chinese text in the survey instrument is: 
gh%BMUB%Be,B%B+
*KMUBe,B%+
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Figure 6.4  
 The survey instrument for this measure reads: “Thinking about Taiwan’s relations 
with the mainland, consider the following differing positions: 
1. Immediate reunification 
2. Immediate declaration of independence 
3. Maintain the status quo, but move toward unification in the future 
4. Maintain the status quo, but move toward independence in the future 
5. Maintain the status quo but decide in the future about unification or independence 
6. Maintain the status quo indefinitely 
Which of these positions is closest to your own? 
 
The original Chinese text is: 
MU% ¡¢£L¤¥¦+
+
+
§¨©ª«MN¦¬­®¯°±+
+
²¨©ª«MN¦¬­®³´µ¶±+
+
·¨¸¹º»%¼½¾¿¯°±+
+
À¨¸¹º»%¼½¾¿µ¶±+
+
Á¨¸¹º»%¤ÂÃÄÅÆµ¶¯°±+
+
Ç¨ÈÉ¸¹º»*ÊËÌ¿Í°¢+
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Figure 6.7 
 The survey instrument for this measure reads, “At present in our country there are 
several important political parties, including the KMT, the DPP, the PFP, the NP, the 
TAIP, and the TSU.  Do you consider yourself close to any particular party?”   
 
If respondent answers no: “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political 
parties than the others?”   
 
If respondent answers yes: “Which party do you feel closest to?”   
 
If a party is named: “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very 
close?” 
 
The original Chinese text is: 
ÎÏ,Ð¡Ñ[ÒÓ.%ÔÕ,-.-6.Z-.Ö.T,.%¼×M
UVWXY%Ø«M¦Ù®Ì¿Ú°ÑÓ.+
+
Í#ÛÜ«M¦ÍÝÞÊËßÜ®%àáâÌ¿Ú°ÑÓ.+
 
Ú°ÑÓ.+
+
%Ì¿ãÑÓ.änåæ%çè%é°ê+
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